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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
A, Whether the judgment(s) is(are) invalid because of attorney 
disloyalty/ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Standard of Review. Attorney disloyalty/ineffective assistance of counsel is 
raised for the first time on appeal and therefore, there is no "standard of review" per se. 
However, "appellants bear the burden of proof." See, e.g. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76,417, 12 P.3d 92, 98. 
Preservation of Argument. Attorney disloyalty is a special type of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and may be raised for the first time on appeal so long as 
appellant is represented by different counsel than at trial. See, e.g., Litherland. 
B. Whether the judgment of Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity should be set 
aside for lack of any factual basis. 
Standard of Review. Whether the trial court complied with the requirements of 
entering a plea is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v. 
Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, [^10, 74 P.3d 1171, rev'don other grounds, 2005 UT 28, 
114P.3d569. 
Preservation of Argument. This issue arises out of attorney disloyalty/ineffective 
assistance of counsel and this Court will review an issue not properly preserved if the 
appealing party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances. The party 
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may also assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue. State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 114,121, fn2, 61 P.3d 1062. 
C. Whether the sentences are the product of attorney disloyalty/ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
Standard of Review. Attorney disloyalty/ineffective assistance of counsel is 
raised for the first time on appeal and therefore, there is no "standard of review" per se. 
However, "appellants bear the burden of proof." See, e.g. Litherland. 
Preservation of Argument. Attorney disloyalty is a special type of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and may be raised for the first time on appeal so long as 
appellant is represented by different counsel than at trial. See, e.g. Litherland. 
D. Whether the trial court erred in setting Defendant's sentence and degree 
reduction motion by failing to consider the evidence presented by Defendant 
regarding the iatrogenic (treatment caused) nature of his psychosis. 
Standard of Review. Review of sentencing decisions and conviction of a lesser 
degree are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Albiston, 2005 UT App 425. 
Preservation of Argument. This issue arises out of attorney disloyalty/ineffective 
assistance of counsel and this Court will review an issue not properly preserved if the 
appealing party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances. The party 
may also assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue. Hansen, 
fn.2. 
E. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to continue 
the sentencing hearing. 
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Standard of Review. Denial of a request for continuance is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, f 8, 116 P.3d 360. 
Preservation of Argument. This issue arises out of attorney disloyalty/ineffective 
assistance of counsel and this Court will review an issue not properly preserved if the 
appealing party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances. The party 
may also assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue. Hansen, 
fh2. 
F. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to enter 
conviction for a lower degree of offense. 
Standard of Review. Interpretation of the statute itself presents a question of law. 
State v. Shepler, 869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 1994). 
Preservation of Argument. This issue arises out of attorney disloyalty/ineffective 
assistance of counsel and this Court will review an issue not properly preserved if the 
appealing party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances. The party 
may also assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue. Hansen, 
fii2. 
G. Whether the confinement regime imposed here is unconstitutional as 
applied to him. 
Standard of Review. The constitutionality of the confinement regime as applied 
to LPG is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93, ^ |4, 100 
P.3d 1218. 
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Preservation of Argument. This issue arises out of attorney disloyalty/ineffective 
assistance of counsel and this Court will review an issue not properly preserved if the 
appealing party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances. The party 
may also assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue. Hansen, 
fn2. 
H. Whether the confinement regime imposed here is a violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 
Standard of Review. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App. 496, [^9. 
Preservation of Argument. This issue arises out of attorney disloyalty/ineffective 
assistance of counsel and this Court will review an issue not properly preserved if the 
appealing party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances. The party 
may also assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue. Hansen, 
121. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The text of relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations is 
contained in the Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition. 
On December 17, 2001, Defendant/Appellant, Leonard P. Gall (LPG) was 
charged with (1) Criminal Homicide, a First Degree Felony and (2) Theft, a Second 
Degree Felony. R6, Addl. LPG was initially represented by the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders, but there were a couple of representation changes, ending up with Mr. Steven 
R. McCaughey entering an appearance for LPG on March 4, 2003.l R295.2 On 
September 10, 2003, LPG entered pleas of (1) Guilty and Mentally 111 (GMI) to Criminal 
Homicide, Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, with dangerous weapons 
enhancement, (2) Guilty and Mentally 111 to Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and (3) Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) to Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony. 
R503-508, Add39-45. The court accepted the pleas and immediately thereafter 
conducted a hearing to determine whether LPG was currently mentally ill, found him to 
be, and committed him to the Utah State hospital for what "may be the rest of 
defendant's life." R608, 509-512, Add6-38, 46-51. 
1
 Suzanne Gustin, later entered an appearance as co-counsel for the sentencing phase. 
R522. 
2
 The designation "R" followed by a number is to the Record as numbered by the Clerk. 
The designation "Add" followed by a number is to the page number of the Addendum 
for this brief. There are numerous documents in the sealed record, all of which bear 
either record page "R588" (evaluations and victim impact statements), or "R589" 
(sentencing submissions). Where it is not otherwise obvious which document is referred 
to, the document will be identified in (parenthesis) and if the entire document is not 
referred to, specific page numbers. 
3
 An Amended Information conforming to this was also filed the same day. R497, 
Add3. 
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On April 23, 2004, LPG (but not his attorney) filed a motion for degree reduction, 
citing new information that the homicide was probably the result of the psychiatric 
drugs. R523, Add52. On April 26, 2004, LPG (but not his attorney) filed a letter 
regarding the disposition of the two GMI judgments, the ultimate aim being: 
if and when, but only if and when, I am found safe for a conditional release 
or discharge by the hospital and authorized by the Court, that such 
conditional release or discharge will be possible.4 
That same day, LPG wrote then counsel, Stephen McCaughey requesting he withdraw 
from representing him because he had lost confidence in him. R531, Add59. 
On April 27, 2004, Mr. McCaughey filed a withdrawal of counsel.5 R532, 
Add60. Nonetheless, at the May 3, 2004, Sentencing Hearing, LPG was represented by 
Mr. McCaughey as if he had not been terminated and withdrawn as counsel. R 609, 
Addl 16-124. LPG was sentenced to two consecutive terms of one to fifteen years on 
the second degree GMI judgments, with either a one to five or one to six years weapons 
enhancement.6 R609:7, Addl22. LPG was then committed to the Utah State hospital 
on the two GMI judgments. R538-9, Addl25-6. 
During this appeal, LPG filed an Appellate Rule 23B motion for a remand of the 
case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact necessary for the court's determination 
of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State opposed and filed a cross 
4R525-7,Add53-55. 
5
 Co-counsel, Suzanne Gustin moved to withdraw the following day, April 28, 2004. 
R535. 
6
 The Transcript states one to five years (R609:7, Add 122), while the Sentence Minutes 
states 1 to six years. R539, Addl26. 
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motion to dismiss the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the 
guilty pleas. This Court denied both motions. 
II. Statement of Facts 
LPG, was born December 3, 1976. R6, Addl. His parents divorced when he was 
six years old. R588 (Cohn 8/26/02, p3). LPG had a pretty normal childhood until age 
16, when he was prescribed Paxil for anxiety. R589, Add 91. He then started 
experiencing worse psychiatric symptoms leading to increasingly aggressive psychiatric 
treatments, including hospitalization and being electroshocked nine times. R589, Add 
91, R588(Cohn 8/26/02, p5, USH 2/13/04 Report). LPG made a number of suicide 
attempts. Id. Not recognized until 2004, it is highly probably the Paxil caused LPG's 
first psychotic symptoms, which because it was unrecognized, resulted in the escalating 
psychiatric treatments and resultant problems. R589 (Tracy Declaration), Add91. In 
spite of all this, LPG graduated from college, receiving a bachelor's degree in film 
studies. R589 (Tracy Declaration), Add 91, R588(Cohn 8/26/02, p5, USH 2/13/04 
Report). 
LPG was reported to be on and off his psychiatric medications over the years and 
the medications were changed from time to time. Id. Starting in early 2001, LPG 
reportedly began getting worse, which was attributed to him stopping his medication. 
R588(Cohn 8/26/02, p. 6). At that time, he was living with his mother, Susan Gall. 
R588(Cohn 8/26/02, p. 6). However, in September of 2001, Ms. Gall refused to let 
LPG continue living with her unless he took all his medication as prescribed and he 
moved in with a friend in Orem in late September of 2001. R588 (Cohn 8/26/02, p6). 
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Mrs. Gall continued to be very concerned and expressed this concern to mental health 
providers. Id. The mental health providers determined that LPG was not an imminent 
danger to self or others and was therefore not subject to involuntary commitment. Id. 
LPG stayed with his mother, Mrs. Gall, for five days over Thanksgiving, 2001, 
and on December 3, 2001, Mrs. Gall again wrote to a mental health professional that she 
was worried about LPG, which apparently was not received until December 10, 2001, 
when Mrs. Gall re-faxed it. R589. 
On December 14, 2001, LPG was visiting his mother at the family home and 
while psychotic and delusional, killed his mother with a hatchet. R6-7, Add 1-2. LPG 
then took his mother's car and attempted to commit suicide by ingesting a large number 
of pills. R588 (Cohn 8/26/02, p9). LPG vomited and being unsuccessful at committing 
suicide, drove to Reno Nevada, where he was apprehended by University of Nevada 
Reno police on the night of December 15 ~ early morning December 16, 2001. Id. 
LPG was transported to Utah and charged with Criminal Homicide, a First 
Degree Felony and Theft, a Second Degree Felony. R6-7, Addl-2. LPG was initially 
represented by the Salt Lake Legal Defenders, primarily Robert Heineman. R15. Mr. 
Heineman asserted diminished capacity,7 did not assert an NGRI defense under existing 
Utah law, but did challenge the constitutionality of Utah's mens rea limitation.8 R60 et 
seq. 
7R44. 
8
 Essentially seeking to overturn State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 199 5)(Herr era I) 
and State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854 (Utah 1999) (Herrera II). 
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LPG had a number of competency to stand trial determinations by psychologist 
Nancy Cohn and psychiatrist Mark Rindflesh, in which while not expressing any opinion 
regarding lack of the requisite mens rea due to mental illness, recited that LPG killed his 
mother to prevent her from being tortured to death. R588. 
There were a couple of substitutions of attorney, with Mr. Steven R. McCaughey 
ultimately becoming counsel on March 4, 2003. R295. Mr. McCaughey did assert the 
possibility of an NGRI defense,9 filed an amended plea to NGRI,10 and arranged for a 
psychiatric evaluation from Susan Mirow, Ph.D., M.D., who determined that LPG did 
not know his mother was human at the time of the homicide. R589 (Mirow). A 
subsequent joint evaluation by psychologist Cohn and psychiatrist Rindflesh did not 
dispute this opinion. R588 (Cohn 8/2/03, Rindflesh 8/4/03). 
Ultimately, LPG, upon the advice of then counsel McCaughey pled GMI to 
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, with dangerous weapons 
enhancement and Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and NGRI to Aggravated Burglary, a 
First Degree Felony.11 R503, R608, Add 6-47. Sentencing on the GMI judgments was 
initially set for March 15, 2004, but postponed until May 3, 2004. R515-6. 
In between, in February of 2004, it became public knowledge that certain 
psychiatric medications known as Selective Serotonin Re-uptake Inhibitor (SSRI) anti-
depressants cause some people to become both manic (including psychotic) and 
9
 R604:4. 
10R413. 
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violent. R523, Add52. LPG then obtained the services of Dr. Ann Blake Tracy, an 
expert on SSRI's to look into his case. R589, Add 61. Dr. Tracy concluded that LPG's 
psychiatric symptoms were most likely caused by his being prescribed the Paxil when he 
1 ^ 
was sixteen, which then precipitated an escalating series of symptoms and treatments, 
ultimately leading to the tragedy of December 14, 200L R589, Add91. LPG then 
obtained the services of Grace Jackson, M.D., a medical expert on psycho-
pharmacology, who concurred. R589, Add96. 
Then counsel McCaughey, however, did not take any steps to utilize this 
information on LPG's behalf and on April 23, 2004, LPG presented it in support of a 
motion to reduce the conviction to a lower degree under U.C.A. §76-3-402.14 R523, 
Add52. LPG also asked that the sentencing hearing scheduled for May 3, 2004, be 
delayed to "sort out what should be done" about the information regarding the likelihood 
it was "really the psychiatric medications that precipitated/caused [LPG] to commit 
[his]crime." Id. In the absence of any action by then counsel Mr. McCaughey on his 
behalf, LPG submitted a letter on April 26, 2004, regarding sentencing, with the ultimate 
goal being: 
(Continued footnote) 
11
 An Amended Information conforming to this was also filed the same day. [R497, 
Add3. 
12
 Paxil, the initial medication LPG was prescribed at age 16 is such an SSRI. 
13
 At that time, the Paxil was prescribed for relatively minor anxiety problems. R588 
(Tracy), Add91. 
14
 LPG mis-cited to "Rule 4-603." 
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if and when, but only if and when, I am found safe for a conditional release 
or discharge by the hospital and authorized by the Court, that such 
conditional release or discharge will be possible.15 
That same day, April 26, 2004, LPG terminated Mr. McCaughey's representation and 
requested that he withdraw from the case. R531, Add59. 
On April 27, 2004, Mr. McCaughey filed a withdrawal of counsel.16 R532, 
Add60. Nonetheless, at the May 3, 2004, Sentencing Hearing, LPG was represented by 
Mr. McCaughey as if he had not been terminated and withdrawn as counsel. R 609. 
During that hearing, neither Mr. McCaughey nor the judge made any mention of the 
termination of Mr. McCaughey as counsel and his filing a withdrawal. R609. Neither 
did the judge rule on LPGfs request to postpone the sentencing hearing. With respect to 
the motion to lower the degree of offense, Mr. McCaughey stated that in his judgment 
'Tiling such a motion would really be frivolous in light of the circumstances of this case. 
But in deference to [LPG] and his father, I would orally make that motion." R609:5, 
Addl20. The court thereupon denied the motion, saying only: 
This was a crime of extreme violence and a 402 reduction is simply out of 
the question in this case. 
R609-6,Addl21. 
nR525,Add53. 
16
 Co-counsel, Suzanne Gustin moved to withdraw the following day, April 28,2004. 
R535. 
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Without discussing the information LPG had presented regarding the iatrogenic 
nature of his psychiatric symptoms,17 the Court sentenced LPG to two consecutive terms 
of one to fifteen years on the second degree GMI judgments, with either a one to five or 
one to six years weapons enhancement. In doing so, the Court stated that it believed 
it was "almost everybody's" goal to ensure that Defendant/Appellant stayed at the Utah 
State hospital "for a long period of time," which presumably included Mr. McCaughey.19 
R609-8. LPG was then committed to the Utah State hospital on the two GMI 
judgments. R539, R609:122, Addl22, 126. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There were two fundamental legal deficiencies below, which generated a number 
of improper results. The first is the disloyalty of then counsel McCaughey, which 
invalidates all three judgments in this case without more. 
The second fundamental problem with the proceedings below revolves around the 
sentencing. Mr. McCaughey's objective of having LPG confined in the Utah State 
Hospital "for a long period of time" as phrased by the Court not only resulted in his 
failure to do anything on behalf of LPG, but to totally undermine L?G's pro se motion 
17
 At the beginning of the hearing the did court indicate it had "received and reviewed 15 
letters as well as numerous documents concerning mental health issues with regard to 
the defendant." R609:4, Addl 19. 
18
 The Transcript states one to five years, R609:7, Addl22, while the Sentence Minutes 
states one to six years. R539, Add 126. 
19
 The transcript can be read a couple of Avays and counsel has been informed an audio 
recording of this hearing is not available. Counsel believes the interpretation that the 
Court was including Mr. McCaughey in the "almost everybody's" is the most logical and 
likely one. 
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for a degree reduction by calling it "frivolous." The Court acted improperly by 
conducting the sentencing hearing with Mr. McCaughey acting as counsel after his 
employment had been terminated and he had withdrawn from the representation. The 
court also erred by refusing to consider a degree reduction due solely to the "extreme 
violence" involved. It was not proper to categorically deny the motion for conviction of 
lower degrees based solely on that factor without taking into consideration the other 
statutorily required factor of LPG's history and character. 
In addition to the fundamental legal deficiencies in the proceedings, the 
incarceration regime in this case results in illegal discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, the Uniform Application provision 
of the Utah Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act, because it appears he 
is being incarcerated for 30 years under the GMI sentences due to his NGRI status, 
rather than receiving a baseline incarceration from the Utah Board of Pardons of 4 years 
and 6.4 months. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Judgments Are Invalid Due to Attorney Disloyalty. 
The Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally held that attorney disloyalty 
invalidates a conviction. 
Given the direct and fundamental nature of the duty of loyalty, we 
will not inquire into the issue of whether the breach of that duty was 
prejudicial. We are obliged not to do so by our own precedent, State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857-58 (Utah 1992), and that of the United States 
Supreme Court, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 
467-68, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). In Glasser, the Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction because an attorney represented codefendants with adverse 
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interests. The Court refused to inquire into the issue of prejudice because 
M[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and 
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of 
prejudice arising from its denial." Id. at 76, 62 S.Ct. at 467; see also 
Woodv. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 
220 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 
1718-19, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 
488-90, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1180-82, 55 L.Ed.2d426 (1978); Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 138 (3d Cir.1984); State v. Smith, 
621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). 
State v. Holland, 876 P.2d, 357, 361 (Utah 1994). 
While the court, at that point, only disqualified the attorney as to further 
proceedings, in the subsequent case of State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 436 (Utah 1996), 
the Utah Supreme Court repeated this language in reversing the conviction. 
We need not examine whether such performance resulted in 
prejudice to Holland. "Once the Court conclude[s] that [the defendant's] 
lawyer had an actual conflict of interest, it [shall] refuse to indulge in nice 
calculations as to the amount of prejudice attributable to the conflict. The 
conflict itself demonstrate^] a denial of the 'right to have the effective 
assistance of counsel.'" 
(citations omitted) 
In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467-68 (1942), 
cited by the Utah Supreme Court in both the Holland cases cited above, the United 
States Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated where an 
attorney did not have undivided loyalty to his client, and this mandated conviction 
reversal. 
That disloyalty of counsel is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution mandating reversal of a conviction is confirmed in Osborn v. 
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625 (CA 10 1988): 
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[A]n attorney who adopts and acts upon a belief that his client 
should be convicted fffail[s] to function in any meaningful sense as the 
Government's adversary." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666, 104 S.Ct. at 2051. 
Whether the attorney is influenced by loyalties to other defendants, third 
parties, or the government, "if [he] entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a 
denial of Sixth Amendment rights." 
This was recently re-confirmed by the 10th Circuit in Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283 
(CA10,2002). 
In United States v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 656-7, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045-6 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court phrased it this way: 
[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment 
requires that the accused have "counsel acting in the role of an advocate." 
. . . But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between 
adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated. 
(footnotes and citations omitted) 
In Osborn, 861 F.2d at 628, the Tenth Circuit discussed how "Counsel's actions in 
regard to sentencing even more clearly indicate the abandonment of his duty of loyalty" 
by having made public statements saying his client should not be given consideration at 
sentencing and stressing the brutality of the crime, rather than presenting information 
that would have supported a more lenient sentence. Mr. McCaughey's performance 
As set forth in the affidavits submitted in support of LPG's Rule 23B Memorandum, 
there were many positive things about LPG as he struggled with the hand he was dealt. 
Mr. McCaughey did nothing to try and use this information for the benefit of his client. 
While these facts are not in the record due to the Rule 23B Motion having been denied 
and therefore cannot be relied upon here, what is crystal clear from the entire record is 
Mr. McCaughey never did a single thing to counteract the impression conveyed by the 
prosecution that LPG was simply a brutal killer as a result of his reckless failure to take 
psychiatric drugs. 
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here was far worse than a public statement against his client. Here he termed a very 
viable charge reduction motion "frivolous" in open court. This is four square with the 
type of counsel performance the Tenth Circuit found in Osborn to be a per se violation 
of the right to counsel and mandates vacation of all three judgments here. 
LPG respectfully suggests Mr. McCaughey's terming the offense reduction 
motion "frivolous" in open court is disloyalty as a matter of law, invalidates the 
judgments in this matter and this Court need go no further. 
As set forth above, appellate courts are not to "indulge in nice calculations as to 
the amount of prejudice attributable" to such disloyalty and must invalidate the entire 
proceeding as violative of the the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
II. The Judgment Of Not Guilty By Reason Of Insanity Is Invalid As the Result 
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Disloyalty and For Lack Of Any Factual 
Basis 
At the last minute, Mr. McCaughey presented LPG with a plea agreement which 
added a third count, Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, to which LPG was 
exhorted to, and did, plead NGRI. This NGRI judgment is both the result of ineffective 
assistance of counsel/disloyalty and is legally defective. 
A. There is No Factual Basis for the Aggravated Burglary Disposition 
At the change of plea hearing the factual basis of the NGRI was stated by Mr. 
McCaughey to be "based on the reports of Dr. Mirow and Dr. Cohn and Dr. Rindflesh 
21
 There is a tremendous amount of other evidence pointing to disloyalty, both in the 
record and in the affidavits of Leonard Preston Gall and Leonard Silvius Gall presented 
(footnote continued) 
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that have been submitted to this court over the period of this case." R 608:20. The 
prosecution offered the following as the basis for the NGRI on the Aggravated Burglary 
charge: 
As an evidentiary matter, your Honor, evidence located by the 
defense, Mr. McCaughey has called into question the precise content of 
LPG's delusion at the time he committed these offenses. Based upon that, 
there has been some doubt interjected as to whether he might otherwise 
receive a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict were the case to proceed 
to trial. 
As a practical matter, the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity judgment 
that you are entering will provide the Court, your Honor, with lifetime 
jurisdiction to supervise this defendant, quite apart from the criminal 
sanctions, and to assure that he continues to comply with treatment and to 
protect himself and the public from being dangerous in the future. 
Id. The Court then found that with respect to justifying the NGRI this was "sound and 
appropriate in this case." R608:21-22. 
However, the NGRI burglary judgment is irreconcilably inconsistent with the 
GMI judgments and there is absolutely no factual basis for the burglary charge. That 
there are no facts to support a burglary charge is strongly suggested by the government 
not even charging LPG with burglary until the plea agreement. Analysis makes clear 
there is no factual basis. 
(Continued footnote) 
in the Rule 23B Motion. Perhaps this is why this Court found a Rule 23B remand 
unnecessary, but in any event, record items, will be discussed infra. 
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Burglary occurs when a person "enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit" various crimes, including assault and theft 
and becomes Aggravated Burglary if 
in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or 
another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon 
against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous 
weapon.23 
Thus, a necessary predicate of Aggravated Burglary is that Burglary have been 
committed. 
Here, the evidence is uncontroverted that LPG had permission to be at his 
mother's24 so the first element is not present. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1229 
(Utah 1998) ("if the actor commits a crime while lawfully inside a building, there is no 
burglary") (emphasis in original). With respect to the second element, "intent to 
commit" certain crimes, it is impossible for LPG to not have been able to form the intent 
to commit the manslaughter and theft by reason of insanity for purposes of the burglary, 
but then be convicted as having the requisite intent for the same crimes. In other words, 
if he couldn't form the intent to commit the manslaughter or theft while entering or 
remaining in the house, he couldn't have had the intent while in the house to commit the 
manslaughter and theft to which he pleaded guilty and mentally ill. See, e.g., Rudolph, 
22
 U.C.A. §76-6-202, emphasis added. 
23
 U.C.A. §76-6-203. 
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id. ("he committed burglary if he formed the intent to commit a sexual assault either at 
the time he entered the victim's home or at any time thereafter while he remained there 
unlawfully"). 
This impossibility is actually starkly illustrated by Mr. McCaughey's statement at 
the change of plea hearing that: 
LPG entered his house, his mother's house, with the intent to ~ or remained 
in his mother's house with the intent to commit a felony. At that time he 
recklessly caused her death. 
R 608:11. Mr. McCaughey's statement that LPG entered his mother's house with the 
intent to commit a felony is absolutely inconsistent with the NGRI disposition. 
Getting back to Mr. McCaughey's statement that the basis for the NGRI 
disposition on the Aggravated Burglay charge are contained in the reports of Dr. Mirow 
and Dr. Cohn and Dr. Rindflesh, this Court will find no such basis. Nowhere in these 
reports is there any discussion of LPG's delusions or other psychiatric symptoms 
negating intent with respect to any burglary charge, which charge, of course, didn't even 
exist at the time the reports were written. 
The aggravated burglary charge was instead developed out of whole cloth for the 
sole purpose of locking LPG up for the rest of his life. This was done by fashioning a 
set of judgments that mimicked the Herrera result of having both NGRI and guilty but 
mentally ill verdicts. However, Herrera involved the extraordinary facts of the 
defendant believing one victim was a robot and the others human. This sort of 
(Continued footnote) 
24
 e.g., R589 (Cohn 8/26/02, p9). 
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extraordinary factual predicate justifying both GMI and NGRI verdicts in the Herrera 
case is simply not present here and neither Mr. McCaughey, the prosecution, or the 
judge for that matter, ever attempted to establish that it was. There simply is no factual 
basis for the NGRI verdict, nor for that matter, any burglary conviction. This mandates 
reversal. 
Moreover, while locking LPG up for the rest of his life may be a proper motive 
for the prosecution, it was not for defense counsel, Mr. McCaughey. It was 
disloyalty/ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. The NGRI Judgment and the GMI Convictions Were the Product of 
Disloyalty/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
In State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^ [16, 26 P.3d 203, 207, the Utah Supreme Court 
reiterated: 
an individual has been denied the effective assistance of counsel if: (1) 
counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced 
the defendant. 
Martinez, at f 17, goes on to state: 
in the context of a guilty plea, the "defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 
In its November 25, 2005, Order denying both LPG's Rule 23B Motion and the 
State's motion for partial dismissal of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims (Rule 
23B Order), this Court stated: 
Failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a jurisdictional 
bar that extinguishes the right to challenge the guilty plea on direct appeal. 
See State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, f48, 114 P.3d 585. Given the holding of 
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Merrill we would lack jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the validity of 
the guilty please under the guise of an ineffectiveness of counsel claim. 
However, we do not determine what effect, if any, Merrill would have on 
the stipulation for entry of a not guilty by reason of insanity judgment on 
the aggravated burglary count, which was contained in the plea agreement. 
Accordingly, we defer a ruling on the issues raised in the cross-motion for 
partial dismissal pending plenary presentation and consideration of this 
appeal. 
As set forth herein, disloyalty, at any stage of the proceedings invalidates all of 
the judgments in this case. This means this Court does not have to reach the narrow 
jurisdictional issue identified in its November 25, 2005, Order. 
It seems prudent, however, to address this question. Clearly, a not guilty by 
reason of insanity judgment entered upon a plea agreement is not a guilty plea to which 
either U.C.A. §77-13-6 or Merrill apply. The harder question is whether once having 
jurisdiction over the NGRI judgment, does this Court obtain jurisdiction over ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding the GMI convictions? LPG submits once this Court has 
jurisdiction on one basis, jurisdiction is no longer an issue and it can hear the entirety of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, including the validity of the guilty plea. See, 
e.g., footnote 6 of Chief Justice Crockett's dissent in State v. Robinson, 23 Utah 2d 78, 
457 P.2d 969 (Utah 1969). Since the GMI convictions and the NGRI judgment were 
part of a "package deal" it does not seem possible nor desirable to separate them out. 
Merrill does not address this situation. 
Thus, if this Court finds the NGRI judgment the product of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, LPG respectfully suggests the GMI judgments must also fall. LPG does not 
perceive this Court's Rule 23B Order as precluding this result because it very 
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specifically denied the State's motion to dismiss "defendant's challenge to the validity of 
O f 
his guilty plea for lack of jurisdiction."" 
From the totality of the situation, particularly the events surrounding the 
sentencing, it is clear Mr. McCaughey's objective was to have LPG locked up for the 
rest of his life and the plea agreement was constructed to do so.27 LPG believes Mr. 
McCaughey's actions at sentencing establishes disloyalty as a matter of law and 
invalidates the judgments in this matter. However, as a precautionary measure, through 
his Rule 23B motion, LPG attempted to augment the current record as to both disloyalty 
and ineffective assistance of counsel that might not constitute disloyalty to, among other 
things,28 include the following facts: 
• Mr. McCaughey had not obtained LPG's agreement to the disposition of 
the case when he told the court at the September 8, 2003 hearing that there 
was a disposition (plea agreement).29 f21 of Affidavit of Leonard Preston 
Cross-Motion for Partial Dismissal and Response in Opposition to Defendant's 23B 
Motion to Remand, dated September 12. 2005, page 1. 
To wit: Mr. McCaughey's failure to take any actions on behalf of his client with 
respect to sentencing and his terming LPG's pro se motion to be convicted of a lower 
degree, "frivolous." R609:5. 
Since the plea agreement was only entered into as a result of this improper objective 
(deficiency), absent the deficiency the plea agreement would not have been agreed to 
and prejudice is established under Martinez. 
28
 The affidavits of LPG and LSG also included a fair amount of material regarding 
LPG's life and background to show Mr. McCaughey was also ineffective because he 
failed to take the actions he could have to counter the overwhelmingly negative portrayal 
and perception of LPG. 
29
 R607:2. 
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Gall submitted in support of the Appellate Rule 23B Motion (LPG 
Affidavit). 
• Mr. McCaughey did not tell LPG the real purpose of the September 10, 
2003, change of plea hearing. 112 of LPG Affidavit. 
• If LPG had been informed that his GMI terms would normally not be set 
while he was in the hospital for up to the entire 30 year maximum 
incarceration thereunder he would not have agreed to the plea agreement. 
Is 31 & 32 of LPG Affidavit. 
• Mr. McCaughey told LPG's father, Leonard Silvius Gall (LSG) that Mr. 
McCaughey had negotiated the disposition that he had because he did not 
feel LPG deserved just two second degree felonies that the prosecution had 
offered. 118, 41 of the Affidavit of Leonard Silvius Gall (LSG Affidavit); 
116 LPG Affidavit. 
• Mr. McCaughey would tell LSG one thing and LPG something completely 
different. 143 of LSG Affidavit. 
These allegations were, however, held by this Court to be insufficient 
"nonspeculative allegations of facts, not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal11 that could support an allegation that counsel was ineffective with 
regard to the stipulation for entry of a judgment of not guilty by reason of 
insanity. 
(Rule 23B Order, page 2). Thus, for purposes of this appeal, LPG must rely upon the 
facts already contained in the record. 
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These facts are mainly that the combination of the GMI and NGRI judgments had 
the effect of increasing LPG's incarceration far beyond what was likely under the 
original charges. Under the "Matrix" which establishes a baseline from which the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole (Board of Pardons) set sentences, the sentence for Criminal 
Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony under U.C.A. §76-5-203, would be 16 years 
and the sentence for Theft, a Second Degree Felony, U.C.A. §76-6-404, would be 16 
months regular probation. Under the Board of Pardon Guidelines, even a consecutive 
sentence for the theft would only add 40% of 16 months, or 6.4 months of probation to 
this. Thus, the baseline incarceration if LPG had been convicted of the crimes originally 
charged would be 16 years of imprisonment and 6.4 months of probation. 
Under the two second degree felonies to which LPG pled GMI, the Matrix 
provides a baseline of 4 years of imprisonment for the manslaughter and the same 6.4 
months of probation for the theft. 
In stark contrast, the result of the interplay between the NGRI and GMI 
judgments is leading to LPG being incarcerated at Utah State hospital without his term 
ever being set in the way that everyone else's is. Under this scenario, he will be 
The prejudice to LPG is apparent. 
31
 See, the first page of the Appendix where this Matrix has been reproduced for the 
Court's convenience. 
32
 Balance of the Appendix. 
33
 U.A.C. §R671-201 provides that: 
"within six months of an offender's commitment to prison the Board will 
give notice of the month and year in which the inmate's original hearing 
will be conducted . . . All felonies, where a life has been taken, will be 
(footnote continued) 
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serving his GMI prison terms at Utah State Hospital for the full 30 years maximum of 
the combined consecutive sentences without his terms for the GMIs ever having been set 
by the Board of Pardons. At that point, he will then still be serving his "up to life" term 
under the NGRI. 
If LPG had been sent to the Utah State Hospital solely on one or more NGRIs, it 
is possible for him to be discharged when it is determined it is safe to do so, which may 
include a conditional discharge. U.C.A. §77-16a-3045 305, 306. However, so long as 
LPG is at the Utah State Hospital on the GMIs these provisions are not applicable. 
Similarly, the Board of Pardons is not setting his term because he is at the hospital on 
the NGRI disposition. 
To summarize then, because LPG is at the hospital his term will likely not ever be 
set and he will be there for the entire 30 years before it is even possible for him to have 
any kind of discharge on his "up to life" NGRI commitment. When the results of the 
combination GMI and NGRI dispositions are analyzed, it becomes obvious they were 
carefully constructed to allow no possibility for release for the longest period of time 
possible. This is certainly consistent with the judge's statement at the Sentencing 
(Continued footnote) 
routed to the Board as soon as practicable for the determination of the 
month and year for their original hearing date." 
However, because LPG has not been committed to prison, it appears this will not occur 
while LPG is incarcerated at Utah State Hospital under the NGRI judgment. It certainly 
has yet to occur. One of the factual elements LPG asked to establish through his Rule 
23B motion was "when the Board of Pardons is likely to set the Defendant/Appellant's 
term on the Guilty and Mentally 111 judgments." 0f3(h), of LPG's proposed Rule 23B 
Remand Order). Perhaps this Court denied the Rule 23B Remand Motion with respect 
(footnote continued) 
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hearing ("Mr. Gall, you will be at the Utah State Hospital... for a long period of time. 
And that's frankly my goal I think for almost everybody in this case from the very 
beginning."34 
There are only two inferences that can be drawn from this. The first is that this 
or 
was the goal of Mr. McCaughey, which constitutes disloyalty. Other facts pointing to 
disloyalty have already been discussed, but it seems worthwhile to reiterate at this point 
that there is absolutely no basis for the burglary disposition. The other inference is that 
Mr. McCaughey didn't understand the effect of this combination of judgments,36 which 
is, of course, ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. 
(Continued footnote) 
to this factual issue because the Court already understands this is the effect of the 
combination GMI and NGRI dispositions. 
34
 R609:8, Add 123. It is troubling for the trial court to say it was the court's goal from 
the very beginning to put LPG at the hospital for a long time. The court's decisions, of 
course, should be made based upon the evidence presented to it at the various phases of 
the proceedings, not based on its goal "from the very beginning." That the court had this 
goal from the very beginning, at a minimum, reinforces the point discussed in the next 
section that the trial court improperly failed to properly consider the evidence before it at 
sentencing. It also, of course, conclusively shows impermissible bias. 
35
 The statement of the judge that this was the "goal I think for almost everybody" at 
least implies that it was Mr. McCaughey's goal as well. The transcript is unclear about 
this because it says "my goal I think for almost everybody," which doesn't make a lot of 
sense unless it was really more like "my goal — I think for almost everybody." Counsel 
attempted to obtain a recording of this hearing to ascertain this, but was told there was 
none available. 
36
 This is suggested by Mr. McCaughey's statement at the Change of Plea hearing that 
"this plea agreement... gives us the same benefit... had he been found not guilty by 
reason of insanity at trial." R608:21. As the foregoing analysis makes clear the plea 
agreement most assuredly did not give LPG the same benefit as an NGRI on the charges 
at trial. 
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III. Mr. McCaughey Was Disloyal/Rendered Ineffective Assistance During 
Sentencing. 
This Court's Rule 23B Order states, "Gall concedes that the record is adequate to 
allow assertion of the ineffectiveness claims [regarding the sentencing proceedings]." It 
is hard to know what to make of this because LPG's Rule 23B Memorandum states: 
As mentioned above, notwithstanding this withdrawal, then counsel 
attended the sentencing hearing on May 3, 2004, as if he were still 
representing Defendant/Appellant. However, he made no efforts on behalf 
of Defendant/Appellant and in fact, as mentioned above, termed the offense 
reduction motion "frivolous." These facts appear in the record so no 
remand is necessary with respect to them. 
What is not in the record, however, is then counsel had informed 
Defendant/Appellant and his father the prosecution had agreed to not seek 
consecutive terms. This agreement was violated during the sentencing 
hearing, yet then counsel did not object. Thus, one of the facts 
Defendant/Appellant needs to establish on remand is that the prosecution 
agreed to not seek consecutive sentences or, alternatively, that then counsel 
told Defendant/Appellant and his father that this was the case. 
(footnotes omitted). 
While as set forth above, LPG believes the fact that Mr. McCaughey: 
(1) purported to represent LPG at the sentencing hearing after he had been 
discharged and withdrawn as counsel, 
(2) failed to make any efforts at all on behalf of LPG with respect to the 
sentencing, and 
(3) termed the offense reduction motion frivolous, 
establishes both ineffective assistance of counsel and disloyalty as a matter of law; it is 
not a concession that the record is adequate. It was precisely because of the possibility 
this Court might not agree this established ineffective assistance of counsel and 
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disloyalty as a matter of law, that the Rule 23B remand was sought to establish, among 
other things, that "the prosecution agreed to not seek consecutive sentences or, 
alternatively, that then counsel told Defendant/Appellant and his father that this was the 
case." 
Logically then, it appears only if this Court 
(a) agrees the existing record establishes ineffective assistance of counsel or 
disloyalty with respect to the sentencing proceedings, or 
(b) concludes that neither 
(i) the State agreeing to not seek consecutive sentences and Mr. 
McCaughey's failure to raise it when this agreement was breached, or 
(ii) Mr. McCaughey lying to LPG and his father that the State had agreed 
not to seek consecutive sentences, 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel or disloyalty, 
can the Court's conclusion about the "concession" regarding the state of the record be 
reconciled with the language of the Rule 23B Memorandum. Clearly, lying to his client 
about such an agreement constitutes disloyalty. This thus only leaves the conclusion 
that the existing record establishes ineffective assistance of counsel or disloyalty as a 
matter of law, a conclusion with which LPG certainly agrees. 
However, it is not at all clear that is what this Court meant in its Rule 23B Order. 
Nevertheless it seems incomprehensible that Mr. McCaughey's statement that the 
offense reduction motion was "frivolous" can be held to be anything other than 
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disloyalty and his complete failure to do anything whatsoever in the sentencing phase on 
behalf of his client can be held to be anything but ineffective assistance of counsel. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred By Ignoring The Evidence of The Iatrogenic Nature 
Of His Psychosis. 
Well in advance of the sentencing hearing set for May 3, 2004, LPG informed 
Mr. McCaughey that information had been coming out that many people become 
psychotic and delusional as a result of the psychiatric medications they are prescribed 
and this should be followed up for potential presentation to the trial court on his behalf 
in connection with the sentencing. LPG and LSG then arranged for Dr. Ann Blake 
Tracy, an expert in these medications, to review his history and address this issue. Dr. 
Tracy's analysis confirmed that LPG's serious psychiatric history was almost certainly 
caused by the treatment he had received, primarily psychiatric drugs. However, Mr. 
McCaughey made no efforts to utilize this information on LPG's behalf and when it 
became clear to LPG that Mr. McCaughey was not going to do anything on his behalf 
with regard thereto, he, among other things, moved for conviction of lower degree of 
offense under U.C.A. § 76-3-402 (402 Reduction) when he wrote the court as follows: 
37
 Mis-cited as Rule 4-603. 
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April 23, 2004 
Honorable Judge Atherton 
Third Judicial District Court 
Re: Rule 4-603 Motion: 
State of Utah v. Leonard Preston Gall, Case No. 011919226; 
Dear Judge Atherton 
There is some new information on my case, which was conveyed to 
my attorney some time ago, but he is out of town and unavailable and I 
wanted to make sure I met the deadline for filing a motion for reduction of 
offense at sentencing in time. I don't know why my attorney has not 
mentioned this option before, particularly in light of the new information. 
My father found Rule 4-603 by himself, just today, the last day to file the 
motion. 
The crux of the matter is that it is looking very likely it was really 
the psychiatric medications that precipitated/caused me to commit my 
crime. I am enclosing the not quite finished report of Dr. Ann Blake Tracy 
about this. 
What I would really like the court to do is allow us some time to 
sort out what should be done about this. However, because of the deadline 
for the Rule 4-603 motion, I am also formally asking that my offenses be 
reduced. 
It is my preference, however, that the sentencing hearing set for May 3rd 
be delayed and we use the time instead to decide what to do about this new 
information. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ 
Leonard Preston Gall 
R523, Add52, emphasis added. 
On April 26, 2004, the final version of the Declaration of Ann Blake Tracy 
Declaration, PhD (Tracy Declaration) was filed. R589, Add61. The Tracy Declaration 
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runs some 35 pages and is a very comprehensive analysis of the situation. Included are 
the following conclusions: 
I believe that Lenny Gall was a normal child with a family history of 
hypoglycemia, a metabolic disorder, who inadvertently got started on these 
serotonergic medications. They were given to him at a younger age than 
the FDA had approved as safe or effective and at an age that they have 
recently warned can be very dangerous leading to suicide and/or violence 
toward others. 
What stands out in Lenny's medical records is the drastic changes for the 
worse after he was first introduced to Paxil at the age of 16 in 1993. 
Shortly after the introduction of Paxil, he went from simple anxiety 
problems to all the signs of a manic reaction to Paxil - including, as Dr. 
Cohn stated in her August 26, 2002, report, "with documentation of 
paranoia, grandiosity, loose associations, and suicidal ideation" (suicidal 
ideation is continuous obsessive thoughts of ways to kill oneself). This in 
spite of the fact that this was child who had a consistent even keel 
disposition before his introduction to Paxil. 
From there it was downhill because no one noticed that the manic 
reactions were drug-induced. Had these manic, paranoid, and suicidal 
reactions been recognized as adverse drug reactions, he could have been 
withdrawn safely from the offending medications at that time. (Paxil had 
just recently been introduced and most adverse reactions had not even 
been determined at that point.) In my experience and in my opinion that 
would have prevented the years of medical treatment for his additional 
drug-induced reactions of depression, suicide attempts, bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia, etc. as well as preventing the drug-induced psychotic 
reaction that led to the death of his mother and his subsequent 
confinement. 
* * * 
My professional opinion is that in considering the information in the 
product package inserts alone there is such overwhelming evidence that 
this entire situation was chemically/physically-induced that I do not 
R589 (Tracy), Add91, emphasis added. 
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understand why anyone did not consider the potential of an extremely 
altered mental state for Lenny in this tragedy.39 
The conclusions of the Tracy Declaration were confirmed by a report from Grace 
E. Jackson, MD (Jackson Report), a psychiatrist who is an expert in 
psychopharmacology, which was filed on April 30, 2004.40 Included in the Jackson 
Report is the following conclusion: 
The development of manic and psychotic symptoms appears to have been 
iatrogenically induced at age 16; iatrogenically perpetuated through 
several years of continuing drug treatment and intermittent drug 
withdrawal; and iatrogenically aggravated by ECT [electroshock] and 
quite possibly an unrecognized closed head injury (frontal lobe syndrome) 
occurring in the immediate aftermath of a serious motor vehicle accident. 
The trial court, however, did not consider any of this evidence, denying the 
motion instead solely on the basis that it was a crime of extreme violence" 
I am denying the motion for a 402 reduction. This was crime of extreme 
violence and a 402 reduction is simply out of the question in this case. 
R609:6,Addl21. 
The failure of the trial court to substantively address the charge reduction motion 
is a violation of Article 1, § 7 of the Utah Constitution as well as the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution as applied to the states under the 14th Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that if state law gives a person a right, federal 
due process requires the state to use proper procedures to effectuate the right. See, e.g., 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 201, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (1990). The same is true under 
39
 R589 (Tracy), Add93. 
40
 R589(Jackson), Add96. 
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Article 1, §7, of the Utah Constitution. Under In the Interest of: L. G. W., 638 P.2d 527 
(Utah 1981), once having raised the issue, an essential element of due process is an 
"inquiry into the merits of the question presented." 
In fact, this Court's recent decision of Albiston, supra,, makes clear that the trial 
court must "consider all legally relevant factors" in considering a 402 Reduction motion. 
U.C.A. § 76-3-402. mandates consideration of both the "nature and circumstances of the 
offense" and "the history and character of the defendant." The best that can be said of 
the trial court's consideration of the motion is that it considered the "nature and 
circumstances of the offense." This is an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. Id. 
Here, the evidence presented by LPG with respect to the motion for conviction of 
a lower offense, set forth above, was directly related to the "history and character of the 
defendant", presenting a compelling case for leniency based upon the iatrogenic 
(treatment caused) nature of the offense.41 It is clear that LPG is a victim of the 
treatment caused psychosis resulting in his mother's death in addition to his mother 
being a victim. Inordinate attribution of blame resulting in the virtual impossibility of 
LPG getting beyond the walls of the hospital for at least 30 years and possibly for life 
compounds the tragedy. LPG was legally entitled to consideration of these factors and 
A pretty large percentage of the facts set forth in the affidavits submitted in support of 
LPG's Rule 23B Motion related to other aspects of the history and character of LPG as 
evidence that Mr. McCaughey was ineffective as counsel in failing to do anything to 
counter the overwhelmingly negative impression that had been given of LPG - an 
impression that was not accurate. 
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more than that, deserved consideration of them as well as a matter of common decency 
and morality. The failure of the trial court do so is reversible error. 
V. The Trial Court Erred By Conducting The Sentencing Hearing With 
Counsel Purporting To Represent LPG After His Employment Had Been 
Terminated; He Had Withdrawn From The Representation and LPG Had 
Moved for a Continuance. 
As set forth above, when LPG realized Mr. McCaughey was not going to present 
the very important information that his psychosis was almost certainly caused by the 
prescribed medications and Mr. McCaughey was not doing anything to try and achieve 
the minimum sentences possible, he terminated his employment and requested the 
sentencing hearing be delayed to "sort out what should be done" about the information. 
Also as set forth above, Mr. McCaughey filed a withdrawal from the case. In spite of 
this, and without acting on the request for continuance, the sentencing hearing proceeded 
as if neither of these events had occurred. 
The withdrawal was not put in the form of a motion, but instead was an 
unequivocal departure from the case.42 Regardless, there is no doubt it was error for the 
trial court to fail to address this. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals has properly held, when a defendant 
expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, a trial court "must make some 
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the 
defendant's complaints." 
State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, [^27, 984 P.2d 382, 388. In Lovell, however, the court went 
on to hold the failure to do so was harmless "given the circumstances" of that case. Id. 
42
 R532,Add60. 
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However, the Utah Supreme Court there also cited with approval United States v. 
Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2nd Cir. 1972) where it stated "[njormally, failure to 
conduct such an inquiry constitutes reversible error." 
The harm here is apparent. In addition to the disloyalty as manifested by 
sabotaging the Motion for Conviction of a Lower Offense by terming it "frivolous," and 
failing to do anything at all to minimize LPGfs length of incarceration, the trial court's 
failure to explore the situation prevented LPG from making a motion to withdraw his 
guilty and mentally ill pleas, which has had the extremely prejudicial consequence of 
limiting his ability to challenge the validity of the pleas in this appeal. 
It was also reversible error for the trial court to fail to grant LPG's request for a 
continuance. 
An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court denies a continuance and 
the resulting prejudice affects the substantial rights of the defendant, such 
that a "review of the record persuades the court that without the error there 
was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.'" 
State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, Tf8, 116 P.3d 360. 
Here, LPG was effectively without the assistance of counsel and the prejudice is 
apparent. He needed someone to make an effort on his behalf with respect to the 
sentencing, including arguing the import of the likelihood of the iatrogenic (treatment 
caused) nature of the crime. Perhaps even more prejudicial is by going forward with the 
sentencing in the absence of the assistance of counsel, LPG did not have a chance to 
move to withdraw his guilty and mentally ill pleas. There were at least two grounds for 
such a motion. One is the ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to the 
-35-
entry of those pleas and the second is that the homicide was almost certainly the result of 
his psychiatric treatment (ie., the drugs he was prescribed). 
VI. The Incarceration Regime Imposed in This Case is Unconstitutional As 
Applied To LPG Because It Deprives Him Of The Benefit Of The Term 
Setting Process By The Board Of Pardons. 
As demonstrated above, because LPG has been committed to the Utah State 
Hospital under his NGRI for from 5 years to life and at the same time serving his 
sentences of 2 to 30 years under the GMI judgments, he is not getting the benefit of the 
term setting process by the Board of Pardons that everyone else receives. If this were 
not so, the baseline sentence the Board of Pardons would be looking at would be four 
years and 6.4 months. Then after serving this term (or whatever term the Board of 
Pardons determined), LPG would be eligible for release under the NGRI disposition 
when the pre-requisites for such release might be satisfied. However, it appears the 
Board of Pardons will not even set his term while he is at the hospital on the NGRI 
disposition. At the same time, the hospital can not even consider LPG for release under 
the NGRI disposition until he serves his sentence, which not having been set, is 30 
years. Thus, solely by virtue of his NGRI status his prison sentence is, in effect, 
increased from a baseline of 4 years and 6.4 months to 30 years. This is a violation of 
both the federal Equal Protection Clause and Utah's Uniform Application provision. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, is contained in §1 
of the 14th Amendment, which provides in pertinent part: 
Section 1.. . . nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Under the federal Equal Protection Clause "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be 
grossly discriminatory in its operation." Williams v. Illinois, 399 US 235, 242, 90 S.Ct. 
2018,2023(1970) 
Article 1, §24 of the Utah Constitution requires that "All laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation." The Utah Supreme Court has recently summarized the 
relationship between the federal Equal Protection Clause and Utah's "uniform operation" 
requirement as follows: 
Even though there is a similitude in the "fundamental principles" 
embodied in the federal Equal Protection Clause and the Utah uniform 
operation of laws provision, "our construction and application of Article I, 
§ 24 are not controlled by the federal courts' construction and application 
of the Equal Protection Clause," and "[w]e have recognized that article I, 
section 24 ... establishes different requirements from the federal Equal 
Protection Clause." In light of and because of these differences, we also 
have reiterated that Utah's uniform operation of laws provision is "at least 
as exacting and, in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard 
applied under the federal constitution." 
Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, f33, 54 P.3d 1069, citations omitted. 
Just as the United States Supreme Court, in Williams, held a facially neutral 
statute may be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause as applied in particular 
circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court has held similarly: 
"What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform." "A law does 
not operate uniformly if 'persons similarly situated' are not 'treated 
similarly'" 
Gallivan, supra., at TJ37, citations omitted. 
In Williams, the United States Supreme Court found an incarceration regime that 
had the effect of discriminating against poor people a violation of due process. 
-37-
It is clear, of course, that the sentence was not imposed upon appellant 
because of his indigency but because he had committed a crime. And the 
Illinois statutory scheme does not distinguish between defendants on the 
basis of ability to pay fines. But, as we said in Griffin v. Illinois, supra, 'a 
law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its 
operation. Here the Illinois statutes as applied to Williams works an 
invidious discrimination solely because he is unable to pay the fine. 
399 US at 242, 2018 S.Ct. at 2022-3, citations omitted. 
The current situation is very similar to that in Williams. The only difference is 
that the disparate treatment on incarceration here is based on LPGfs finding of mental 
illness, rather than ability to pay fines. This is violative of both the federal Equal 
Protection Clause and Utah's Uniform Application provision. 
VII. The Incarceration Regime Imposed in This Case is a Violation Of The 
Americans With Disabilities Act. 
The same disparate treatment discussed in the previous section regarding how the 
interplay of the GMI sentences and the NGRI disposition is a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Uniform Treatment 
provision of the Utah Constitution constitutes a violation of the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 USC §12131 etseq (ADA). 42 USC §12132 provides: 
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity. 
The United States Supreme Court has held both that the ADA prohibits undue 
institutionalization as a result of mental illness ("undue institutionalization qualifies as 
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discrimination 'by reason of... disability."1), and inures to the benefit of people in 
prison ("the plain text of Title II of the ADA unambiguously extends to state prison 
inmates").44 
Thus, even if this Court finds that incarcerating LPG to 30 years of a prison 
sentence (at the hospital) because he is classified as mentally ill instead of a baseline 
incarceration of 4 years and 6.4 months is not a violation of Equal Protection or Uniform 
Application, it is a violation of the ADA. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellant Leonard Preston Gall 
respectfully requests this Court to: 
A. Vacate the Judgments in this matter because of attorney disloyalty and 
remand for further proceedings; 
B. Vacate the Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity Judgment for lack of any 
factual bais; 
C. Vacate the Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity Judgment due to attorney 
disloyalty/ineffective assistance of counsel; 
D. Vacate the sentences in this matter and remand for sentencing proceedings 
consistent with the decision of this Court; 
43
 Olmsteadv. L.C., 527 US 581, 597-602, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 2185-2188 (1999). 
44
 Pennsylvania Dep't. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 US 206, 213, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1956 
(1998). 
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E. Declare the incarceration regime under the judgments in this case 
unconstitutional as a violation(s) of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution and/or the Uniform Application provision of the 
Utah Constitution as applied to Defendant; and 
F. Declare the incarceration regime under the judgments in this case a 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jfl_ day of January 2006. 
LAW PROJECT FOR PSYCHIATRIC RIGHTS, INC. 
-40-
ADDENDUM 
Amend. XIV U.S. Const. 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Article 1, §7, Utah Const. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article 1, §24, Utah Const. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Americans with Disabilities Act, of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§12132 
§ 12132. Discrimination 
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation 
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 
U.C.A. §76-3-402 
§ 76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and 
character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, 
the court may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose 
sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered 
to be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
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(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and 
the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class A 
misdemeanor; or 
(b)(i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed 
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a 
hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest of 
justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless 
the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the 
offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced 
under this section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from 
obtaining or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by 
law. 
U.C.A. §76-5-203 
§ 76-5-203. Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is 
younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
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(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 
Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an 
act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death 
to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in 
the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; 
and 
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(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate 
offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the 
commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under 
Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense 
is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is 
established under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted 
murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause 
the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; 
or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection 
(4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) 
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the 
then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
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(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
U.C.A. §76-6-202 
§ 76-6-202. Burglary 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses 
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by 
the actor while he is in the building. 
U.C.A. §76-6-203 
§ 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, 
or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any 
person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
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(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as 
under Section 76-1-601. 
U.C.A. §76-6-404 
§ 76-6-404. Theft-Elements 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
U.C.A. 77-13-6 
§ 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea 
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. 
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea 
held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 
days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified 
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, and FLule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
U.C.A. 77-16a-304 
77-16a-304 Review after commitment. 
(1) The executive director, or his designee, shall establish a review team of 
at least three qualified staff members to review the defendant's mental 
condition at least every six months. That team shall include at least one 
psychiatrist and, if the defendant is mentally retarded, at least one staff 
member who is a designated mental retardation professional, as defined in 
Section 62 A-5-301. 
(2) If the review team described in Subsection (1) finds that the defendant 
has recovered from his mental illness, or, that the defendant is still mentally 
ill but does not present a substantial danger to himself or others, the 
executive director, or his designee, shall notify the court that committed the 
defendant that the defendant is a candidate for discharge and shall provide 
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the court with a report stating the facts that form the basis for the 
recommendation. 
(3) The court shall conduct a hearing within ten business days after receipt 
of the executive director's, or his designee's, notification. The court clerk 
shall notify the prosecuting attorney, the defendant's attorney, and any 
victim of the crime for which the defendant was found not guilty by reason 
of insanity, of the date and time of hearing. 
(4) (a) If the court finds that the person is no longer mentally ill, or if 
mentally ill, no longer presents a substantial danger to himself or others, it 
shall order the defendant to be discharged from commitment. 
(b) If the court finds that the person is still mentally ill and is a substantial 
danger to himself or others, but can be controlled adequately if 
conditionally released with treatment as a condition of release, it shall order 
the person conditionally released in accordance with Section 77-16a-305. 
(c) If the court finds that the defendant has not recovered from his mental 
illness and is a substantial danger to himself or others and cannot 
adequately be controlled if conditionally released on supervision, the court 
shall order that the commitment be continued. 
(d) The court may not discharge an individual whose mental illness is in 
remission as a result of medication or hospitalization if it can be determined 
within reasonable medical probability that without continued medication or 
hospitalization the defendant's mental illness will reoccur, making him a 
substantial danger to himself or others. That person may, however, be a 
candidate for conditional release, in accordance with Section 77-16a-305. 
U.C.A. 77-16a-305 
77-16a-305 Conditional release. 
(1) If the review team finds that a defendant is not eligible for discharge, in 
accordance with Section 77-16a-304, but that his mental illness and 
dangerousness can be controlled with proper care, medication, supervision, 
and treatment if he is conditionally released, the review team shall prepare a 
report and notify the executive director, or his designee, that the defendant 
is a candidate for conditional release. 
(2) The executive director, or his designee, shall prepare a conditional 
release plan, listing the type of care and treatment that the individual needs 
and recommending a treatment provider. 
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(3) The executive director, or his designee, shall provide the court, the 
defendant's attorney, and the prosecuting attorney with a copy of the report 
issued by the review team under Subsection (1), and the conditional release 
plan. The court shall conduct a hearing on the issue of conditional release 
within 30 days after receipt of those documents. 
(4) The court may order that a defendant be conditionally released if it finds 
that, even though the defendant presents a substantial danger to himself or 
others, he can be adequately controlled with supervision and treatment that 
is available and provided for in the conditional release plan. 
(5) The department may provide treatment or contract with a local mental 
health authority or other public or private provider to provide treatment for 
a defendant who is conditionally released under this section. 
U.C.A. 77-16a-306 
77-16a-306 Continuing review -Discharge. 
(1) Each entity that provides treatment for a defendant committed to the 
department as not guilty by reason of insanity under this part shall review 
the status of each defendant at least once every six months. If the treatment 
provider finds that a defendant has recovered from his mental illness, or if 
still mentally ill, no longer presents a substantial danger to himself or 
others, it shall notify the executive director of its findings. 
(2) Upon receipt of notification under Subsection (1), the executive director 
shall designate a review team, in accordance with Section 77-16a-304, to 
evaluate the defendant. If that review team concurs with the treatment 
provider's assessment, the executive director shall notify the court, the 
defendant's attorney, and the prosecuting attorney that the defendant is a 
candidate for discharge. The court shall conduct a hearing, in accordance 
with Section 77-16a-302, within ten business days after receipt of that 
notice. 
(3) The court may not discharge an individual whose mental illness is in 
remission as a result of medication or hospitalization if it can be determined 
within reasonable medical probability that without continued medication or 
hospitalization the defendant's mental illness will reoccur, making the 
defendant a substantial danger to himself or others. 
UAC R671-201. Original Parole Grant Hearing Schedule and Notice. 
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R671-201-1. Schedule and Notice. 
Within six months of an offender's commitment to prison the Board will 
give notice of the month and year in which the inmate's original hearing 
will be conducted. A minimum of one week (7 calendar days) prior notice 
should be given regarding the specific day and approximate time of such 
hearing. 
All felonies, where a life has been taken, will be routed to the Board as 
soon as practicable for the determination of the month and year for their 
original hearing date. The Board will only consider information available to 
the court at the time of sentencing. All first degree felonies, where death is 
not involved, will be eligible for a hearing after the service of three years. 
All second degree felonies, where death is not involved, will be eligible for 
a hearing after the service of six months unless the second degree is a sex 
offense and in those cases will be eligible for a hearing after the service of 
eighteen months. 
All third degree felonies, where a death is not involved, and all class A 
misdemeanors, will be eligible for a hearing after the service of three 
months unless the third degree felony is a sex offense and in those cases 
will be eligible for a hearing after the service of twelve months. 
Excluded from the above provisions are inmates who are sentenced to 
death or life without parole. 
An inmate may petition the Board to calendar him/her at a time other than 
the usual times designated above or the Board may do so on its own 
motion. A petition by the inmate shall set out the special reasons which 
give rise to the request. The Board will notify the petitioner of its decision 
in writing as soon as possible. 
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DAVE) E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ROBERT L.STOTT, 3131 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
QK 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEONARD PRESTON GALL 
DOB 12/03/76, 
AKANONE 
218 East 2000 North 
529-39-6960 
OTN 
so# 
Defendant. 
Screened by: R. Stott 
Assigned to: TBAM &/>*, 
DAO # 01025094 " %Lj^O ft 
BAIL: $1,000,000.00 
Warrant/Release: Defin Jail/Reno, Nevada 
INFORMATION 
C-No. 0 ? ? 9 j ^ f g 
The undersigned Detective T. Park - Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Agency Case No. 
01-146802, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes 
of: 
COUNTI 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 14, 2001, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
LEONARD PRESTON GALL, a party to the offense, intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Susan Gall and/or intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Susan Gall 
and/or acting under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human life, 
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby caused the 
death of Susan Gall. 
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COUNT IV 
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about December 14, 2001, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, LEONARD PRESTON 
GALL, a party to the offense, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
operable motor vehicle of Susan Gall with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
M. Gall, Dr. T. Grey, T. Park C. Nelson, V. Delahunty, E. Imotan, D. Steffens, T. 
Screiber, D. Jenkins, M. Cupello, C. Sofe and T. Jenkins. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Affiant has been informed by Deputy Imotan that on the above place and date he found 
the body of Susan Gall. Affiant has been informed by Dr. Todd Grey, the Medical Examiner for 
Salt Lake County, that on December 15, 2001 he performed an autopsy upon the body of Susan 
Gall and determined that the cause of death was multiple chopping blows to her head and neck. 
The cause of death was homicide. Affiant has also been informed by Office Duke Steffens of the 
University of Reno Nevada Police Department that on December 16, 2001 in Reno Nevada, he 
saw the defendant, Leonard Gall, in possession of Susan Galls' car; a 1989 Buick Skylark. 
Defendant told officers that he had killed Susan Gall, his mother, by using an axe. He also told 
the officers that he took his mother's car after he killed her. 
DETECTIVE T.PARK 
Affiant 
Subscribed and swo 
day of December, 2$$ 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
Deputy District Attorney 
^u~_ 1 n onm/^ ,TT/AI nocno/f 
MAGISTRATE^!-
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
J. KEVIN MURPHY, 5768 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
O R W & N A ^ C T COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 10 2003 
By. 
SALT LAKE CO 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEONARD PRESTON GALL 
DOB 12/03/76, 
AKANONE 
218 East 200 North 
529-39-6960 
OTN 
SO# 
Defendant. 
Screened by: R. Stott 
Assigned to: J.K. Murphy 
DAO# 01025094 
AMENDED 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 011919226 
_ _ ^ _ _ , . 
The undersigned under oath states on information and belief that the defendant 
committed the crimes of: 
COUNTI 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MANSLAUGHTER, a Second Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 14, 2001, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 205(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, LEONARD PRESTON GALL, a party to the offense, did recklessly cause 
the death of Susan Gall. Further, that a dangerous weapon or a facsimile of a dangerous 
weapon or the representation of a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the Ciminal Homicide, Manslaughter, giving rise to enhanced penalties as 
provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
COUNTH 
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about December 14, 2001, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, LEONARD PRESTON 
GALL, a party to the offense, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
operable motor vehicle of Susan Gall with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
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COUNTm 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about December 14, 2001, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
6, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
LEONARD PRESTON GALL, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully 
in the dwelling of Susan Gall with the intent to commit an assault, and was armed with a 
dangerous weapon, to-wit: a knife and a hatchet. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
M. Gall, Dr. T. Grey, T. Park C. Nelson, V. Delahunty, E. Imotan, D. Steffens, T. 
Screiber, D. Jenkins, M. Cupello, C. Sofe and T. Jenkins. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Affiant has been informed by Deputy Imotan that on the above place and date he found 
the body of Susan Gall. Affiant has been informed by Dr. Todd Grey, the Medical Examiner for 
Salt Lake County, that on December 15, 2001 he performed an autopsy upon the body of Susan 
Gall and determined that the cause of death was multiple chopping blows to her head and neck. 
The cause of death was homicide. Affiant has also been informed by Office Duke Steffens of the 
University of Reno Nevada Police Department that on December 16, 2001 in Reno Nevada, he 
saw the defendant, Leonard Gall, in possession of Susan Galls' car; a 1989 Buick Skylark. 
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Defendant told officers that he had killed Susan Gall, his mother, by using an axe. He also told 
the officers that he took his mother's car after he killed her. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
M 
Deputy District At t^ey 
September 9,2003 
cw/01025094 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1° 
day of September, 2003. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEONARD PRESTON GALL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 011919226 
Transcript of: 
CHANGE OF PLEA PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860 
SEPTEMBER 10, 2003 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN 0 4 2005 
REPORTED BY: SUZANNE WARNICK, RDR, CSR 
238-7529 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
ANNE A. CAMERON 
Deputy District Attorneys 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
311 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
For the Defendant: 
STEPHEN R. MCCAUGHEY 
Attorney at Law 
10 West Broadway, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
* * * 
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1 WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10; 2003; 10:10 A.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 
4 THE COURT: All right. Let's take the matter of 
5 State of Utah versus Leonard Preston Gall, Case No. 011919226. 
6 Will counsel state their appearances. 
7 MR. McCAUGHEY: Steve McCaughey for the defendant. 
8 MR. MURPHY: Kevin Murphy and Anne Cameron for the 
9 State. 
10 (The defendant comes into the courtroom.) 
11 THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey, this is Mr. Gall with you 
12 at the podium? 
13 MR. McCAUGHEY: It is, your Honor. Can we have his 
14 hand uncuffed, please? 
15 THE COURT: Which hand does he write with? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: My right hand. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Mr. McCaughey, have you 
18 received a copy of the Amended Information that has been filed 
19 by the State in this case? 
20 MR. McCAUGHEY: I have. That!s the one Mr. Gall and 
21 I have discussed this morning, and we talked about earlier, 
22 that includes Count III, an Aggravated Burglary. And it also 
23 includes Count I, which was the Criminal Homicide and now is a 
24 reduction down to Manslaughter, a Second, which was a First 
25 I Degree Homicide. And it includes a Theft. I have received it 
1 and we have gone over it. 
2 THE COURT: All right. And the proposed disposition 
3 in this case? 
4 MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, it is that — the 
5 proposed disposition is that Mr. Gall will enter a plea of 
6 guilty but mentally ill to Count II and to Count I; and that 
7 the Court, based on certain reports and factual statements, 
8 will enter and find him not guilty by reason of insanity on 
9 the Count III, which is Aggravated Burglary. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Murphy, is that your understanding of 
11 the disposition in this case? 
12 MR. MURPHY: It is, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Have you spoken with the family of the 
14 victim, Mrs. Gall, about the disposition? 
15 MR. MURPHY: I have, your Honor. Two of the family 
16 members are here. And this disposition has also been reviewed 
17 very carefully by the administration of the District 
18 Attorney's Office. 
19 THE COURT: Is this disposition, with regard to all 
20 three counts, acceptable to the victim's family? 
21 MR. MURPHY: My understanding from them over the past 
22 several weeks is that it is. 
23 THE COURT: All right. 
24 And Mr. McCaughey, you have spoken with Mr. Gall at 
25 some length, I understand, with regard to entering the pleas 
1 of guilty and mentally ill. 
2 MR. McCAUGHEY: Mr. Gall and I have discussed the 
3 case in general ever since I have been retained by him, which 
4 was several months ago. But, particularly in the last month 
5 since we've had negotiations, serious negotiations, plea 
6 negotiations with the District Attorney's Office, he and I 
7 have spoke on several occasions and at length regarding this 
I —T^i}/ /fc^t bet" 
8 possible plea and its benefits. So, yes. ' x I l 
9 THE COURT: You believe Mr. Gall is prepared to go 
10 forward this morning with this? 
11 MR. McCAUGHEY: I think he is. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 All right. Mr. Gall, you are now charged by an 
14 Amended Information with Criminal Homicide Manslaughter, a 
15 Second Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake 
16 County, State of Utah, on or about December 14th of 2001. The 
17 allegation is that you, a party to the offense, did recklessly 
18 cause the death of Susan Gall. Further, that a dangerous 
19 I weapon, or a facsimile of a dangerous weapon, or the 
20 representation of a dangerous weapon, was used in the 
21 commission or furtherance of the Criminal Homicide 
22 Manslaughter, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by 
23 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated. 
24 You're also charged with Theft, a Second Degree 
25 Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about December 14th of 2001. The allegation is 
that you, a party to the offense, obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the operable motor vehicle of Susan 
Gall with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
Mr. Gall, is it your intention to plead guilty and 
mentally ill to these two charges today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gall, are you under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Do you take prescription medication? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. What is your medication, Mr. Gall; 
what do you take? 
THE DEFENDANT: Ifm taking Wellbutrin, trazodone, 
lithium, propanolol and Risperdal. 
THE COURT: And this is medication that has been 
prescribed to you because of your diagnosis of schizophrenia; 
is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: It was prescribed for manic-
depression. 
THE COURT: Okay. And there was a diagnosis both of 
bipolar disorder then and schizophrenia; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Schizo-affective disorder, from 
the psychiatrist that came to the jail. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. And you have been in custody now, 
2 Mr. Gall, since January 16th of last year; is that correct? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Uh. . . 
4 THE COURT: That's what my records show. Itfs an 
5 extended period of time, about 18 months; is that right? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's correct. I was in 
7 custody in Reno starting December 16th. 
8 THE COURT: Right. Then you were transferred here to 
9 Salt Lake on the 16th of January, right? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
11 THE COURT: During that period of time, have you been 
12 maintaining these medications in the jail? Have you been 
13 taking all of these medications in the jail that have been 
14 prescribed to you? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: And you have taken them in recent days as 
17 well, continuously? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. And you have taken your most 
20 recent dosage of those medications? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
22 THE COURT; Is there anything about those many 
23 medications that you take that would interfere with your 
24 ability to understand the proceedings in court today? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have either a mental or a physical 
condition that would interfere with your ability to understand 
these proceedings? 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh, while I'm on the medication, I!m 
able to proceed with it. But I suppose with my mental 
illness, I maybe would not. 
THE COURT: All right. One of my jobs today, 
Mr. Gall, is to make sure you understand everything that's 
happening. And the very significant factors involved in this 
case relate to your severe mental illness. 
And these medications have been prescribed to you so 
that you can become competent to understand things and to 
carry on. And you have indicated to me already that you have 
taken all these medications and you have taken them regularly 
for a very long period of time. 
Notwithstanding the recognized mental illness that 
you suffer from, do you believe you understand what's going on 
in court today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh, yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey, Ifll ask you these same 
questions essentially. You have been counsel for Mr. Gall for 
a rather extended period of time, some six months or so, at 
this point. And you have had an opportunity to visit Mr. Gall 
many times, including in recent days. Do you believe that he 
is competent and understands the proceedings and can knowingly 
o 
1 and intelligently go forward with these pleas today? 
2 MR. McCAUGHEY: I do, your Honor. I have observed 
3 Mr. Gall over a period of six months now. And I have observed 
4 an improvement in his cognitive ability, his ability to 
5 understand whatfs going on, in his relationship with me. It's 
6 been a positive improvement all along. 
7 And he and I have talked at length about what we1re 
8 doing here. And I believe he has a good grasp of whatfs going 
9 on and I believe he understands everything. 
10 THE COURT: Is there any reason that you believe we 
11 should not go forward today with the acceptance of these 
12 pleas? 
13 MR. McCAUGHEY: No, there's not. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gall, are you able to 
15 read the English language? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: How much schooling have you had? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I graduated from college with 
19 I a bachelors. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. So you have got a bachelors 
21 degree? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
23 THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to read a 
24 statement of the constitutional rights you give up by entering 
25 a plea? 
THE DEFENDANT; What was that again? 
THE COURT: Did you read that document — 
Mr, McCaughey there has a rather lengthy document — 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: — that explains in written form all the 
constitutional rights you give up by entering a plea of 
guilty. Have you had an opportunity to read that document? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you also have an opportunity to speak 
with Mr. McCaughey about the constitutional rights you give up 
by entering a plea? 
THE DEFENDANT; Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you also speak with him about the 
basis of these charges, the possible penalty, and the nature 
of these allegations against you? 
THE DEFENDANT; Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you feel like you need any more time 
to speak with Mr. McCaughey? 
THE DEFENDANT; No. 
THE COURT; And, Mr. Gall, are you satisfied with the 
representation he's given you in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT; Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT; All right. Thank you. 
Mr. McCaughey, you have previously stated that you 
believed that Mr. Gall is capable of going forward this 
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1 morning. And he's indicated he has reviewed his rights with 
2 you; is that correct? 
3 MR. McCAUGHEY: He has. 
4 THE COURT: Do you believe he understands the 
5 constitutional rights that he gives up? 
6 MR. McCAUGHEY: I believe he does. 
7 THE COURT: Do you believe also that he understands 
8 the possibilities with regard to sentencing in this case? 
9 MR. McCAUGHEY: I do. We've gone over the sentencing 
10 possibilities: Consecutive versus concurrent, credit for time 
11 served, where he is going to be housed, et cetera. We have 
12 gone over that extensively and I believe he understands. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Will you then give me the 
14 factual basis supporting each of these charges. 
15 MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, on December 14th of 2001, 
16 at the address stated in the Information, Mr. Gall entered his 
17 house, his mother's house, with the intent to — or remained 
18 in his mother's house with the intent to commit a felony. At 
19 that time he recklessly caused her death. And, after that, he 
20 took the car and then went to Reno. 
21 Those are the factual bases that led to the charges 
22 and to the two guilty pleas. I think that there is a 
23 different factual basis that leads to not guilty by reason of 
24 J insanity, but those are the facts for the first two. ^^te^f [\ 
25 I THE COURT: I'll speak about that a little later. 
1 MR. McCAUGHEY: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: The allegation also — that is, with 
3 regard to the Manslaughter charge — is that he used a 
4 dangerous weapon when he caused the death of his mother, Susan 
5 Gall. 
6 MR. McCAUGHEY: I believe the evidence will show that 
7 that involved an axe, possibly a knife, but at least an axe. 
8 THE COURT: And that was what caused her death; is 
9 that correct? 
10 MR. McCAUGHEY: Right. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Gall, is that what you did? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Uh, yes. 
13 THE COURT: Do you understand that that is the 
14 conduct you are admitting to by entering a plea of guilty 
15 today? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
17 THE COURT: Do you understand that you're admitting 
18 to having killed your mother in this manner, and also you're 
19 admitting to stealing this car and, in fact, taking the car 
20 for several days, ultimately being picked up in Reno, Nevada? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that the 
23 disposition in this case anticipates that you will enter a 
24 plea of guilty and mentally ill to this charge? 
25 I want to make sure you understand that a plea of 
1 guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty to the charge. 
2 Itfs not contingent upon anything that might happen in the 
3 future. 
4 As part of this type of a plea, I will ask for some 
5 mental health evaluations. I will consider them. But, 
6 regardless of the outcome, what I will look at is what your 
7 mental state is currently, your mental health issues 
8 currently. 
9 If I find that you're not mentally ill at the 
10 present time, that doesn't make any difference with regard to 
11 the entry of this plea. You're entering a plea of guilty, and 
12 you will be sentenced in some manner reflecting your guilt in 
13 this matter. 
14 Do you understand that this is not going to be 
15 removed in any way, this plea? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: No one told you anything other than that? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: No one did? You understand that this is 
20 J an absolute plea and it's not going to change? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. What I am really going to be 
23 I looking at is more toward where you will be living, where you 
24 will be placed. I will not be looking at a modification of 
25 the guilty plea itself. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any questions about that, 
Mr. Gall? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: All right. I want to make sure that you 
also understand that you are giving up your right to go to 
trial. We had a trial set in this case, set for, in fact, all 
of next week. You're giving up your right to bring your own 
witnesses, the right to confront witnesses against you. 
If you go to trial, you are presumed innocent. You 
don't have to testify against yourself nor prove your 
innocence. The burden is upon the State of Utah to prove each 
element of each of these charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You have a right to a speedy trial; that is, you 
have a constitutional right to have this case move with due 
speed through the court system. You have a right to an 
attorney throughout the proceedings. 
You have a right to a jury trial. The jury must be 
composed of a panel of impartial jurors. It must be a 
unanimous verdict before you can be convicted. 
And you have a right to appeal the conviction. Your 
right to appeal a plea of guilty is much more limited. 
Mr. Gall, do you understand that that is the case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor, 
THE COURT: Do you understand also that those are 
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1 constitutional rights you give up by entering a plea? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: Letfs talk a little bit about sentencing. 
4 I want to explain to you the maximum sentences for these 
5 offenses. 
6 The Second Degree Felony Manslaughter can carry with 
7 it an indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of one to 15 
8 years, a fine of $10,000 plus an 85 percent surcharge. That 
9 changes when there is the addition of a dangerous weapon 
10 enhancement. And that means that I can order that you serve 
11 up to two years to 15 years at the Utah State Prison or even 
12 two years to 20 years at the Utah State Prison for the 
13 manslaughter conviction. 
14 With regard to the Theft, a Second Degree Felony, I 
15 can order that you serve an indeterminate term at the Utah 
16 State Prison of one to 15 years, pay a fine of $10,000 plus an 
17 85 percent surcharge. 
18 Mr. Gall, I want you to understand also that, with 
19 regard to sentencing, all sentencing decisions are my 
20 decisions. I have spoken extensively with the attorneys in 
21 this case and will continue to do so. I have reviewed mental 
22 health records and will continue to do so. I want you to 
23 understand that they are very much a part of the sentencing 
24 and the disposition in this case. 
25 But, ultimately, the person who makes all decisions 
with regard to sentencing is me. I am the one who will be 
doing that. I am not bound to accept recommendations. I will 
be the one that will make all decisions with regard to 
sentencing, including whether any commitments I may order will 
run concurrently — that is, at the same time as each other --
or consecutively — one after another. 
I will make a determination, in large part, about 
where you are going to be housed. I anticipate that, for an 
extended period of time, you will be housed at the Utah State 
Hospital. But, again, I am the one who makes that 
determination and I will do so when I receive the necessary 
information from the State Hospital, itself, as well as other 
mental health evaluations. 
Do you understand that I am the one who is making 
those decisions? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Did anyone tell you anything other than 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Did anyone promise you any kind of 
treatment from the Court, anything, so that you would enter 
this plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: Would you say that again? 
THE COURT: Did anyone make any promises to you, 
particularly about what I might do by way of sentencing? 
16 
1 MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, I did indicate to 
2 Mr. Gall that we had spoken with you and it was your 
3 indication that you did not intend to impose a fine in this 
4 case. The decision had not been made, but that was your 
5 initial impression based on where he was going to be. 
6 THE COURT: That's correct. 
7 MR. McCAUGHEY: Other than that, has there been any 
8 promises made? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Uh, no. 
10 THE COURT: And you understand I will make a decision 
11 with regard to the fine. But, at this point, itTs frankly 
12 unlikely that I will impose a fine in this case. But, then 
13 again, I will make that decision at the time of sentencing, 
14 I make that determination at the time of sentencing. Do you 
15 understand that? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Gall, has anyone threatened 
18 you so that you would enter a plea today? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
20 THE COURT: Has anyone forced you in any way? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
22 THE COURT: Has anyone compelled you in any way to 
23 enter this plea today, these two pleas today? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
25 THE COURT: Are you doing this of your own free will? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And are you doing it because you 
committed these two offenses? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions that I can 
answer for you now, Mr. Gall? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll ask that you sign that statement 
now. 
(The defendant signs his Statement of Defendant.) 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Did you want to go into the not 
guilty by reason of insanity? 
THE COURT: No. I will do that later. 
I have before me now a statement that has been 
signed by the defendant and by counsel. 
Mr. Gall, how then do you plead to the charge of 
Criminal Homicide Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, at 
2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
or about December 14th of 2001, the allegation being that you 
recklessly caused the death of Susan Gall; further, that you 
used a dangerous weapon, or a facsimile of a dangerous weapon, 
or the representation of a dangerous weapon, in the commission 
of this criminal homicide? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty and mentally ill. 
THE COURT: And how do you plead to the charge of 
i a 
1 Theft, a Second Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, Salt 
2 Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 14th of 2001, 
3 the allegation being that you exercised unauthorized control 
4 over the operable motor vehicle of Susan Gall with the purpose 
5 to deprive the owner thereof? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty and mentally ill. 
7 THE COURT: I'll accept both pleas of guilty and 
8 mentally ill. You have a right to file a motion to withdraw 
9 these pleas before sentence is announced. I am also now 
10 signing the Statement of Defendant and I incorporate it into 
11 the court record. I find the pleas to be knowing, intelligent 
12 and voluntary this morning. 
13 Let's move on now to Count III. Count III reads as 
14 follows: Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, at 2925 
15 I East 2965 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or 
16 about December 14th of 2001, the allegation being that 
17 Mr. Gall, a party to the offense, entered or remained 
18 unlawfully in the dwelling of Susan Gall, with the intent to 
19 commit an assault, and was armed with a dangerous weapon, to 
20 wit: a knife and a hatchet. 
21 MR. McCAUGHEY: That's fine. 
22 J THE COURT: I believe, by stipulation of the parties, 
23 you have agreed that I will enter a verdict with regard to 
24 Count III of not guilty by reason of insanity. 
25 Mr. McCaughey, is that true? 
1 MR. McCAUGHEY: That is, your Honor. And thatfs 
2 based on the reports of Dr. Mirow and Dr. Cohn and 
3 Dr. Rindflesh that have been submitted to this Court over the 
4 period of this case. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Murphy, is the State stipulating to 
6 this verdict? 
7 MR. MURPHY: Yes, the State is, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Will you give me a basis for this 
9 particular disposition? 
10 MR. MURPHY: As an evidentiary matter, your Honor, 
11 I evidence located by the defense, Mr. McCaughey has called into 
12 question the precise content of Mr. Gall's delusion at the 
13 time that he committed these offenses. Based upon that, there 
14 has been some doubt interjected as to whether he might 
15 otherwise receive a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict 
16 I were the case to proceed to trial. 
17 I As a practical matter, the not-guilty-by-reason-of-
18 insanity judgment that you are entering will provide the 
19 J Court, your Honor, with lifetime jurisdiction to supervise 
20 this defendant, quite apart from the criminal sanctions, and 
21 to assure that he continues to comply with treatment and to 
22 protect himself and the public from being dangerous in the 
23 future. 
24 THE COURT: And, Mr. Murphy, you stated earlier, in 
25 general, that the family of Susan Gall have reviewed this 
1 entire disposition and were in agreement with it as well. 
2 MR. MURPHY: That's correct, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: And that includes this not-guilty-by-
4 reason-of-insanity finding by this Court and the entry of that 
5 verdict? 
6 MR. MURPHY: That's correct, your Honor. 
7 MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, if I may. 
8 Also, part of the reason for entering into this plea 
9 agreement is that, had this matter gone to trial, we could 
10 have ended up with the same not-guilty--by-reason-of-insanity 
11 verdict in reference to the homicide charge that we have on 
12 the aggravated burglary. But we would have been taking a risk 
13 that Mr. Gall could have been convicted on the First Degree 
14 Murder charge, which would have resulted in a guilty but 
15 mentally ill but then would have resulted in a commitment to 
16 the Utah State Prison for five to life. 
17 That is something we were, most assuredly, trying to 
18 avoid. And this plea agreement has allowed us to do that and 
19 gives us the same benefit that we would have had, had he been 
20 found not guilty by reason of insanity at trial. 
21 THE COURT: All right. And I am in agreement with 
22 the assessment. I have spent a great deal of time on this 
23 case. And I believe that both the pleas of guilty and 
24 mentally ill to Counts I and Count II and the verdict of not 
25 guilty by reason of insanity to Count III are sound and 
1 appropriate in this case. 
2 And I believe it is a disposition that is in the 
3 best interests of all parties involved, and that includes 
4 Susan Gall's family, and also Mr. Gall, Leonard Gall. I 
5 believe that it is, in fact, the most appropriate disposition 
6 in this case. 
7 Mr. Gall, I'm prepared to accept and issue a verdict 
8 of not guilty by reason of insanity to the charge of 
9 Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony. I want you to 
10 understand, Mr. Gall, that the maximum penalty for this 
11 offense is a commitment of five years to life at the Utah 
12 State Prison. And by entering this verdict — had you been 
13 convicted of a first degree felony — 
14 And by entering this verdict, this Court will 
15 maintain — will have the ability to maintain jurisdiction 
16 over this case, over that count — and that means specifically 
17 over you — for as long as the prison could have. That means 
18 up to your entire lifetime. And that's part of what's going 
19 on with the acceptance of this disposition of not guilty by 
20 reason of insanity. 
21 Do you understand that will afford this Court 
22 lifetime jurisdiction over where you are; do you understand 
23 that that's true? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Did you say that I can be at the Utah 
25 I State Prison during this whole time? 
1 THE COURT: Not on this charge. 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: You can be in the Utah State Prison on 
4 your pleas of guilty and mentally ill, on those two second 
5 degree felonies. You cannot be at the Utah State Prison under 
6 a not guilty verdict. 
7 But you can and will be under the jurisdiction of 
8 this Court until this Court relinquishes jurisdiction. And 
9 this Court has the ability to have jurisdiction -- that is, to 
10 basically control where you are — for your entire life. Do 
11 you understand that that's true? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: I thought after my two — after my 
13 two one to 15s were done, that I would automatically go to the 
14 State Hospital. 
15 THE COURT: That may be the case. Mr. Gall, it's 
16 hard to predict at this point what's going to happen in what 
17 could be a 30-year period. 
18 You cannot spend more than 30 years at the Utah 
19 State Prison because that's the maximum that I can order a 
20 prison commitment for on two second degree felonies. Your 
21 placement after that really is something that's up to me or 
22 the judge who succeeds me in this position. 
23 I Do you understand that? 
24 MR. McCAUGHEY: But she can't send you back to the 
25 I prison. You can be in the State Hospital or in some sort of 
form of conditional release or something like that, but it 
would not be at the prison. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that that's the case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Also, the law does require that I make 
specific findings with regard to the entry of this kind of a 
disposition, whether there is a victim of the crime for which 
I am accepting the verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, and if the victim wishes to be notified of any 
conditional release, discharge or escape. 
And with regard to the burglary charge, Mr. Murphy, 
I understand the victim is Leonard Gallfs brother, Michael. 
MR. MURPHY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And is it his desire to be notified, 
consistent with the statutory requirements? 
MR. MURPHY: It is, your Honor. And also a close 
family member — in fact, Susan Gall's brother — Ted Jenkins 
is also here today. He would also like to receive that 
notification. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No. 
23 I THE COURT: I believe that is appropriate. And I 
24 will indicate also that Ted Jenkins wishes to be informed with 
25 regard to any conditional release, discharge or escape. 
/innoft 24 
1 Upon the acceptance of a verdict of not guilty by 
2 reason of insanity, the Court must conduct a hearing within 
3 ten days of today to make a determination of whether Mr. Gall 
4 is currently mentally ill. I believe that this Court can go 
5 forward with that hearing today, based on a number of factors. 
6 I The most important and most compelling in my mind is that, 
7 within the last month, the Court received updates from 
8 Dr. Nancy Cohn and Dr. Mark Rindflesh, who were the original 
9 mental health examiners in this case — both of whom did an 
10 update in August of this year — as well as a brief but 
11 current report by Susan Mirow. 
12 Mr. McCaughey, do you feel like, based on that 
13 I current information, 1 can go forward this morning with that 
14 hearing? 
15 MR. McCAUGHEY: I do. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Murphy? 
17 MR. MURPHY: The State feels that way as well, your 
18 Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right. 
20 Mr. McCaughey, your proffer with regard to 
21 Mr. Gall's mental illness, current mental illness? 
22 MR. McCAUGHEY: I believe, after reading Dr. Mirowfs 
23 report, and Dr. Rindflesh and Dr. Cohn, I think he still has 
24 an on-going mental illness. I understand it!s being treated 
25 with medication but it is still present. And I think that 
1 meets the statutory criteria that the Court needs to find. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Murphy, are you in agreement with 
3 that? 
4 MR. MURPHY: Yes, your Honor, We think he still 
5 suffers from mental illness. We think that he still poses a 
6 substantial, if not immediate, threat to himself or others, 
7 particularly given his history of noncompliance with 
8 medication when he!s not compelled to comply. 
9 THE COURT: All right. And I am in agreement with 
10 that, having reviewed all of that documentation. 
11 With regard to Mr. Gall's mental illness, I will 
12 make the following findings: I find then that, by clear and 
13 convincing evidence, that the defendant, Leonard Gall, is 
14 still mentally ill; and also find by clear and convincing 
15 I evidence that, because of that mental illness, the defendant 
16 presents a substantial danger to himself or others. 
17 I On that basis, Mr. Gall, I am ordering your 
18 J commitment under the verdict of not guilty and mentally ill to 
19 the Utah State Hospital. 
20 With regard to Counts I and Count II, the guilty and 
21 mentally ill sentences, the statute requires that, prior to 
22 sentencing under those provisions, I notify the Director of 
23 I the Department of Human Services about this verdict, or the 
24 J acceptance of these pleas, and permit her — to give her 
25 notice, and permit her and her department at the Utah State 
1 Hospital to examine Mr. Gall prior to sentencing on this case. 
2 I believe that can be done at the State Hospital. 
3 I will request the Director of Human Services to 
4 permit that evaluation to be done at the Utah State Hospital. 
5 I don't anticipate any difficulties with that, based on the 
6 fact that I have ordered Mr. Gall to be housed at the Utah 
7 State Hospital under the other provision. 
8 Mr. McCaughey, Mr. Murphy, we talked a few moments 
9 ago in chambers and talked about setting the sentencing out 
10 approximately six months so that Mr. Gall can have a 
11 sufficient time at the Utah State Hospital to be thoroughly 
12 J evaluated by the psychiatrists at the Utah State Hospital. 
13 Is that your request then, Mr. Murphy? 
14 MR. MURPHY: Yes, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: And Mr. McCaughey, as you know, Mr. Gall 
16 has a right to be sentenced on these cases between two days 
17 from now and 45 days from now. I can set the sentencing out 
18 longer if you agree to that. 
19 MR. McCAUGHEY: We will waive the time for 
20 J sentencing, your Honor, as long as it's clear that we will be 
21 arguing for credit for time served from today, the date that 
22 he entered his plea at least, and also from the time he 
23 started to serve his time in the jail when he was booked into 
24 jail. But, at least, I want that clear, that that's the basis 
25 J that we're waiving it is that we have the right to ask for 
1 credit for time served. 
2 THE COURT: And, certainly, as I indicated earlier, I 
3 will listen to arguments and recommendations with regard to 
4 sentencing. But, again, I am the one who is going to make the 
5 decision in that regard. 
6 Mr. McCaughey, you certainly are aware of that. 
7 MR. McCAUGHEY: I understand that, your Honor. But, 
8 just for the record, we do desire that he be evaluated at the 
9 Utah State Hospital. 
10 THE COURT: That then will be my order. Letfs get a 
11 sentencing date in early March. 
12 How about the 15th of March? 
13 MR. McCAUGHEY: The Ides of March. 
14 THE COURT: The Ides of March. You can remember it 
15 that way. 
16 MR. McCAUGHEY: What time? 
17 THE COURT: 2 o ' c l o c k . 
18 MR. McCAUGHEY: That's all right. 
19 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Murphy? 
20 MR. MURPHY: Yes. Michael Gall, the defendant's 
21 brother, is here. He has asked leave to be heard by the Court 
22 now that the plea has been entered. And I will tell you also 
23 J that he is going to be asking that a no-contact order be 
24 entered between the defendant and himself. 
25 THE COURT: I certainly think that's appropriate. 
1 That's something I can order at the present time. 
2 Any objection to Mr. Gall speaking now, 
3 Mr. McCaughey? 
4 MR. McCAUGHEY: No. May we be excused while that 
5 happens? 
6 THE COURT: I111 actually ask that you go over by the 
7 jury box so that Mr. Gall can speak. And Leonard Gall, if you 
8 will go over with your attorney. 
9 Are you Michael Gall? 
10 GENTLEMAN SPEAKING: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. And you wish to say something 
12 then? 
13 GENTLEMAN SPEAKING: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 GENTLEMAN SPEAKING: Here? 
16 THE COURT: Yeah. You can just stand right there. 
17 No, you don't have to go on the witness stand. 
18 GENTLEMAN SPEAKING: Right here. Okay. 
19 Umm, I know that I will speak again at the 
20 sentencing hearing. But I just wanted to say, umm, first off, 
21 I still love my brother, umm, but I don't understand why he 
22 took our mom's life. She was always good to him. 
23 I Umm, I also want to say that he has given a lot of 
24 pain to me and to my family. But I forgive him. I don't have 
25 I any anger towards him. 
But the only person I really have any anger against 
is my father. And I know my father. If he wasn't like the 
way he was, maybe none of this would have happened. 
I don't blame my brother, I don't. The most person 
I blame is my father. And I would -- I love my brother. But 
I never want to see my father again. That's all. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Gall. 
Mr. McCaughey, if you and Mr. Gall will come back 
for a moment to the podium. 
I intend to recess court in a few moments. But 
also, before doing that, I will say a few words about this 
case. 
This case, from beginning to end, is a tremendous 
tragedy for everybody involved — for the Gall family, for the 
community. I never met Susan Gall. But I have read some of 
her words and I have heard about her from people. Her loss 
and the circumstances of her death are as tragic as any that 
we can see in a court. 
Mr. Gall, with regard to your life now and the past 
year and a half and in the future, it's hard to imagine the 
horror you must live in on a daily basis, having taken the 
life of your mother and the pain that your family members feel 
as a result of this. It has caused larger pain, though, also 
through this entire community. 
The community in Utah has responded to this. The 
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1 legislature has passed legislation that hopefully will prevent 
2 this type of a situation from ever happening again. 
3 Mr. Gall, you suffer from an extreme mental illness, 
4 a mental illness that you cannot control, and that one of the 
5 symptoms is not taking medications. It goes along with the 
6 mental illness, and that's typical. 
7 And what that has left us with is a community with 
8 the obligation of caring for people in your situation — or 
9 not the "obligation." It leaves the question up of that. 
10 And our community has not, in the past, taken steps 
11 to be actively involved in the lives of people such as you. 
12 In retrospect, we would all like to look back and say, maybe 
13 if Leonard Gall had stayed on his medications, maybe if we had 
14 resources for him, maybe if the family was able to somehow get 
15 him some help, all of this wouldn't have happened. 
16 And maybe all of that's true. But that didn't 
17 happen. And we are left here today having to recognize the 
18 horror and the tragedy that your conduct and your life and the 
19 circumstances have resulted in. 
20 I have no answers with regard to those issues, 
21 Mr. Gall. But I can tell you that they're of a daily concern 
22 to me and to many people in this community. 
23 J With that, Mr. McCaughey, I appreciate your work on 
24 this case. 
25 I Mr. Murphy, Ms. Cameron. 
1 We'11 be in recess. 
2 MR. McCAUGHEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
3 (These proceedings concluded at 10:53 a.m.) 
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1 C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, SUZANNE WARNICK, RDR, CSR, do certify that I am a 
5 nationally certified Registered Diplomate Reporter with the 
6 Certificate of Merit, and also a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
7 in and for the State of Utah. 
8 That at the time and place of the proceedings in the 
9 foregoing matter, I appeared as the official court reporter in 
10 the Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judith S. 
11 I Atherton, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the 
12 J proceedings had therein. That, thereafter, my said shorthand 
13 I notes of the Change of Plea Proceedings were transcribed by 
14 computer into the foregoing pages; and, after editing, this 
15 I constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of the same. 
16 WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
17 I this, the 4th day of March, 2004. 
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vs. 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN 
SUPPORT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY 
ILL PLEA, PURSUANT TO §77-16a-103, 
UTAH CODE ANN., AND STATEMENT OF 
COUNSEL 
Case No: 011919226 FS 
JUDGE JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
I, Leonard Preston Gall, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and 
that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty and mentally ill to the following crimes: 
Crime and Statutory 
Provision 
Manslaughter, U.C.A § 76-5-205, 
with dangerous weapon enhancement, 
U.C.A. § 76-3-203 
Theft of automobile, U.C.A. § 
76-6-404 
Degree 
2nd degree 
felony 
2nd degree 
felony 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
2 years to 15 years prison, may be 
2 years to 20 years; $10,000 
fine plus 85% surcharge 
1 to 15 years prison; $10,000 
fine plus 85% surcharge 
In addition, I am stipulating that the Court will enter judgment of "not guilty by reason of 
insanity," on a charge of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony under U.C.A. § 76-6-203. I 
acknowledge and certify my understanding that under this "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
judgment, I am subject, in addition to the criminal penalties for my above-described "guilty and 
mentally ill" pleas, to commitment to the Utah Department of Human Services for involuntary 
mental health treatment; further, that the period of such commitment may, under U.C.A. 77-16a-
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302, extend for a period of five years to life, subject to periodic review by the trial court. 
I have received a copy of the Amended Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
and mentally ill. 
Factual Basis for Pleas 
The elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty and mentally ill are: 
Manslaughter: that on or about December 14, 2001, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, I did recklessly cause the death of my mother, Susan Gall, 
and that I used a dangerous weapon to do so. 
Theft of Automobile: that on or about December 14,2001, at 2925 East 2965 South, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, I did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
operable motor vehicle of my mother, Susan Gall, with the purpose to deprive her of that 
automobile. 
I understand that by pleading guilty and mentally ill I will be admitting that I committed 
the crimes listed above. I stipulate that the following facts describe the conduct for which I am 
criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the trial court to accept my guilty and mentally 
ill pleas and prove the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty and mentally ill: 
At the above-described place and time, I was suffering from a serious mental illness, and 
for several months I had not been taking the medication prescribed to control the symptoms of 
my illness. By refusing to take my prescribed medications, I acted recklessly. As a result, I was 
experiencing delusions caused by my mental illness, and acting upon those delusions, I attacked 
my mother in her bedroom with a knife and a hatchet, killing her. I then took her automobile, 
eventually driving it to Reno, Nevada, where I was arrested about two days later. 
These facts also create a substantial risk, were this case to proceed to trial, that I would be 
found guilty of criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony as charged in the originally-filed 
Information in this Court, as well as theft of an automobile. I am entering into this plea 
agreement, in part, to avoid this risk. 
Factual Basis for Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Judgment 
I understand that aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, occurs when a person enters 
or remains unlawfully in the dwelling of another, with the intent to commit an assault on any 
person, and uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who 
is not a participant in the crime. Based upon the report of an expert witness, retained by the 
defense in this case, a question has been raised about the content of my delusional thinldng at the 
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time that I killed my mother; in particular, the question is whether I had the intent to assault or 
kill another human being. I understand that based upon the existence of this question, the 
prosecution has agreed to the "not guilty by reason of insanity" judgment on this charge. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas, and consenting to the "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
judgment, voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the constitutions of 
Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty and mentally ill I will give 
up all the following rights: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is Stephen R. McCaughey. My 
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty 
and mentally ill pleas, along with the consequences of the "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
judgment. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury, and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty and mentally ill. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, 
a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me, and; b) my 
attorney would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against 
me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses if I 
chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of 
those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those 
costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold that choice against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I 
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crimes. If I choose to 
fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At 
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty and mentally ill, I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crimes stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty and mentally ill. I understand that if I wish to appeal my 
sentence I must file a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days after my sentence is entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty and mentally ill I am waiving and giving 
up all the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty And Mentally 111 Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty and mentally ill. I know that my sentence may include a prison 
term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime(s), which 
include my mother's immediate family. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). 
Plea Agreement. My guilty and mentally ill pleas, and the entry of the "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" judgment, are the result of a plea agreement between my attorney, in full 
consultation with me, and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of 
the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
Upon the entry of my guilty and mentally ill pleas as stated above, the State will 
recommend that I be committed to the Utah State Hospital for evaluation and treatment, 
with periodic review by the trial court, until commitment to the State Hospital is no 
longer clinically necessary. At the end of that time, the trial court will sentence me, on 
the "guilty and mentally ill" pleas to counts I and II of the Amended Information, within 
the maximum terms elsewhere set forth in this Statement. 
I also reiterate my understanding and agreement that regardless of the terms and duration 
of my ultimate criminal sentence under my guilty and mentally ill pleas, I will remain 
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legally committed for involuntary mental health treatment, under the trial court's ongoing 
jurisdiction, for a period extending beyond my criminal sentence, and which could 
continue for the rest of my life, with regular review by the trial court. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or any 
sentencing recommendation, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting 
attorney, or jointly recommended by the defense and the prosecution, are not binding on the 
judge. I also know that any opinions counsel express to me as to what they believe the judge may 
do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering these pleas of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty and mentally ill. No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 26 years of age. I have attended school through bachelor's degree. University of 
Utah. I can read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty and 
mentally ill. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which 
impair my judgment. Instead, I have been taking the medication prescribed for my mental 
illness, enabling me to freely, rationally, and voluntarily enter into this plea agreement. 
Based upon my current compliance with my prescribed treatment, I believe myself to be 
of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and 
the consequences of my guilty and mentally ill pleas, as well as the consequences of the "not 
guilty by reason of insanity" judgment. I am not currently suffering from an impairment that 
would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entering my pleas. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty and mentally ill pleas, I must file 
a written motion to withdraw my pleas before sentence is announced. I will only be allowed 
to withdraw my guilty and mentally ill pleas if I prove that they were not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my pleas made after sentencing must 
be pursued under the Post Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this / a day of. ,2003. 
ENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for Leonard Preston GalL the defendant above, and that I 
know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him; I have discussed it with him and 
believe that he folly understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent to proceed with the plea agreement described herein. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime and the factual synopsis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Statement, are accurate 
and true. 
S WHEKTL McCAUGHEY 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Utah State Bar No. 2149 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Leonard Preston 
Gall, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual bases for 
the defendant's criminal conduct constituting the offenses are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea have been directed toward defendant. The 
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the Plea Agreement, or as 
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supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
prosecution evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offenses for which the 
pleas are entered, or for the greater offense of criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony, as 
well as motor vehicle theft. Finally, in light of this defendant's well-documented prior history of 
serious mental illness, and upon consultation with and the consent of the victim's family, I 
believe that the acceptance of the pleas would serve the public interest. 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
DEPUTY DISTRICT. 
Bar No. 5768 
TORNEY 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty and mentally ill pleas are freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. The Court further finds that the defendant has freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily agreed that a judgment of "not guilty by reason of insanity" will be entered on a 
charge of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty and mentally ill pleas to the 
crimes set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered, and that judgment of "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" on aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, is also entered. 
DATED this /& day of September, 2003. 
BY THE CO 
DNORASf 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEONARD PRESTON GALL, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
LAW AND MOTION 
NOTICE 
Case No: 011919226 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Date: September 10, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Reporter: WARNICK, SUZANNE 
Prosecutor: ANNE A CAMERON 
J KEVIN MURPHY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEPHEN R. MCCAJGHEY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 3, 1976 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. MANSLAUGHTER - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty-Mentally 111 - Disposition: 09/10/2003 Guilty 
Mental 111 
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty-Mentally 111 - Disposition: 09/10/2003 Guilty 
Mental 111 
3. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty-Insanity - Disposition: 09/10/2003 Not 
Guilty -Insanity 
Case No: 011919226 
Date: Sep 10, 2003 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
HEARING 
COURT FINDS BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT IS 
STILL MENTALLY ILL AND POSES SUBSTANTIAL DANGER TO HIMSELF AND 
OTHERS. ORDER TO COMMIT TO STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL TO BE SUBMITTED 
BY COUNSEL. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/15/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON _ 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days 
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is 
(801)238-7300. 
0004? 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
ANNE A. CAMERON (8865) 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEONARD PRESTON GALL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF COMMITMENT TO 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
PURSUANT TO "NOT GUILTY BY 
REASON OF INSANITY" JUDGMENT, 
AND NOTICE OF PROPOSED 
COMMITMENT UNDER "GUILTY AND 
MENTALLY" ILL PLEAS 
Case No. 011919226 
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton 
On September 10, 2003, the parties to this case, represented by their respective counsel, 
appeared for entry of "guilty and mentally ill" pleas on counts I (manslaughter, with dangerous 
weapon enhancement) and II (automobile theft) of the Amended Information, and for stipulated 
entry of judgment of "not guilty by reason of insanity" on count EH (aggravated burglary). Upon 
inquiry of defendant and counsel, and review of the written plea statement executed by the 
parties and their counsel, the Court accepted those pleas on counts I and II, and entered the 
"insanity judgment on count HI. 
" l E D DISTRICT COURT 
»'^d Judicial District 
SEP \ : 2093 
SALT LAKpegphh 
Deputy ClerT 
ORDER OF COMMITMENT TO DHS 
State vs. Gall 
(gall NGRI commitment) PAGE 2 
Defendant Gall, on advice of counsel and with the prosecution's consent, then waived the 
maximum time for sentencing on counts I and II. Sentencing on those counts is hereby set for 
March 15, 2004, at 2:00 PM. 
The Court then proceeded to disposition on the "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
judgment on count m, aggravated burglary, under Utah Code § 77-16a-302 (2002). Based upon 
the several mental health evaluations previously submitted to the Court, and based upon the 
attorneys' review of the facts of this case and of the defendant's extensive mental health records, 
this Court FINDS, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant Gall is still mentally ill, and 
that because of his mental illness, he presents a substantial danger to himself or others. See Utah 
Code § 77-16a-302(2). Of particular concern in this regard is the defendant's well-documented 
history of major mental illness, his noncompliance with his prescribed psychotropic medication, 
and his history of threatening and violent behavior when such noncompliance causes his mental 
condition to decompensate. 
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that defendant Gall be committed to the Utah 
Department of Human Services for confinement, evaluation, and treatment of his mental illness 
at the Utah State Hospital. Count IE, aggravated burglary, is a first degree felony. Therefore, the 
period of defendant's commitment, for the "not guilty by reason of insanity" judgment on this 
count, maybe for the rest of defendant's life, Utah Code §§ 77-16a-302(3) (2002) and -303(1) 
(1992), but is subject to review by the Department of Human Services at least every six months, 
under the provisions of Utah Code § 77-16a-304 (1992). 
As required by Utah Code § 77-16a-303(2), the Court FINDS that there is a victim of the 
aggravated burglary. This victim is Michael Gall, defendant's brother. Victim Michael Gall 
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ORDER OF COMMITMENT TO DHS 
State vs. Gall 
(gall NGRI commitment) PAGE 3 
wishes to be notified of any conditional release, discharge, or escape of defendant Gall from the 
confinement provided by the Department of Human Services. Another victim is Ted Jenkins, 
brother of the deceased victim, who also requests notification. 
Sentencing on the "guilty and mentally ill" verdicts is scheduled for March 15,2004, at 
2:00 PM. At that time, the Court may commit defendant to the Department of Human Services 
pursuant to Utah Code § 77-16a-202 (2002). Per Utah Code § 77-16a-104(4) (2003), the Court 
hereby NOTIFIES the executive director of the Department of Human Services of this proposed 
placement, and invites the Department of Human Services to evaluate defendant and make a 
recommendation to the Court regarding defendant's sentence and placement on the "guilty and 
mentally ill" judgments. 
Regarding Human Services and State Hospital evaluation both on the "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" judgment and on the "guilty and mentally ill" pleas, attorneys for the 
prosecution and for the defense are hereby authorized, within thirty days of entry of this Order, to 
submit letters to the Department and the State Hospital, with copies to the Court, outlining their 
specific areas of concern regarding defendant. In order to make a more fully-informed decision 
regarding sentencing, the Court hereby requests that the Department and the State Hospital 
address those concerns as part of their evaluation of defendant Gall. 
ORDER OF COMMITMENT Tu DHS 
State vs. Gall 
(gall NGRI commitment) PAGE 4 
SO ORDERED this lb day of _ 
Stipulated and Approved as to Form: 
J. Kevin Murphy 
Deputy District Attdfaiey 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
^ , 2003. 
fj / v •; • X V 
v—JqbfKklSVH. ATHERfON 
a strict Cquri; Judge 
A A ft K i 
Apnl23,2004
 0,STRICT COHH I 
OUAPR23 PH 3t l*9 
Honorable Judge Atherton 
Third Judicial District Court *< "-< .• J^VJ/U. iJfSifijUT 
. \ UHjMQUNTY 
Re: Rule 4-603 Motion: " Tr'^y^^pov 
] State of Utah v. Leonard Preston Gall, Case No. 011919226;' "' "C ' 
Dear Judge Atherton 
There is some new information on my case, which was conveyed to my attorney 
some time ago, but he is out of town and unavailable and I wanted to make sure I met the 
deadline for filing a motion for reduction of offense at sentencing in time. I don't know 
why my attorney has not mentioned this option before, particularly in light of the new 
information. My father found Rule 4-603 by himself, just today, the last day to file the 
motion. 
The crux of the matter is that it is looking very likely it was really the psychiatric 
medications that precipitated/caused me to commit my crime. I am enclosing the not 
quite finished report of Dr. Ann Blake Tracy about this. 
What I would really like the court to do is allow us some time to sort out what 
should be done about this. However, because of the deadline for the Rule 4-603 motion, 
I am also formally asking that my offenses be reduced. 
It is my preference, however, that the sentencing hearing set for May 3rd be delayed and 
we use the time instead to decide what to do about this new information. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
LeonardTreston Gall 
I hereby certify that a copy of this motion was mailed to ftrvme- A-» (^owiey* ow 
on April 23, 2004. 
eonard Silvius Gall 
April 17, 2004 
£.11 f 
Honorable Judge Atherton F) K T R * T"P H i in'* 
Re: State of Utah vs. Leonard Preston Gall 
n TT
 M ^u «
 0k m 2 6 P# & 27 
Dear Honorable Atherton: i A 
I am the defendant, Leonard Preston Gall, the son of Susan Jenjjan^  ^ D L ^ ^ J y 
Leonard Silvius Gall and the brother of Michael Raymond Gall. I'mjsad because of this 
tragedy - sad for my mom, Susan, myself, for my dad, Leonard, Micha^S^pT^f^ 
mother, her brothers and sisters, all their relatives, friends and our whole community. I 
recognize my responsibility for my mom's death in December 2001.1 have felt deep 
sorrow and grief. I thought a lot about my mother and how good she was and I feel sorry 
for her and everyone else who has been hurt because of this. She was a great mother. I 
really loved her a lot. 
I am asking you to consider the new facts that have come forth since my 
September 10, 2003 hearing, with the overriding consideration that your upcoming 
sentencing be just. These facts include that I was prescribed Paxil eleven years ago at the 
age of 16 and that later my parents abruptly took me off the Paxil. The Paxil was 
improperly prescribed for simple anxiety problems without my parents being made aware 
of any serious reactions or withdrawal risks, including the high risk of adverse reactions 
to me due to my family's low blood sugar history. My parents were also not made aware 
that Paxil was not approved for use in anyone under the age of 18. Paxil was recently 
banned in the United Kingdom for use in anyone under the age of 18 and doctors in the 
United States have warned against it. Dr. Nancy B. Cohn's August 28, 2002 report and 
Dr Ann Blake Tracy's March 29, 2004 declarations further confirm the adverse effects 
forme of Paxil shortly after my taking it, including "with documentation^of paranoia, 
grandiosity, loose associations and suicidal ideation" and the adverse effects of the 
various other serotonergic medications prescribed for me including Prozac, Trazadone, 
Wellbutrin, and Zyprexa, from 1993 to 2001. 
Zyprexa was prescribed and taken shortly before the violent incident on 12/14/01. 
Zyprexa's present package insert reports that and Dr. Ann Blake Tracy's March 29, 2004 
declaration states that "Akathisia levels while on Zyprexa jumped FIVE times as opposed 
to not being on the drug Akathisis is believed to be the reaction that produces suicide or 
violence while taking one of these serotonergic medications. So according to this package 
insert, the six pills of Zyprexa Mr. Gall ('Lenny') took in the days before the killing 
could have potentiated a violent episode by FIVE times." The package insert also states 
that delusions are a frequent adverse effect and I was clearly suffering from such 
delusions when the tragedy occurred. There is evidence before the court that had Paxil 
not been prescribed forme when I was 16, and/or had Zyprexa not been prescribed 
shortly before the incident, this tragedy probably never would have happened; I loved my 
mom. Also had the manufacturers of Paxil, Zyprexa, and the other drugs warned of the 
risks of suicide and homicide for certain people like myself this tragedy may never have 
happened. The suicide and homicide risks of anti-depressants are presently being 
investigated by our U.S. Senate. 
I am asking you to weigh these above mentioned new facts within the plea 
bargain I signed on September 10, 2003: Also, I'm asking you to consider the facts that I 
have always loved my mom and always wanted to protect her; that my mom invited me 
over to her house on December 14, 2001; that my brother let me in our house; that my 
mom and I always used et. 'other's car; that any of these offenses c Jfrom a single 
episode; that I have shown I am amenable to supervision; that I was exceptionally 
cooperative with law enforcement; that the offense represents a single incident with my 
not having any prior history of violence; that I'm doing well in the hospital including 
having been elected president of the forensic patients and am effectively carrying out 
these responsibilities. With these in mind, I am asking that you adjust/reduce the offenses 
or consider sentencing as follows: 
A. Offense adjustments/reductions 
1. Adjust the second-degree manslaughter with weapons enhancement to "Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity". 
2. Adjust the second-degree vehicle theft to "Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity". 
3. Such other different adjustment/reductions that the Court may find just. 
B. In the event the Court does not adjust/reduce the offenses to "Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity" as above, that the Court sentence as follows: 
1. Continue my treatment in the Utah State Hospital. 
2. Credit me for time served in the Jail and Hospital. 
3. Regarding each of the Guilty and Mentally 111 pleas, that you choose to have 
them run at the same time (concurrently). 
4. That under 76-3-203 and 76-3-203.8 you sentence me to indeterminate terms 
of 2-5 years for the plea - manslaughter with dangerous weapon enhancement 
and 1 to 5 years for the plea - theft of an automobile and that the sentences 
run concurrently - or whichever reduction the court chooses for each of these 
two pleas. 
5. Also, that under 77-18-1 (2)a, that the court after imposing sentences, suspend 
the execution of each of the above sentences or of any sentences and place me 
on bench probation under the jurisdiction of this Court - for each of the Guilty 
and Mentally 111 pleas. 
6. Also, that under 76-16a-301 to 76-16a-306, and under the other Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedures, that you adjust the "Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity5' 
on a charge of Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, to "Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity" on a charge of burglary (in a dwelling), a second degree 
felony, and that the commitment is clarified to extend for a period of up to 15 
years, subject to review by the trial court. That any time in the hospital be 
credited to time served of the Guilty and Mentally 111 sentences. 
7. Please have the entire case under the Court's jurisdiction rather than under the 
Board of Pardons. That way the Court can be assured I can be discharged only 
when and if the Court finds it's safe to do so. 
Some of my mother's friends and relatives have written letters to you. I think they 
may have extreme fears from a statement in some letters written when I was delusional. 
They may think I have plans, intents, or desires to kill or harm them. 
I do not have any plans, intentions, desires or even thoughts about killing or 
harming any friends or family of my mothers. In fact, I hope the absolute best for them. 
Also, I have no plans, intents, desires or thoughts of harming or killing anybody. 
The essential idea of my request is that the sentencing be structured so that if and 
when, but only if and when, I am found safe for a conditional release or discharge by the 
hospital and authorized by the Court, that such conditional release or discharge will be 
possible. 
Thank you for your consideration. ^ 
TeonXYA P^cf^*, n^v\ v.—^—y j Leonard Preston Gall 
cc: Leonard Silvius Gall 
0/SrRiCTAgfll^2004 
Judge MthAtherton 0 U P R 2 6 P H 2 : 2 7 
Third Judicial Court >;;. ^ „rt_ DISTRICT 
450 State Street * " x >" ** COWTY 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 \J\ 
' ' - W Y CLERK 
Dear Judge Atherton, 
I am Leonard (Len) Silvius Gall - 1 am Leonard (Lenny) Preston and Michael Gall's father. I 
was the husband of Susan Gall for over ten years (1972-1983). I am writing because while, I, like 
everyone else have been horror struck by this tragedy, I also would like to prevent a second 
tragedy of locking up my son for the rest of his life if that proves unnecessary. 
I am a Christian who believes in continuously protecting the health and welfare of my family, 
my sons, Lenny Preston and Michael and myself. I also believe in making every effort to get to 
the truth of important things. I am 61 years old. I have had 38 years of business experience and a 
Master's Degree in Business Administration from Stanford University. 
Susan and I were separated in 1981 and eventually divorced. She moved back to Utah with 
Michael and Lenny and I stayed living in Santa Barbara, California until moving to Utah two 
years ago to respond to this tragedy. During the separation and after the divorce, my sons each 
visited me about four weeks a year every year and I faithfully paid child support to their mother. 
The visits were always positive for each of us. I think I have always been a positive influence in 
each of my son's lives and plan to always be so. 
Lenny certainly never had any intent to harm or had any knowledge of harming his mother. 
Throughout his whole life, he has always loved and been protective of his mother. He always 
was an even-keeled, normal boy throughout the first 16 years of his life. He had a lot of friends 
and was well liked. He always treated people with great love and respect. He received A's and 
B's in school. He was involved in numerous extracurricular activities, including playing soccer, 
basketball, and volleyball. He was often elected the captain of those teams. He played trumpet in 
the band. He was a solid leader. 
I believe my son, Lenny, is now either not mentally ill or mentally ill for a different reason - the 
not mentally ill or different reason being the initial effect that Paxil, 11 years ago at age 16, and 
the subsequent other medications in 11 years, have had on him - particularly the effect of the 
Zyprexa which was prescribed and taken shortly before the incident on 12/14/01. Zyprexa's 
present package insert reports and Dr. Ann Blake Tracy's March 29, 2004 declaration states that 
"Akathisia levels while on Zyprexa jumped FIVE times as opposed to not being 
on the drug. Akathisia is believed to be the reaction that produces suicide or 
violence while taking one of these serotonergic medications. So according to this 
package insert, the six pills of Zyprexa Mr. Gall ('Lenny') took in the days before 
the killing could have potentiated a violent episode by FIVE times." 
The package insert also states that delusions are a frequent adverse effect and Lenny was clearly 
suffering from such delusions when the tragedy occurred. Up until the FDA on 2/3/04 first 
confirmed the suicide and violence risks of these drugs, I believed Lenny was mentally ill the 
last 11 years. Now I'm not so sure. He's certainly had significant psychological and/or psychotic 
reactions to these drugs. 
At 16 years old, in 1993, he was prescribed Paxil for simple anxiety - without me being aware of 
this being prescribed - my being unaware because his mother and I had been separated when 
Lenny was five and Michael was two - she living in Utah with Lenny and Michael, I in Santa 
Barbara. 
I also found out recently from Dr. Kohn's August 26, 2002 report and Dr. Anne Blake Tracy's 
March 29, 2004 report, that my son, Lenny, had significant psychological or psychotic reactions 
to Paxil shortly after he began taking it in 1993.1 knew nothing about those reactions previously 
until reading these reports. I'm shocked that Lenny was prescribed this drug when its known that 
there is greater adverse reaction risks to someone taking these drugs when low blood sugar is 
common in a person's family history - and I was diagnosed over 30 years ago with acute low 
blood sugar. 
Had I known in 1993 about Lenny's significant reactions to Paxil, I would have reviewed this 
with whomever prescribed the Paxil. However, even if I had known in 1993 and then reviewed it 
with whomever prescribed it, I, and any parent, still could have made serious mistakes about 
what to do about it. At that time, Paxil had recently come out and there were very few, if any, 
published adverse reactions to Paxil - even the tests of the drugs were not made public. 
However, Paxil, as you probably know, was not and has never been approved for use by anyone 
under the age of 18. In fact, Paxil was banned from use by the United Kingdom in people under 
the age of 18 and warnings against such use issued in the United States by the F.D.A. 
As it was, then in 1994, Lenny decided to go to college in the city I lived in - Santa Barbara. He 
brought his Paxil pills with him - the first time I became aware that he was taking them. So, me 
being an athlete playing different sports - volleyball, running, weightlifting, yoga, skiing, etc. - I 
suggested to Lenny to tone up and start exercising again like he did when he played on sports 
teams and quit the Paxil. Little did I, or his mom know he should have quit the Paxil over time -
even possibly taking a year to get off completely. Instead, I suggested he stop taking all of it and 
just begin exercising and playing sports. 
A few months later in 1995, Lenny then had his second significant reaction - abrupt withdrawal 
- to the Paxil (the first reaction being shortly after he began taking it), - including he was driving 
around the freeways of Los Angeles calling his mother and I, telling us that something was 
trying to torture him or us. So in retrospect, with the benefit of new knowledge about these 
drugs, it now appears all of the serious psychiatric symptoms were prescription drug caused 
culminating with the psychotic reaction to the just prescribed Zyprexa. 
I believe Lenny is now beginning to understand how and why that this happened and is 
effectively focused on living his life safely for himself and everyone. It seems to me that in light 
of all these circumstances, the most just sentencing would be structured so that Lenny can be 
nr*fK7 
released when and if, but only when, he is considered safe for a conditional release or discharge 
by the hospital and authorized by the Court. 
What Fm asking you to do, your Honor, is to consider how much Lenny loves and has always 
loved his mom, how he treats people well, and help give him the possibility of living a normal 
life again. It seems to me that the best option at this point is for Lenny just to be committed to the 
Utah State Hospital for "Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity" for all three offenses. However, if 
you decide otherwise I'm requesting you suspend, reduce, or suspend the execution of each part 
of his possible sentences/commitments - the guilty and mentally ill parts, the weapons 
enhancement part and the not guilty by reason of insanity part. 
It's highly probable that the medications were the root-cause of what happened. As we all are 
now beginning to more learn, these medications are not safe for a certain people, like Lenny, 
who has a family history of low blood sugar and who has a tendency to significantly and 
adversely react to them. 
I would therefore fervently request that your sentencing decisions take these circumstances into 
account and allow for the possibiHty for Lenny to be released, if and when, but only if and when 
it is considered safe to do so by the hospital and the Court. 
Thank you for your consideration of this request and may God grant you the wisdom to issue a 
just decision. 
Silvius Gall eonard (Len> 
LfiSfH'CfcOUKY 
m APR 26 PH 1<35 
V. LjptC COUNTY 
\A April 26,. 2004 
fu-pHTY CLERK 
Steve McCaughey 
Attorney 
10 West Broadway 
Suite 655 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dear Mr. McCaughey, 
I've lost confidence in your representation of me. I, therefore, am requesting that you 
withdraw as my counsel. 
cc: Judge Judith Atherton 
Ann A. Cameron 
Susanne Gustin, 
00059 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY - 2149 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 West Broadway, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6474 
Facsimile: (801) 364-5014 
FILED 
THIRD ?ic-"T-'.?-"•' COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BY. D'-P'Of 'i CLERK 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LEONARD PRESTON GALL, 
Defendant. 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 011919226 FS 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned attorney withdraws his appearance as counsel in the 
above-entitled matter on the basis and for the reason that the defendant has lost confidence in his 
attorney and wishes to retain other counsel. (See attached letter.) 
DATED this ^?7day of April, 2004. 
^STEPHEN R. McCAUQtfEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
DISTRICT COUHr 
0UAPR26 PM&21 
-,- . M., .MuOISTRiC.r 
. \ / i LAK£COOHTY 
Ann Blake Tracy, PhD ~-7?mmmr~ 
Health Sciences with emphasis on Psychology 
3851 Saddler Drive 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
USA 
Phone: 801-209-1800 Fax: 801-282-5282 E-mail: 
atracyphdl @aol. com 
March 29,2004 
Declaration of Ann Blake Tracy, PhD 
RE: Leonard Preston Gall - DOB 12/6/76 
Introduction 
I have been asked to give my expert opinion on the adverse effects of 
serotonergic chemicals which potentially trigger violence in the user and any 
possible role they may have played in this case. Lenny Gall's first 
experience with serotonergic medications was in 1993 at the age of 16. He 
was prescribed Paxil for simple anxiety without his parents being made 
aware of any serious adverse reactions or withdrawal risks. His parents were 
also not made aware that Paxil was not approved for use in anyone under the 
age of 18. After serious adverse psychiatric reactions to Paxil Lenny was 
continued on various serotonergic medications including, Prozac, trazadone, 
Wellbutrin, and Zyprexa, from 1993 to 2001. 
Zyprexa was prescribed for Lenny shortly before the violent incident on 
12/14/01. Akathisia levels while on Zyprexa jumped by FIVE times as 
opposed to not being on the drug! Akathisia is believed to be the reaction 
that produces suicide or violence while taking one of these serotonergic 
medications. So according to Zyprexa's package insert the six pills of 
Zyprexa Mr. Gall took in the days before the killing could have potentiated a 
violent episode by FIVE times. 
I have reviewed the police reports and evidence, doctor and hospital reports, 
news reports, autopsy reports, victim statements, medical records, etc. in the 
case of Leonard Preston Gall in order to give my expert opinion on the 
adverse effects of the serotonergic chemicals which potentially trigger 
violence in the user. 
In forming my opinion I have also interviewed Mr. Gall and his father in 
gathering information on this case and met with the staff at Utah State 
Hospital including Don Rosenbaum, Director of Forensic Administration, 
Dr. Paul Whitehead, Lenny's psychiatrist, and Greg Porter, Lenny's social 
worker. 
For a decade and a half I have researched, written, lectured, done radio, 
television, newspaper and magazine interviews on the subject of the SSRI 
and SNRI antidepressants. I have also written several books on this group of 
drugs, the most current being an approximately 500 page book on the Prozac 
family of antidepressants entitled Prozac: Panacea or Pandora? - Our 
Serotonin Nightmare. I have also produced an hour and a half long audio 
tape on the safest methods of withdrawal along with modalities that rebuild 
the body/brain after the damage caused by these drugs. 
Over the past 12 years I have testified as an expert witness in court cases 
involving out of character behavior including extreme violence triggered by 
these medications, as well as acting as a consultant for attorneys in a large 
number of these cases - many of which have since been settled by the drug 
manufacturers. Of course these were secret settlements with gag orders -
which I believe strongly should be made illegal because buying silence in 
these cases is an extreme hazard to public safety. If we are prevented from 
learning via the sad experience of others it will be our misfortune to learn by 
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our own sad experience due to that lack of warning. 
Serotonin, Suicide & Aggression - The Causal Connections 
Paxil is in a new class of antidepressant drugs known as Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs). Other popular drugs in this class of 
antidepressants are Prozac, Serafem, Zoloft, Luvox, Celexa, Lexapro; the 
Serotonin Norepinphrine Reuptake Inhibitors (SNRI) antidepressants: 
Effexor, Serzone and Remeron; another that was introduced before this 
which is very similar in action upon serotonin is trazadone, with the brand 
name Deseryl (As you will notice the similarity in spelling of the names, 
Serzone (nefazodone) & Deseryl (trazadone) are similar drugs.) One last 
antidepressant to add to this list which has a strong secondary impact upon 
serotonin is Wellbutrin. We also have the new serotonergic antipsychotics: 
Zyprexa, Geodon, and Risperdol. This new group of atypical antipsychotics 
would be best described as a combination of the older antipsychotics and 
these new SSRI antidepressants. These newer serotonergic medications have 
been introduced to the market over the past decade and a half now. 
Of these drags Lenny Gall was prescribed from 1993, at the age of 16, until 
2001: Paxil, Prozac, Trazadone, Wellbutrin, and Zyprexa. 
On February 2,2004, the FDA held a special hearing to discuss the dangers 
of SSRI & SNRI antidepressants in those under age 18. The drugs in 
question were Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Luvox, Celexa, Lexapro, Effexor, 
Serzone, Remeron and Wellbutrin. These drugs (excluding Prozac) were 
banned this past year in the UK by their medical regulatory board, the 
MHRA. This action was based on studies, clinical trials, conducted in the 
under 18 age group by the drug manufacturers. The studies had not been 
revealed to officials before this time even though some had been conducted 
12 years previously. They were released only after much public and 
government pressure. 
The studies, conducted by the manufacturers, demonstrated the most serious 
adverse effects of suicide, violence, self-mutilation and medical damage at a 
rate over three times greater than placebo in children. (This should be of 
particular interest to those in Utah as we have led the way in the use of these 
drugs since they were introduced a decade and a half ago. We now use 
double the national average of these antidepressants in Utah and as of five 
months ago we learned that suicide is currently the leading cause of death in 
males 15-44! Simple math would lead to the conclusion that either these 
drugs are causing an increase in suicide, or at the very least, they are doing 
nothing to stop or slow down suicides.) 
The UK moved quickly to warn of these most serious adverse effects while 
our own FDA has followed suit at a much slower pace. But after hearing 
testimony on Feb. 2,2004 the FDA Advisory Committee, who was not 
scheduled to arrive at a decision until June, 2004, ruled that this was much 
too serious a situation and warnings must be put into place immediately. 
This came as a great surprise to those of us presenting testimony due to the 
fact that 9 out of 10 of the FDA reviewers personally had financial ties to the 
drug companies and because they were not expected to reach a decision 
before June, 2004 on this issue. Yet they went on to recommend warnings 
being put into place on Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Luvox, Celexa, Lexapro, 
Effexor, Serzone, Remeron and Wellbutrin. The warnings they 
recommended were suicide, violence toward others to the point of homicide, 
aggression, agitation and confusion associated with the use of these drugs in 
those under 18 especially when first starting to use the drugs or whenever 
the dose is adjusted. 
On March 22,2004, the FDA followed the advice of their advisory 
committee and issued these warnings. They surprised most everyone by 
including the same warnings for adults as well as those under 18 - a move 
the FDA in the UK is expected to make sometime this Spring. 
Several years ago these drug companies were offered an extension on their 
patent period if they would conduct clinical trials on children to determine 
the safety and effectiveness of the drugs in children. The FDA felt it 
necessary in light of so many physicians prescribing these unproved drugs 
"off label" to children and teens. Of great interest to the court should be the 
fact that these companies have continued to refuse to disclose this clinical 
trial information to the FDA. They are claiming that these safety studies are 
"trade secrets" and cannot be released! There is apparently no law that 
requires these studies to be released. Their refusal to disclose this data has 
prompted government authorities to come forward to suggest that Congress 
may have to step in to investigate. 
This past Wednesday, March 24,2004, Congress did step in demanding 
answers. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, led by Joe 
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Barton of TX and James Greenwood of PA, demanded to know from the 
FDA: 
#1 What did the FDA know about these drugs? 
#2 When did they know it? 
#3 Why did the FDA not issue these warnings about serious damage 
sooner? 
They want all records of any kind, including even memos exchanged 
between a long list of drug manufacturers and the FDA, be turned over this 
Congressional committee by April 5,2004 in order to investigate this matter 
even further. 
Some manufacturers admitted that the drugs appear to have no more benefit 
than a placebo for children but they are holding back the data that would 
clearly have insured the warnings the FDA Advisory Committee felt should 
be implemented immediately. So, although the evidence of suicide and 
violence is overwhelming, we have had to wait while many American 
children have suffered great harm and caused harm to those around them as 
a result of this lack of warning. 
An article (2/27/04) from the John's Hopkins Newsletter entitled 
"Companies hide pills' dirty secrets" reports: "According to The Washington 
Post, doctors writing prescriptions do not have approved labeling to guide 
them and must rely on their own judgment and the available scientific 
knowledge," even though some pertinent information is not being disclosed. 
And being 18 years old is pretty close to 19, 20,21 or 22 . . . . Antidepressant 
medication is also chemically addictive: When the reports in the U.K were 
released, British regulators warned people who were currently taking the 
medication not to stop because of the harmful side effects and sudden 
withdrawal symptoms." 
http://www.jhunewsletter.eom/vnews/display.v/ART/2004/02/27/403ea6933 
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Dr. David Healy has been a strong voice in the UK warning about these 
serotonergic antidepressants. In a recent letter to the head of the USFDA 
about America's problems with these drugs, he posed several questions. 
Among them was this question: 
"What will the FDA do to remedy the incredible fact that Americans track 
the fate of parcels through the post 100 times more accurately than they 
track the death of children and adults on these drugs?" 
America's Third Leading Cause of Death - Properly Prescribed 
Prescription Drugs 
The large majority of the public remain unaware that the third leading cause 
of death (200,000 annually) in America is the taking of prescription drags as 
prescribed according to a recent study done by pharmacists. It is not a 
problem in abusing these drags but in taking them as one has been counseled 
by their physician to take them that kills so many. In other words the death 
toll from prescription drags each week is as great as suffering another 9/11 
tragedy each week. 
But with this new information coming out from health regulatory boards we 
begin to see that these are not the only victims. There are also behavioral 
effects of some medications that are causing many additional deaths. After 
conducting studies on his own colleagues that produced suicidal and 
homicidal ideation (constant persisting thoughts and planning of suicide or 
homicide) and actions, Dr. David Healy, one of the leading experts on SSRI 
antidepressants in the UK, estimates a death toll from Prozac-induced 
suicides alone to be 50,000 worldwide. 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors and Atypical Antipsychotics 
The new serotonergic antidepressants and antipsychotics, are designed to 
increase levels of serotonin and they do so by inhibiting serotonin reuptake. 
In other words, they do this by decreasing one's ability to metabolize 
serotonin. What research has always shown since the discovery of serotonin 
in the mid fifties is that the impairment of sef otonin metabolism produces 
impulsive murder or suicide. 
Although the public and even treating physicians have been led to believe 
that increasing serotonin is what is needed to cure depression, suicidal 
tendencies, anxiety, etc., research shows the exact opposite - hardly what the 
marketing claims would have us tnink. But, since when has marketing and 
reality had anything in common? 
P450 2D6 Liver Enzyme Problems With Sertonergic Medications 
We know that 7% -10% of the population genetically lack the liver enzyme 
system necessary to metabolize SSRI antidepressants. We also know that in 
longer term the use the drug itself causes this same liver enzyme to become 
impaired in breaking down the medication which leads to toxic reactions as 
do high dosages or overdose. Additionally this ability to metabolize varies 
from race to race. 
Of course the lack of this enzyme means a patient cannot break down these 
medications which lead to toxic reactions. I think we often forget that, in 
mind altering drugs or psycho active drugs as these antidepressants are, the 
toxic reactions can generally be expected to manifest in behavioral changes 
before the physical toxic effects become obvious. 
Although there should be a requirement that patients be tested to see if they 
have a functioning P450 2D6 liver enzyme system before ever taking one of 
these antidepressants, the test is not required and rarely done before 
prescribing. 
Records indicate that Lenny was not given this test, as so many other 
patients were not given the test before ever taking an SSRI antidepressant. 
His serious adverse reactions to Paxil upon initiation of use indicated that 
Lenny may be in the 7 -10% of the population that lack the P450 liver 
enzyme necessary to metabolize SSRI antidepressants. But rather than 
consider that possibility and test for it, he was continued on the medication 
with reactions building to even higher levels after that. 
Serotonin Syndrome 
The fatal toxic reaction known as Serotonin Syndrome includes many 
mental/behavioral changes before death is produced. It is a condition in 
which the level of serotonin level itself reaches a toxic level. It is caused by 
using two substances in combination that both inhibit serotonin reuptake. 
This reaction is so dangerous that it can produce death in a 24 hour period. 
This toxic effect also produces many mental changes which can include 
euphoria and intoxication, sustained rapid eye movement and muscle 
twitching, overreaction of the reflexes, with rapid mental changes ranging 
from confusion to hypomania (a happy drunken state). 
Suicidal tendencies and especially impulsive suicidal tendencies indicate a 
toxic reaction to a serotonergic medication. And Lenny, while taking 
serotonergic medications, attempted suicide at least three times that the 
records indicate. Understanding that impulsive suicidal actions are a toxic 
reaction to medication would help one see the potential for impulsive violent 
action on Lenny's part as the toxicity increased. But rather than realize this 
was a toxic effect of his medication it was allowed to reach the point where 
it led to the violent act we witnessed on Dec. 14,2001. 
Serotonin Toxicity 
Decrease in serotonin metabolism = increase in serotonin levels = 
violence 
Dr. Felix Suiman from Israel who did the initial research on serotonin found 
that those who could not metabolize serotonin, thus causing the levels of 
serotonin to rise were in effect being poisoned by the higher levels of 
serotonin. [Now keep in mind that this is the same so called "therapeutic" 
effect produced chemically by this new Prozac family of SSRI 
antidepressants.] 
These patients suffered from out of character aggression, hot flashes, 
irritability, irrational tension and anxiety, sleeping difficulties of all types, 
horrifying nightmares, spontaneous abortion or miscarriage, etc. He also 
found that when rabbits, the most docile of creatures, were given injections 
of serotonin they became aggressive and would attack. Even the first trials 
for Prozac, the mother of this family of antidepressants, demonstrated that 
cats and dogs given the drug would growl or hiss. This adverse aggressive 
effect subsided when they were withdrawn from the drug. 
Over the past 50 years scientific research has continued to demonstrate that a 
decrease in one's ability to metabolize serotonin (which in turn leads to an 
increase in serotonin levels) is found in: schizophrenia or psychosis, mania, 
mood disorders (including depression and anxiety), organic brain disease, 
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autism, mental retardation, Alzheimer's disease, anorexia, old age, suicide, 
(especially violent suicide), repeat suicide attempts, arson, violent crime, 
hostility, insomnia, alcohol abuse and cravings for alcohol and other drugs, 
reckless driving, impulsive acts with no concern for punishment, bulimia, 
more contact with police, arguments with spouses, friends or relatives, 
impaired employment due to arguments, exhibitionism, obsessive 
compulsive behavior, a lessening of conscious control over behavior, etc. 
Mutant Mice Study: An article about a study published in 1996 by 
researchers at the University of Southern California and headed by Dr. Jean 
Chen Shih was entitled "Mutant Mice May Hold Key To Human Violence -
An Excess Of Serotonin." The study explained that a type of genetically 
engineered mouse was the most violent known to man. These mice would 
rip one another to shreds when placed in a cage together. 
In this study researchers also mentioned a group of Dutch men in the same 
family who had been incarcerated for violent crime including rape, arson 
and assault. They found that both the mutant mice and the men in this Dutch 
family lacked the enzyme necessary to break down serotonin - producing the 
same end result as the SSRI antidepressants when they impair one's ability 
to metabolize serotonin. This impaired serotonin metabolism produces 
increased levels of serotonin leading to the long list of problems above 
including violence and hostility. 
Dr. J. J. Mann from Australia has published extensive research over many 
years demonstrating that an inability to metabolize serotonin leads to 
impulsive murder and suicide. Although he was an expert for the Paxil 
manufacturer as a defendant in a recent Paxil-induced mass murder/suicide 
case, Dr. Mann was compelled to testify that Paxil and other SSRIs, cause a 
decrease in serotonin metabolism and that the decrease in metabolism of 
serotonin produces impulsive murder and suicide. This was a 2001 WY case 
where a man on Paxil shot his wife, daughter, baby granddaughter and 
himself after only two pills. The jury ruled that the evidence was clear that 
Paxil was the major cause of the out of character impulsive murder/suicide 
and awarded the survivors $6.4 Million in damages. (Tobin vs 
GlaxoSmithKline - www.justiceseekers.com) 
Dr. SherwinNuland in the 6/9/94 issue of New York Review of Books 
criticized the publication of the book Listening to Prozac for its 
encouragement in using a drug like Prozac that works via increasing 
serotonin. After discussing the similarity of serotonin to psychedelic drugs 
like LSD and PCP he pointed that research shows the dangers of serotonin 
increases as: constriction of lungs and intestines, diarrhea, wheezing, 
flushing, tightening of the bronchioles, mental confusion and lessening of 
conscious control over behavior. 
Serotonin in Anxiety and Panic Response 
Australian researcher Murray Essler and his colleagues at Melbourne's 
Baker Medical Research Institute once again confirmed earlier research 
indicating high serotonin in anxiety. They were shocked to find that, even on 
a good day, the average serotonin levels in panic disorder patients were 
EIGHT times higher than the normal population. Of course their research 
indicates the increasing of serotonin levels will make one's anxiety and 
panic response far greater. 
In light of his discovery, Dr. Essler, sounding a strong alarm to his 
colleagues, questioned why it had become common practice to prescribe 
serotonergic medications, which increase serotonin levels even higher, to 
patients suffering from anxiety or panic disorders. 
Lenny was initially given the serotonergic medication, Paxil, outside FDA 
safety guidelines for someone his age (16), for a problem of simple anxiety 
in 1993. From Dr. Essler's research and the research of many others before 
him, this anxiety would indicate that Lenny had problems metabolizing 
serotonin leading him to have higher serotonin levels than normal. It, 
therefore, should have been expected that any medication that would 
increase serotonin levels would only make his condition worsen. 
With this information it is most interesting to note Dr. Cohn's August 26, 
2002 report about Lenny's condition over his initial period of use of the 
serotonergic medication, Paxil. Dr. Cohn noted: 
"He became more clearly symptomatic over the following year, with 
documentation of paranoia, grandiosity, loose associations, and suicidal 
ideation. By December of 1994 he was demonstrating more floridly manic 
symptoms, including rapid speech, restlessness, and mood instability He 
was apparently treated with antidepressant medications during that time 
period. . ." 
He had gone from simple anxiety into many serious symptoms of a manic 
reaction to Paxil. Dr. Cohn makes it quite clear that the concern here would 
be that Lenny's symptoms of manic reaction were becoming very obvious. 
His physicians should have noted and appropriately withdrawn him from the 
medication in order to prevent the worsening of this adverse reaction. 
Earlier Medications That Affected Serotonin 
Serotonergic agents are not new to us. Society has had previous tragic 
experiences with other chemicals that increase serotonin levels. We now 
know those drugs as LSD, PCP, and Ecstasy. When LSD was introduced to 
us, by its manufacturers, Eli Lilly [also the makers of Prozac] in 1956 we 
were led to believe that this new medication would be the "miracle cure" for 
mental illness and alcoholism, as well as serve as an aid in psychoanalysis. 
As a society we learned via very sad experience that the initial information 
we were given on LSD was far from true. Society continues half a century 
later to suffer as a result of this pharmaceutical mistake costing society 
billions of dollars and many more lives every year. 
Psychiatrists prescribed Ecstasy for depression, etc. until about five years 
before Prozac was introduced in America when Ecstasy also was pulled 
from the legal market. 
Similarly when PCP was introduced as a pain killer and anesthetic the initial 
researcher told us that this drug had a "large margin of safety in humans." 
The researcher who made that statement apologized 20 years later and is 
now publishing warnings about the potential of SSRI antidepressants to 
produce LSD flashbacks, etc. Thanks to the protests of police, other 
emergency personnel, as well as judges, PCP was removed from the market 
seven years after its introduction and long before the researcher who 
promoted it apologized for ever being involved in the development of this 
most dangerous drug. After stating that they would never have continued the 
research on this drag had they known and lamented, "What have we 
wrought?!" 
Generally these types of regrets are sounded AFTER a drug is pulled from 
the market, similar to what we heard from the developer of Fen-Phen after 
its removal. But the warning for these new antidepressants has already been 
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sounded by their creator, Dr. Candace Pert, while they are yet on the market. 
Tragically it appears that few listened six years ago to the strong warnings 
that came from Dr. Candace Pert, one of the two discoverers of the serotonin 
binding process which made the SSRI antidepressants possible. Dr. Pert 
stated in the Oct. 20,1997 issue of TIME Magazine, speaking about these 
SSRI antidepressants, "I am alarmed at the monsters I created." She went on 
to express how little we know about these drugs and their dangers, especially 
the dangers in longer-term use. 
Although such bold statements by one involved in the birth and development 
of a new class of medications have never been made before, little stir was 
made over her statement and the drugs continue to thrive in our society. 
When you understand the implications of the widespread use of these 
serotonergic chemicals, the ignoring of such critical input from such a 
renowned researcher about her own discovery along with its far reaching and 
potentially devastating impact upon society it is indeed daiming. 
Research demonstrates that we are experiencing a chemical/medical de ja vu 
with this new group of drugs - a rebirth of the LSD/PCP era. Tragically we 
are learning that history is repeating itself at the expense of many innocent 
lives - those unaware of their powerful adverse effects who take the drugs 
and those who live and associate with those who do take them. 
LSD Effects of SSRI Antidepressants 
In Clinical Psychiatry News 27(6):34,1999 researchers from Yale, Malcolm 
Bowers, MD, et. al., reported that over a 14 month period they found that 
psychosis induced by this new group of SSRI antidepressants represented 
8% -11% of psychiatric admissions in a general hospital. When extended 
out nationwide that should represent a figure of 160,000 to 250,000 hospital 
admissions for psychotic breaks every year in this country. 
The researchers were shocked at such a high number of cases being reported 
since they pointed out that most of these would go unrecognized as drug-
induced leading physicians to continue to drug the patient rather than 
discontinue treatment with the offending medications. Clearly Lenny was 
one of those whose drug-induced psychotic break went unrecognized as 
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such. Due to this rather than being withdrawn properly from the offending 
medication at that time via an extremely slow tapering, he was treated with 
more and more medication for what should have been recognized as a drug-
induced psychotic break. 
Another set of researchers reported in Int J Psychopharmacol 1999;2:165-
172 on the implications for SSRI-induced mania and psychosis. They found 
that Prozac and other SSRI antidepressants can simulate the effects of LSD 
and phenethylamine hallucinogens. 
Again in the New York Times Dr. Howard Markel reported 10/24/00 on his 
previous research on SSRI antidepressants and adolescents. He found that 
SSRIs induced LSD flashbacks in his patients. As he searched to learn why 
he found that they increase serotonin as does LSD and have an affinity for 
many of the same neuroreceptors in the brain further stressing the similarity 
in action between LSD and SSRI antidepressants. 
Then once again in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 62;1, Jan. 2001, 30-33 
the same researchers from Yale released new research showing the similar 
action of SSRIs and LSD. Entitled "Antidepressant-AssociatedMania and 
Psychosis Resulting in Psychiatric Admissions" the paper reports that SSRIs 
like LSD also affect serotonin-2 receptors in the brain. The study ended with 
this conclusion: "To the extent that LSD and phenthylamine hallucinogens 
are seen as psychotogenic in humans, then SSRIs may facilitate the 
emergence of some forms of psychosis." 
Compelling Anecdotal Evidence 
The first in this class of SSRI antidepressants, Zimelidine, was introduced in 
1983 in Europe. (It has since been removed from the market due to adverse 
reactions.) Since the introduction of this first SSRI we have witnessed as a 
world a sharp increase in violence within the walls of people's own homes. 
The anecdotal evidence (the same type of evidence we use to pull drugs 
from the market - numbers of adverse reaction reports) is compelling. 
To clarify the great importance of antidotal evidence I refer to a document 
filed in the US District Court of Kansas in a case involving a Zoloft induced 
suicide of a 13 year old boy, Matthew Miller. This is a declaration by Dr. 
Jonathan Cole, MD, who is known as the father of psychopharmacology in 
America. Dr. Cole states, "The real world is not perfect. Drugs can and do 
cause adverse effects which can resemble the manifestations of the illness 
and arguments about the causes and nature of these adverse events, 
including suicides, must rest on case reports [antidotal evidence] and data 
collected in small studies for other purposes... If some cases stand out 
strikingly, there are logically others where the adverse effect is more subtle." 
One Microcosm: In the early 1990's Dr. James Goodwin of Winatchee, WA 
earned the title "Pied Piper of Prozac" by recommending an SSRI 
antidepressant to everyone of his patients. Dr. Goodwin, himself on Prozac, 
lost his license to practice for some time because of this. He told me 
personally face to face in June of 1994 that everyone of his approximately 
800 patients were on either Prozac or Paxil. 
The first year after Dr. Goodwin's excessive prescribing of the SSRIs the 
impact appeared in police reports for that small town. This indicates an 
alarming possible link between the use of these drugs and a drastic increase 
in violence. In 1988, the year before Goodwin's prescribing binge began, the 
town reported 19 attempted suicides, 9 rapes and 208 assaults. By the time 
the 1990 figures were reflected in the 1991 report those figures jumped from 
the previous 19 attempted suicides to 43, from 9 rapes to 20 and from 208 
assaults to 508. While the town experienced almost no increase in 
population during this period, each category of violent crime had more than 
doubled in that short amount of time. No other potential contributing factors 
stood out to explain this jump in violent crime for the small city of 
Winatchee. 
Hypoglycemia and Mental Changes 
Lenny has a history of hypoglycemia in his family line which would indicate 
that Lenny had a strong possibility of blood sugar problems as well. His 
father, among others in Lenny's family line, was diagnosed with acute 
hypoglycemia over thirty years ago. Those who have a genetic weakness 
will of course be at a higher risk of adverse reactions affecting blood sugar. 
These serotonergic medications have such a strong negative impact upon the 
pancreas that they can cause hypoglycemia (reduced blood sugar), as well as 
diabetes (increased blood sugar). Even slight imblances in blood sugar will 
immediately begin to produce loss of brain cells or brain damage. The brain 
cannot function without proper blood sugar levels and any imbalance in 
either direction can produce seizure activity in the brain leading to violent or 
other out of character behavior. 
In fact one of Lenny's hospital reports had flagged blood sugar as a possible 
concern. Yet Lenny was not tested for this metabolic disorder - something 
that should have been ruled out -before he was ever medicated with a 
psychiatric medication. 
Every SSRI antidepressant has hypoglycemia hsted as a side effect and over 
the past 12 years of working with those having adverse reactions to the 
SSRIs, I have found hypoglycemia to be the most common reaction in 
patients. This is, in my opinion, the most obvious reason why so many 
patients report a craving for alcohol and sweets while on these 
antidepressants. 
In a hypoglycemic state the body works to raise the blood sugar level as 
rapidly as possible to avoid going into insulin shock. The problem of course 
is that alcohol and sugar can lead to additional rebound effects of dropping 
the blood sugar level even lower. So a chemically induced craving for the 
substances that will worsen this condition will compound the effects of this 
disorder. 
The hypoglycemic reactions produce a strong adverse effect on the pancreas 
weakening it even further to the point of producing diabetic reactions to the 
drug. Zyprexa has such a high rate of patient reports of producing intense 
diabetic reactions resulting in deaths that the drug is facing not only many 
wrongful death lawsuits as a result, but also lawsuits for chemically inducing 
a high rate of diabetes. 
Adverse mental effects of hypoglycemia strongly impact mental status: 
Gabriel Cousens, MD and psychiatrist states: "Hypersensitivity to alterations 
in blood glucose, with associated erratic behavior, may be linked with the 
increasing number of people suffering from unexplained anxiety and panic 
attacks." He also explains that "When blood sugar drops below a certain 
point, the glucose receptor center cannot properly control the anxiety center 
in the locus coeruleus. This results in anxiety symptoms typified by mental 
and physical agitation, fear [paranoia], increased heart rate, and irritabihty." 
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p. 141, "Spiritual Nutrition and the Rainbow Diet" 
Dr. James W. Long has for many years published a yearly issue of "The 
Essential Guide to Prescription Drugs." In his 1995 issue he addresses the 
potential of medications to produce hypoglycemia. He states that, "Since 
normal brain function is dependent upon an adequate supply of glucose, 
reducing the level of glucose in the blood below a critical point will cause 
serious impairment of brain activity." He states that the symptoms range 
from drunkenness to convulsions and death. Then states, "Hypoglycemia at 
any stage requires prompt recognition and treatment. Because of the 
potential for injury to the brain, the mechanisms and management of 
hypoglycemia should be understood by all who use drugs capable of 
producing it." 
[NOTE: Before the full body convulsions become the reaction to 
hypoglycemia it should be expected that milder seizure activity will occur 
that produces many mental changes and out of character behavior.] 
A case in point is a school incident in 1998 in Pocatello, ID where a young 
man on Zoloft held students hostage for several hours. Luckily his father 
was a doctor who knew enough to rush him in to have brain wave patterns 
taken. It was found that he was in seizure activity from the Zoloft. 
Medication that can produce drastic drops in blood sugar can produce this 
seizure activity in the brain leading to mental changes that produce bizarre 
out of character behavior. 
Another example would be the case of Officer Stephen Christian. Officer 
Christian was one of Dallas' finest officers with a 23 year career and 19 
commendations. He was also a minister. 
After being started on Prozac Officer Christian continued to report that he 
was having delusions. Doctors told him that Prozac does not cause delusions 
- apparently they had not read the package insert listing "delusion" or 
"psychosis" as a side effect. So Officer Christian was admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital for treatment. 
In his initial physical, as he was admitted to the hospital, they found that his 
blood sugar was so adversely affected the level was a mere 46. At 40 a 
patient is generally comatose. Rather than notice the relationship of his 
extreme low blood sugar to his medication and reduce the dose, the doctors 
TRIPLED the Prozac dose for Officer Christian in the hospital and released 
him, 
If his blood sugar levels were so adversely affected by a 20mg dose, anyone 
can imagine what a tripling of the medication dosage could have done. Two 
weeks later Officer Christian ran into a police substation at 3:00 AM 
wearing plain clothes and shooting. He was pronounced dead after taking 27 
bullets himself and wounding a fellow officer. [Officer Christian's wrongful 
death case as well as the injury to his fellow officer was settled out of court 
by the makers of Prozac several years ago.] 
Akathisia is a side effect of SSRIs that produces suicide and violence 
The definition of akathisia is: motor restlessness and specifically, a feeling 
of muscular quivering... Often, the symptoms is of such intensity that it 
becomes impossible for the patients to sit still day or night, and which is 
described by them as more difficult to endure than any of the symptoms for 
which they had been originally treated. Because akathisia produces such a 
strong stimulant effect the word akathisia is a Greek term meaning "can't sit 
still." It is a very severe over stimulation or agitation leading patients to 
report they would do anything to stop it, including suicide, as a solution to 
put an end to such utterly intolerable restlessness. 
Acquaintance with this symptom of akathisia, which often persists for a 
considerable time after the drug has been withdrawn, is important because it 
is sometimes mistaken for an agitated depression and wrongly treated. 
(Psychiatric Dictionary, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1981) 
Akathisia is often indicated in medical reports by the word "tremor." In the 
Paxil package insert, during the withdrawal from Paxil, tremor is listed as 
being over three times higher than in the withdrawal from placebo. This 
would indicate that akathisia is likely three times greater in withdrawal from 
Paxil as in withdrawal from placebo. And as indicated in the Zyprexa 
package insert, those on Zyprexa have a FIVE times greater rate of suffering 
akathisia than those on placebo. 
Listed below are a few medical studies relating to Akathisia: 
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Publication: Comprehensive Psychiatry, January/February 1975 
Research Paper: The Many Faces of Akathisia 
Author: Theodore Van Putten 
Publication: Australian Journal of Hospital Pharmacy, Volume 24, No. 6, 
1994 
Research Paper: Akathisia: Current Status of a Perplexing Clinical 
Syndrome 
Authors: John A. Gattera, Bruce G. Charles, Barry A. Smithurst 
Publication: Psychopharmacology Bulletin, Volume 26, No. 1,1990 
Research Paper: Akathisia and Violence 
Authors: Martha L. Crowner, MD, Richard Douyon, MD, Antonio Convit, 
MD, Pedro Gaztanaga, MD, Jan Volavka, MD, Phd, and Robert Bakall, MD 
Publication: The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 
Nov 10 1978, Vol 240, No. 20 
Research Paper: Neuroleptics. Violence as a Manifestation of Akathisia 
Author: Walter A. Kackich, MD 
Publication: The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol 176, No. 9, 
1988 
Research Paper: High Potency Neuroleptics and Violence in Schizophrenia 
Authors: John N. Herrera, PhD, John J. Sramek, Pharm.D., Jerome F. Costa, 
MD, Swati Roy, PhD, Chris W. Heh, MD, and Bich N. Nguyen, RN 
Publication: American Journal of Psychiatry, 142:4, April 1985 
Research Paper: Suicide Attempts Associated with Akathisia 
Authors: Robert E. Drake, MD, PhD, and Joshua Ehrlich 
The following are medical studies relating to SSRIs, Akathisia and 
Violence: 
Publication: Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry, 30:2, March 1991 
Research Paper: Emergence of Self-Destructive Phenomena in Children and 
Adolescents during Fluoxetine Treatment 
Authors: Robert A. King, MD, Mark A. Riddle, MD, Phillip B. Chappell, 
MD, Maureen T. Hardin, MSN, George M. Anderson, PhD, Paul Lombroso, 
MD, and Larry Scahill, MSN, MPH 
Publication: Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, Volume 29, 
Number 1 
Correspondence: Antidepressants and Side Effects 
Editor: Sidney Bloch 
Publication: Primary Care Psychiatry 2000, Vol 6, No 1 
Research Paper: Emergence of antidepressant induced suicidality 
Author: David Healy, North Wales Department of Psychological Medicine 
Publication: CNS Drugs 1 (3): 223-231,1994 
Research Paper: The Fluoxetine and Suicide Controversy: A Review of the 
Evidence 
Author: David Healy, North Wales Department of Psychological Medicine 
Publication: Psychiatry Drug Alerts, Volume Hi/November 1989/Number 
11 
Research Paper: Fluoxetine-induced Akathisia 
Author: Lipinski J. et al 
Publication: The American Journal of Psychiatry, 147:2, February 1990 
Research Paper: Emergence of Intense Suicidal Preoccupation During 
Fluoxetine Treatment 
Author: Martin H. Teicher, MD, PhD, Carol Glod, RN, MSCS, and 
Jonathan 0. Cole, MD 
Publication: The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 50:9, September 1989 
Research Paper: Fluoxetine-induced Akathisia: Clinical and Theoretical 
Implications 
Authors: Joseph F. Lipinski, Jr, MD, Gopinath Mallya, MD, Paula 
Zimmerman, RN, and Harrison G. Pope, Jr, MD 
Publication: The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, Volume 52, Number 12, 
December 1991 
Research Paper: Re-exposure to Fluoxetine after Serious Suicide Attempts 
by Three Patients: The Role of Akathisia 
Authors: Anthony J. Rothschild, MD, and Carol A. Locke, MD 
Publication: Archives of General Psychiatry, July 1992 
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Research Paper: Fluoxetine, Akathisia and Suicidality: Is there a causal 
connection? 
Author: William C. Wirshing, MD 
Publication: Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 53:11, November 1992 
Research Paper: Akathisia, Suicidality and Fluoxetine 
Author: Margaret S. Hamilton, MD, and Lewis A. Opler, MD, PhD 
REM Sleep Behavior Disorder (RBD) 
Initial studies with the SSRI antidepressants showed that REM sleep was 
being repressed by the drugs. REM is critical to brain function and one's 
level of consciousness. Without proper REM sleep one will experience 
breaks of REM sleep during periods of wakefulness and begin acting out in a 
dream state - basically this is what we would refer to as a psychotic break. 
This is how sleep deprivation can produce psychotic breaks. 
In sleep research this is known as a REM Sleep Behavior Disorder (RBD). 
In RBD there is no paralysis during sleep allowing one to act out dreams or 
nightmares. Generally in RBD it is a nightmare that is experienced causing 
80% of patients experiencing RBD to hurt themselves or someone else -
even to the point of homicide. 
In the past RBD was known basically as a "drug withdrawal state" or 
something expected to occur mainly in withdrawal from psycho active 
drugs. But early on in my research on serotonergic drugs I began to see all 
the signs of RBD in patients taking SSRI antidepressants. Most shocking to 
me was to view brain wave patterns of a patient on the SSRI Prozac for six 
months. The brain waves indicated that this patient, who appeared alert and 
functioning to those interacting with him, was in a total anesthetic sleep state 
and dreaming! The statements, "I have acted out my worst nightmare on this 
drug," and "I don't know what is real and what is a dream" became so 
common from patients that it made me determined to learn what was 
happening to produce this effect. 
I contacted Dr. Carlos Schenk and Dr. MarkMahwold, the leading 
researchers on RBD in the United States, to alert them of the feedback 
coming in from patients. At the time I contacted these researchers they 
informed me that there was no research on a connection between the SSRIs 
and RBD. But, after my call, they began to research this issue. They were 
surprised to learn, when they looked back through their records over several 
years, that 48% of the patients they had diagnosed with RBD were taking 
Prozac (the only SSRI antidepressant on the market at that time). They then 
alerted their researchers to take note of this as they worked with RBD 
patients. With this approach they found a shocking 80% of the cases they 
were diagnosing with RBD were on an SSRI antidepressant. Another 6% 
were on the older tricyclic antidepressants. 
So from their research we now know that the very large majority (86%) of 
cases being diagnosed with this horrible sleep disorder, where one acts out 
their worst nightmare, is being found in patients taking antidepressants with 
the largest majority on SSRI antidepressants. Researchers believe that it is 
likely the high serotonin levels that over stimulate the brain stem which 
removes one's ability to have paralysis when they sleep. This then allows the 
patient to move around and literally act out the dreams or nightmares they 
are having - exactly word for word what patients had been repeating over 
and over again. 
Now the most obvious and most frightening question, if RBD was initially 
known as a drug withdrawal state, how much greater must be the possibility 
of RBD in the withdrawal from these SSRI antidepressants and new atypical 
antipsychotics with SSRI features? If 86% of the cases being diagnosed are 
currently on these drugs, how many more instances of RBD are likely in the 
withdrawal from these drugs? Clearly we can expect that figure to be 
extremely high. With the recent FDA warnings being issued many patients 
may be frightened into abrupt withdrawal from these medications. Because 
of this potentially very high rate of RBD in withdrawal from these 
medications this must be investigated immediately to insure public safety. 
The high rate of RBD in patients on SSRI antidepressants should be enough 
to demonstrate the extreme danger posed by these drugs. This is why the 
brain wave patterns I mentioned above is what I presented to the FDA in 
September of 1991 as my greatest concern with these drugs. And this new 
RBD research showing such a high rate of patients with RBD on an SSRI 
was the main issue I presented to the FDA in my testimony on Feb. 2, 2004. 
I believe there is little question that Lenny also acted out his worst nightmare 
on December 14, 2001. It was well documented that his sleep was very 
much impaired by the many various serotonergic medications he had taken 
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over the years before his mother's death. His sleep deprivation, coupled with 
the high potential for RBD (produced by a continuous barrage of 
serotonergic drugs) greatly impaired his ability to have much, if any, contact 
with reality. I see no possible way for Lenny to have possessed a level of 
consciousness necessary to form intent to harm at the time of his mother's 
death. 
Critical Information on SSRI Accumulation in Brain Tissue 
In America Prozac was the first in this new group of SSRI antidepressants 
and atypical antipsychotics to be introduced to the market. Its introduction 
was the end of December in 1987. 
Lenny was given a fairly high dose of Prozac (40 mg). 
Like the other drugs in this group Prozac is highly protein binding - 94.5% 
as opposed to cocaine which is only 8%. (Paxil is 98%.) This means that it 
binds to brain tissue at a much higher rate and takes FAR LONGER to flush 
out of the system. 
Dr. Craig Karson investigated this binding aspect and found an extremely 
high accumulation rate of this drug after the first six months of use. He is 
highly concerned that we are testing blood instead of brain tissue to 
determine the toxicity of an SSRI in a patient. Yet, while in the brain, where 
the drug has its strongest impact, the level of the drag is approximately up to 
100 times greater than what is found in the blood. For more accuracy he 
wishes we would test brain tissue instead of blood to determine drug levels 
of SSRIs. Similar studies have been done on Paxil and Luvox also showing 
a very high accumulation rate in brain tissue as opposed to blood. 
Dr. Karson believes that this high accumulation rate with a much longer 
washout period is the reason why it takes so long for the side effects of these 
highly protein bound drags to subside once they begin. Dr. Karson followed 
one of his patients who took Prozac for one year and then tapered off the 
drag. Two years later when the patient died he tested brain tissue and even 
he with all of his experience in brain accumulation levels was shocked to see 
how high a level of Prozac there was in the brain tissue so long after use. 
This high protein binding aspect of these drugs poses another very serious 
A f3 n o o 
problem - the mixing of these drugs within the brain itself when used one 
after another. Prescribing information on all of the drugs warns of using 
these drugs in combination. Yet with Dr. Karson's research we learn that 
these drugs are being combined within the patient's system when used one 
after another. The main concern in combining these drugs which target 
serotonin is the inducing of the potentially fatal and strongly behavior 
altering Serotonin Syndrome. (Refer to previous information on Serotonin 
Syndrome) 
Paxil Package Insert - Listed Side Effects Pertinent To This Case: 
Lenny's initial SSRI prescription in 1993 was for Paxil. At the time he was 
only 16 years old. The drug was not approved for use in youth of his age. 
And now Congress is asking why warnings were not issued on children and 
the adverse reactions of these drugs before now. Paxil is the first drug he 
stopped taking "cold turkey," in 1994, after 18 months on Paxil. Both taking 
the Paxil initially and its subsequent inappropriate cold turkey withdrawal, 
threw him into a manic state leading to his first psychiatric hospitalization. 
But studies indicate that these "withdrawal-induced manias," as they are 
called, can be so severe that mood stabilizing medications generally used for 
mania cannot stop the antidepressant-induced manic psychosis. 
To give an idea of the side effects that come from these medications which 
would be pertinent to this case, especially in light of the warning out of the 
UK and our own FDA, I list for you the side effects for adults taking Paxil, 
Prozac, Zyprexa, Wellbutrin, Neurontin and Trazadone that would apply in 
this case to help us understand what happened to cause this delusional 
aggressive violent action by Lenny in Dec. 2001: 
METABOLIC—"hypoglycemia and diabetes" 
PSYCHIATRIC—"emotional lability, confusion, abnormal thinking, 
hysteria, drug dependence, extrapyramidal reaction, hostility, hallucination, 
increased reflexes, manic-depressive reaction, euphoria, paranoid reaction, 
delirium, delusions, psychosis, psychotic depression, withdrawal syndrome." 
Paxil-Ten Times Greater Rate of Hostility 
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In June, 2003 the FDA in the UK banned the use of Paxil, and two months 
later banned the use of Effexor in those under the age of 18. The ban was 
due to drug company documents kept hidden from the public for 12 years 
indicating a three times greater rate of suicide, violence, psychosis, self-
mutilation and medical damage in tests done on those under 18. Other 
countries have since joined in banning these drugs. 
With those reports being made public seven out of the ten USFDA panel 
members who voted on the safety of these drugs for adults publicly stated 
that they would change their vote in light of this new information. Other 
experts warned that if this is being found in those under 18 it is happening 
with adults as well. (Front page, New York Times, August 7,2003) 
Beyond that, Dr. David Healy who has personally viewed the internal 
company documents on Paxil, made an absolutely shocking statement on 
October 12,2003, at a debate on these drugs which took place in Austraha. 
Dr. Healy reviewed these documents in a case in Wyoming in which an 
elderly man, Donald Schell, shot and killed his wife, daughter, infant 
granddaughter and himself after taking only two Paxil pills. (The jury ruled 
in that case that the evidence was clear that the two Paxil were the cause of 
this tragedy awarding $6.4 Million to the few remaining family members.) 
Dr. Healy stated that he had found the documents indicated a ten times 
greater rate of hostility in those under 18 who were taking Paxil. He went on 
to explain what the company meant by the word "hostility": 
"From the unpublished data that the company has put into the pubhc 
domain, children appear on Aropax [Paxil] to be 10 times more likely to be 
hostile than children taking placebo." 
"I wouldn't have guessed what this word might have meant any more than 
any of you will have guessed, but in actual fact hostile doesn't mean 
children saying "Hey Mum, get lost". It means children who may have 
engaged in homicide, may have engaged in a homicidal act, may have been 
suffering from homicidal ideation, or may have engaged in aggressive 
behaviour of one sort or the other." 
http ://www. abc .net. au/m/science/mind/s96129 8 .htm 
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Zyprexa Package Insert - Listed Side Effects Pertinent To This Case: 
Monoaminergic Antagonist: "Olanzapine is a selective 
monoaminergic antagonist with high affinity binding to the following 
receptors: Serotonin 5HT 2A/2C ..." [The 5HT 2 binding is the same 
receptor that Dr. Malcolm Bowers from Yale proposed that the binding to 
the 5HT 2 receptor is likely the reason for the SSRI antidepressants to be 
causing such a high rate of psychosis. This is the same receptor LSD is 
known to bind to in producing psychosis. Zyprexa is an atypical 
antipsychotic in that it is more like a combination of an SSRI antidepressant 
combined with an old antipsychotic] 
Hypoglycemia and Diabetes Mellitus:"... epidemiological studies 
suggest an increased risk of treatment-emergent hyperglycemia-related 
adverse events in patients treated with the atypical antipsychotics... In some 
cases, hyperglycemia has resolved when the atypical antipsychotic was 
discontinued; however, some patients required continuation of anti-diabetic 
discontinuation of the suspect drug." 
Akathisia: Akathisia levels while on Zyprexa jumped by FIVE times 
as opposed to not being on the drug! Akathisia is believed to be the reaction 
that produces suicide or violence while taking one of these serotonergic 
medications. So according to this package insert the six pills of Zyprexa Mr. 
Gall took in the days before the killing could have potentiated a violent 
episode by FIVE times. 
Nervous System: "FREQUENT: abnormal dreams, amnesia, 
delusions, emotional lability [mood swings], euphoria, manic reaction, 
schizophrenic reaction INFREQUENT: alcohol misuse, antisocial reaction, 
CNS stimulation, delirium, depersonalization, obsessive compulsive 
symptoms, phobias, stuttering, withdrawal syndrome" [This certainly 
describes absolutely everything we witnessed Lenny do in the months 
leading up to and including the day of the violent incident on Dec. 14,2001. 
He was also demonstrating the physical adverse effects - note that one of the 
initial interviewers mentioned an odd stuttering aspect to his speech.] 
Lenny was prescribed Zyprexa and began taking the drug shortly before the 
December 14,2001 incident. Clearly he suffered very serious adverse 
reactions to Zyprexa as we witnessed and as was mentioned in many reports 
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in the form of abnormal dreams, amnesia, delusions, emotional lability, 
euphoria, manic reaction, schizoprenic reaction, CNS stimulation, delirium, 
depersonalization, obsessive compulsive symptoms, phobias, stuttering, and 
withdrawal syndrome. 
Prozac Package Insert - Listed Side Effects Pertinent To This Case: 
Because Prozac was the first SSRI introduced to the market we know more 
about adverse reactions from it than the newer drugs. What we find as an 
adverse effect from Prozac should be expected with all of the clones of 
Prozac that followed it - Zoloft, Paxil, Luvox, Celexa, Lexapro and the 
newer serotonergic ant psychotics - Zyprexa, Geodon, and Rispirdol. 
According to the Prozac package insert "the most common adverse event 
associated with discontinuation in 3 pediatric placebo-controlled trials was 
mania/hypomania." 
Nervous System: Frequent adverse reactions were agitation, amnesia, 
confusion, emotional lability, and sleep disorder. Also listed as "infrequent", 
not even "rare," are akathisia, CNS depression, CNS stimulation, 
depersonalization, euphoria, hallucinations, hostility, paranoid reaction, 
personality disorder and psychosis. 
Other reactions, for which Lenny sought treatment, were the toxic physical 
effects of asthma, hemorrhage, vomiting, and ear pain. 
Trazadone Package Insert - Listed Side Effects Pertinent To This Case 
Trazadone selectively inhibits serotonin uptake. Of utmost concern 
with Trazadone would be the clinical reports indicating almost a three times 
greater incidence of "tremor" - something that often indicates the very 
serious reaction of akathisia. 
Other reports on Trazadone are: abnormal dreams, agitation, anxiety, apnea, 
extrapyramidal symptoms, grand mal seizures, hallucinations, insomnia, 
liver enzyme alterations, paranoid reaction, psychosis, rash, stupor, tardive 
diskinesia, etc. 
Wellbutrin Package Insert - Listed Side Effects Pertinent To This Case: 
Wellbutrin works via the reuptake of norepinephrine, serotonin, and 
dopamine. 
History of Seizure or Cranial Trauma: Wehbutrin XL should be 
administered with extreme caution to patients with a history of seizure, 
cranial trauma, or other predispositions(s) toward seizure, or patients treated 
with other agents (e.g., antipsychotics, other antidepressants, theophylline, 
systemic steroids, etc.) that lower seizure threshold. 
[In 2001, a few months before the tragedy, Lenny had a very serious car 
accident where his car flipped over ten times and was totaled. In this type of 
accident, the brain hits against the inside of the skull causing much bruising 
and injury to the brain. In 1995 Lenny had also been given 9 ECT 
treatments or electronically induced seizures. Both of these actions would 
have set him up for a serious reaction to Wellbutrin including seizure activity 
which can trigger delusions, violence, and out of character behavior. The 
Wellbutrin package insert warns strongly about seizure potential with the use 
of Wellbutrin in those with previous seizure activity or cranial trauma. These 
two actions and the side effects of Wellbutrin should have been more 
seriously considered as a contraindication before ever prescribing Wellbutrin 
to Lenny] 
General: Agitation and Insomnia: Increased restlessness, agitation, 
anxiety, and insomnia, especially shortly after initiation of treatment with 
bupropion. 
Psychosis, Confusion, and Other Neuropsychiatric Phenomena: 
Depressed patients treated with bupropion have been reported to show a 
variety of neuropsychiatric signs and symptoms, including delusions, 
hallucinations, psychosis, concentration disturbance, paranoia, and 
confusion. In some cases, these symptoms abated upon dose reductions 
and/or withdrawal of treatment. 
Activation of Psychosis and/or Mania: Antidepressants can 
precipitate manic episodes in bipolar disorder patients during the depressed 
phase of their illness and may activate latent psychosis in other susceptible 
patients. 
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Drug Interactions:... studies suggest that paroxetine, sertraline, 
norfluoxetine, and fluvoxamine as well as nelfinavir, ritonavir and effavirenz 
inhibit the hydroxylation of bupropion. 
Many drugs, including most antidepressants (SSRIs, many tricyclics), beta 
blockers, antiarrhythmics, and antipsychotics are metabolized by the 
CYP4502D6 isoenzyme. Although bupropion is not metabolized by this 
isoenzyme, bupropion and hydrosybupropion are inhibitors of CYP4502D6 
isoenzyme in vitro. 
Concomitant use of bupropion with other drugs metabolized by CYP4502D6 
has not been formally studied. 
Drugs That Lower Seizure Threshold: Concurrent administration of 
WELLBUTINXL Tablets and aganets (e.g., antipsychotics, other 
antidepressants, theophylline, systemic steroids, etc.) that lower seizure 
threshold should be undertaken only with extreme caution, (see 
WARNINGS). Low initial dosing and gradual dose increases should be 
employed. 
Alcohol: In postmarketing experience, there have been rare reports of 
adverse neuropsychiatric events or reduced alcohol tolerance in patients who 
were drinking alcohol during treatment with bupropion. The consumption of 
alcohol during treatment with WELLBUTRIN XL should bee minimized or 
avoided. 
Agitation: 1.8% Wellbutrin 0.3% in placebo [a rate of 6 to 7 times 
greater incidence of agitation with Wellbutrin] 
Nervous System: depersonalization, emotional lability, hostility, 
suicidal ideation, vertigo, derealization, hypomania delirium, euphoria, 
hallucinations, manic reaction, and paranoid reaction. 
Neurontin Package Insert - Listed Side Effects Pertinent To This Case 
With Neurontin it is important to know that the manufacturer is facing 
multiple litigations due to a whistle blower from within the company 
admitting that salesmen were being told to introduce themselves as "Dr." so 
and so to gain the confidence of doctors and then suggest the drug be used 
for unapproved uses to increase sales. 
From the website of one such law firm, Parker & Waichman out of NY, we 
find the following: "Neurontin, the controversial epilepsy drug that was 
heavily marketed for off-label use may be linked to suicidal behavior... It is 
believed that Parke-Davis which was acquired by Pfizer in 2000 had a 
systematic strategy to market and promote Neurontin for untested uses, such 
as chronic pain, bipolar disorder and migraine." 
(http://yourlawyer.com/practice/pmtpage.hmi?topic=Neurontin) 
Nervous System: FREQUENT: hyperkinesia, increased reflexes, 
anxiety and hostility INFREQUENT: dreaming abnormal, dystonia, stupor, 
apathy, hallucination, agitation, paranoia, depersonalization, euphoria, 
feeling high, doped up sensation, suicidal, psychosis RARE: personality 
disorder, mania, neurosis, hysteria, antisocial reaction, suicide gesture 
Warning: Antiepileptic drugs should not be abruptly discontinued 
because of the possibility of increasing seizure activity. [Keep in mind that 
mania is continuous mild seizure activity and Lenny experienced mania in 
the abrupt withdrawal from this drug when he converted to another religion.] 
Conclusion 
In conclusion I believe years of research speaks for itself. It is clear that the 
evidence linking SSRI antidepressants, tricyclic antidepressants, atypical 
antipsychotics [serotonergic antipsychotics] and other serotonergic agents, to 
aggressive or violent actions, including self harm and harm to others, is 
overwhelming. This is a public safety issue that should no longer be ignored. 
At this point far too many have suffered and/or died as a result of society's 
ignorance of this research. Hopefully Congress moving to demand studies 
kept hidden for years will begin to shed more light on this travesty. 
The Washington Post reported the very latest on this issue on Friday, April 
23,2004: 
http://www.washmgtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34792-
2004Apr22_2.html 
Antidepressants Called Unsafe For Children 
4 Medications Singled Out In Analysis of Many Studies 
By Shankar Vedantam 
Washington Post Staff Writer 
Friday, April 23, 2004; Page A03 
Four popular antidepressants being used to treat thousands of depressed 
American children are unsafe, ineffective or both, according to the first 
comprehensive scientific review to include all available studies, including 
negative data that have long been withheld from public scrutiny by the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
It is especially dangerous to prescribe Paxil, Zoloft, Effexor and Celexa for 
children who are suicidal, said British researchers who conducted the 
analysis published yesterday in the journal the Lancet, because the data 
show a clear increase in the risk of suicidal behavior among children taking 
the drugs ~ and no benefit.... 
Wayne D. Blackmon, a Washington psychiatrist who has long said clinicians 
cannot rely on the integrity of the data they are being given, said Congress 
should force the FDA to take unpublished negative trials into account and 
force the companies to make all data — positive and negative — available for 
public scrutiny. 
In the meantime, he said, clinicians should go back to the Hippocratic oath — 
"First, do no harm" — and "recognize that you are flying by the seat of 
your pants." 
This Washington Post article shows how "especially dangerous" Paxil was 
for young Lenny Gall. 
Also, the most critical period of use when the majority of adverse effects 
could be expected is when the SSRI is started, stopped or a change in 
medication occurs. Lenny experienced all of those repeatedly from 1993-
2001. 
I believe that Lenny Gall was a normal child with a family history of 
hypoglycemia, a metabolic disorder, who inadvertently got started on these 
serotonergic medications. They were given to him at a younger age than the 
FDA had approved as safe or effective and at an age that they have recently 
warned can be very dangerous leading to suicide and/or violence toward 
others. 
What stands out in Lenny's medical records is the drastic changes for the 
worse after he was first introduced to Paxil at the age of 16 in 1993. Shortly 
after the introduction of Paxil, he went from simple anxiety problems to all 
the signs of a manic reaction to Paxil - including, as Dr. Cohn stated in her 
August 26,2002 report, "with documentation of paranoia, grandiosity, loose 
associations, and suicidal ideation" (suicidal ideation is continuous obsessive 
thoughts of ways to kill oneself). This in spite of the fact that this was a child 
who had a consistent even keel disposition before his introduction to Paxil. 
From there it was downhill because no one noticed that the manic reactions 
were drug-induced. Had these manic, paranoid, and suicidal reactions been 
recognized as adverse drug reactions, he could have been withdrawn safely 
from the offending medication at that time. (Paxil had just recently been 
introduced and most adverse reactions had not even been determined at that 
point.) In my experience and in my opinion that would have prevented the 
years of medical treatment for his additional drug-induced reactions of 
depression, suicide attempts, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, etc. as well as 
preventing the drug-induced psychotic reaction that led to the death of his 
mother and his subsequent confinement. 
Also in 1995, Lenny's first abrupt withdrawal (from Paxil) threw him into 
full blown mania. This is extremely dangerous due to the potential of 
withdrawal-induced mania. This action in effect pushed Lenny out of the 
Paxil-induced frying pan right into the fire. This is mania referred to as 
"withdrawal mania" because it is brought on by the abrupt withdrawal from 
this group of antidepressants. It is this failure to warn of the serious dangers 
associated with withdrawal that has triggered multi district lawsuits against 
GlaxoSmithKline, the makers of Paxil. 
The worst way to take these serotonergic drugs is intermittently with 
changes in dose and switching of medications. This is one of the warnings 
the FDA just put into place on these drugs. Taking them intermittently 
produces what is called a kindling effect. What this means is that each time 
the drug is introduced again the patient has a much stronger effect when 
taking small amounts. 
This is the way Lenny was taking these drugs after his abrupt withdrawal 
from Paxil threw him into a manic reaction. Lenny took Zyprexa this way 
because it was the way his physician had prescribed it for him. Then when it 
should have become obvious that he was having a manic reaction from the 
abrupt withdrawal he was placed on yet more serotonergic antidepressants 
and serotonergic antipsychotics. This continuous drugging with serotonergic 
agents impaired his metabolism of serotonin even further, thus increasing the 
possibility of serotonin-induced psychosis, RBD, impulsive suicide or 
homicide. 
The continuous drugging with one serotonergic medication after another 
kept him from experiencing a washout period from the Paxil which would 
have shown that the real cause of the initial manic psychosis was Paxil - a 
drug-induced manic psychosis which is known to be transient or which is 
known to be eliminated by the appropriate withdrawal of the offending 
medication instead of abrupt withdrawal as Lenny inadvertently did. 
My tape on withdrawal suggests taking months to years (depending upon the 
length of time on the drugs) to wean off these drugs in order to avoid manic 
or psychotic reactions. After 14 years of working with patients withdrawing 
from these drugs I have found the safest length of time for withdrawal is 
about half the amount of time a patients has taken them (except for longer 
term use where it seems that just about a year and a quarter for withdrawal in 
a patient on the drugs is a safe withdrawal period). Interestingly Eli Lilly, the 
makers of Prozac, just changed the withdrawal period in their clinical trials 
after a young healthy volunteer hung herself in their laboratory in 
withdrawal from their newest SSRI antidepressant. 
In my opinion the two abrupt withdrawals, the first from Paxil in 1995, and 
the second from the Zyprexa shortly before the 12/14/01 tragedy caused 
serious behavioral changes due to the withdrawal effects. Adding to that was 
the shock to his system due to the drastic change in medication the 
beginning of 2001 when he abruptly dropped off Wellbutrin and Neurontin. 
At that time he continued to use Trazadone sporadically and St. John's Wort 
(an herb used as a natural alternative that increases serotonin levels) three 
times a day when he converted to another religion and was told his faith was 
stronger than his "mental illness." 
Little did anyone know that what Lenny was dealing with were drug 
reactions that would become far worse with any abrupt changes in 
medication. That warning only came March 22, 2004 from the FDA. How 
would anyone know with this blatant lack of warning by both the drug 
manufacturers and the FDA? This in turn produced the violent behavior by 
Lenny in December of 2001 - violent behavior which the drug companies 
knew for years and did not warn - drug-induced violence known to be FAR 
GREATER than normal. 
I believe it was shock from these abrupt withdrawals of Paxil and Zyprexa 
that produced the kindling effect leading to the impulsive as well as 
compulsive suicidal and homicidal thoughts. And also led to the more 
mtense-toxic-mentalrandrJ^ehavioral changes and continuous prescribing of 
more and more serotonergic medications. 
Although there are those while unaware of this information on these 
medications have alleged that Lenny acted recklessly by refiising to take his 
prescribed medications, we can see from this information that he was instead 
acting responsibly by wanting to come off medications that we now know 
were actually harming him. 
My professional opinion is that in considering the information in the 
product package inserts alone there is such overwhelming evidence that this 
entire situation was chemically/physically-induced that I do not understand 
why anyone did not consider the potential of an extremely altered mental 
state for Lenny in this tragedy. And when looking at the severity of the first 
manic psychosis triggered by the abrupt withdrawal of the Paxil, I am 
shocked that no one considered that it was an effect of this abrupt 
withdrawal or a Paxil-induced manic psychosis. Yet Dr. Malcomb Bowers 
from Yale noted that he was shocked when he found so many reports of 
SSRI-induced psychosis reported by hospitals when MOST PHYSICIANS 
do not recognize that these psychosis are drug induced psychotic breaks. 
Although he found 8% -11% of those were hospitalized due to an SSRI-
induced psychosis, he stressed that there must be a much higher number 
going psychotic on these medications that were not being noticed, reported, 
or treated, but ending up in continuous treatment for what was actually a 
drug-induced psychosis. Obviously Lenny should have been weaned 
gradually off the Paxil shortly after the introduction to the drug when the 
first signs of paranoia, rapid speech, delusions, suicidal ideation, etc. - all 
signs of serious reactions to Paxil. 
Clearly the sum total of this scientific evidence indicates that the expected 
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result of the combination of many various serotonergic medications Lenny 
was using over the years, combined with the recent abrupt withdrawal from 
Zyprexa would be expected to produce a range from very diminished 
capacity to no mental capacity at all to act on one's own. I agree with other 
experts that he was not conscious enough to form any intent to do much of 
anything due to the toxic effects of these drugs in his system. 
I firmly believe that as he is weaned appropriately off these drugs that have 
caused these reactions we will see a normal human being with no tendency 
toward violence as he was before ever being given these serotonergic drugs. 
This is something I have seen in case after case after case. 
I do believe it to be clear in reviewing the data we now have on Paxil that 
this drug was the initial catalyst that consequently led to the tragic events of 
12/14/01. This greatly impaired Lenny's thought processes initially leading 
to more and more drugs of a similar nature that in turn led to such out of 
character behavior on his part for several months during 2001. Then the 
initiation of use of the serotonergic agent Zyprexa once again by Lenny 
produced a kindling effect making his reactions to the drug much greater. All 
of that led to the delusions resulting in the death of his mother and his own 
suicide attempt and suicidal ideation afterwards. 
Respectfully, 
Ann Blake Tracy, PhD 
Executive Director, 
International Coalition For Drug Awareness 
Author of Prozac: Panacea or Pandora? 
Our Serotonin Nightmare 
Office: 801-282-5282 
Cell: 801-209-1800 
E-Mail Address: atracyplid.l@aol.coni 
Website: www.drugawareness.org 
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Educational and Professional Background 
I am a Board Certified psychiatrist residing in North Carolina. The scope of my current 
practice includes clinical duties as a contract psychiatrist, independent research in the 
areas of neuropharmacology and epidemiology, and educational lectures for medical 
professionals and the public. 
Academically, my background includes baccalaureate degrees from California Lutheran 
University (BA in political science, BS in Biology - completing both programs summa 
cum laude), as well as a Master's in Public Administration. My professional education 
in medicine was completed at the University of Colorado School of Medicine in May 
1996. Following medical school, I was commissioned in the US Navy with orders for 
post-graduate training in psychiatry: internship at San Diego Naval Medical Center 
(Balboa Hospital - graduating in 1997); residency in Washington, D.C. in the National 
Capital consortium (a tri-service training program performed at Walter Reed Army 
Hospital, Bethesda Naval Hospital, and Malcolm Grow Hospital at Andrews Air Force 
Base). 
Subsequent to the successful completion of my residency in June 2000,1 was assigned as 
a staff psychiatrist at Bethesda Naval Hospital where I supervised the work of trainees 
and provided care to active duty personnel, their dependents, and retirees. Since 
transitioning out of the military in spring 2002,1 have pursued work as a Locum Tenens 
provider and independent consultant. 
II. Forensic Experience 
In spring of 2003,1 participated as an expert witness in the case of Myers vs. Alaska 
Psychiatric Institute (API). The case was important because of its consideration of my 
testimony about the efficacy and safety of neuroleptics. Special emphasis was placed 
upon the FDA's analysis and approval of olanzapine (Zyprexa) as a primary example of 
the "newer" antipsychotic therapies. Interestingly, on March 1, 2004, the FDA 
announced its requirement for new warnings about health risks associated with 
olanzapine [1] and other atypical neuroleptics. This FDA alert was consistent with manv 
of the concerns which I had expressed in my affidavit [2] and more recent writings [3]. 
In considering my testimony in the Myers case, the Alaska Superior Court, and the 
former Director of Schizophrenia Research at NIMH (National Insitutes of Mental 
Health) both qualified me as an expert in the area of psychopharmacology. This 
expertise continues to expand, particularly through my personal research which has been 
preparatory for the publication of a book explaining the mechanisms through which 
psychiatric medications often prevent or delay recovery. 
My most recent work with patients involved a Locum Tenens assignment in the North 
Carolina Department of Corrections. In that position, which I held between August 2003 
and March 2004,1 was directly responsible for the medication management, 
multidisciplinary treatment plans, and initial psychiatric assessments of patients at three 
different facilities, ranging from in-processing and minimum custody camps to a 
close-custody facility housing inmates with chronic medical and mental illnesses. Most 
recently, I have testified on behalf of an Alaska state prisoner (Bavilla vs. State of 
Alaska, Department of Corrections) who was challenged with involuntary treatment 
(neuroleptics), despite the fact that she posed no imminent danger to herself or others. 
IH. Impact of Former Testimony and Relevance to Present Case 
In the 2003 case of Myers vs. API, my testimony addressed many of the flaws associated 
with the development and approval of psychiatric drugs, and with the dissemination of 
information explaining the risks associated with chemical therapies. As many physicians 
and legal professionals seem unaware of the scope of these problems, a brief review may 
be helpful in the current deliberations: 
1) ghost writing: this refers to the process by which payments are given by 
pharmaceutical companies to physicians who lend their names to drug-company 
generated research reports. This perpetuates the illusion of independent research and 
objective findings, when in fact the listed authors have never participated in, nor 
reviewed results, of the data for which they assume authorship [4] 
2) file drawer effect & publication bias: this refers to the process by which journals, 
professional organizations, and the media "file" negative studies in the waste can or other 
"file" drawer, delaying or refusing to publish them. Negative studies are far less likely to 
be reported in medical journals, due to pressures upon editors from advertisers and other 
sources [5] 
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3) non-disclosure agreements: this refers to the process by which drug companies and 
other flinders of research force their employees to sign contracts prohibiting uncensored 
release of investigations and findings. These agreements can prevent or delay public 
access to vital information for many years, often with tragic results [6, 7]; such 
agreements also preclude expert witnesses from disclosing proprietary information which 
becomes available to them through the process of litigation and discovery, again 
compromising the quality of infor/nation which is released to the public and to 
professionals at large 
4) biased trial designs: this refers to the numerous methods used by drug companies and 
other agencies to produce and interpret data favorable to new products, relative to 
placebo or older therapies. Specific examples of the biases employed include the use of 
non-comparative dosing strategies; placebo washout; penetration of blinding procedures; 
the use of concomitant medications; rater-scored rather than patient-scored assessment 
scales; post-hoc determinations of efficacy; and the manipulation of intention to treat data 
to favor LOCF vs. OC results [8,9] 
IV. Purpose of This Report 
I have been asked to review the matter of the State of Utah vs. Leonard Preston Gall, in 
order to provide an independent, psychiatric opinion about factors which may have 
influenced the defendant's capacity to either understand his behaviors at the time of the 
crime(s); or to conform his behaviors to the expectations of society and the law at the 
time of the crime(s). While my evaluation will incorporate a biopsychosocial review of 
the case, I will be emphasizing the contributions of medical conditions and treatments 
which may have been missed or minimized in previous deliberations and sentencing. 
V. Materials Reviewed 
In preparing this report, I have reviewed the following materials: 
1) Declaration of Ann Blake Tracy, PhD 
dated March 29, 2003 
2) Letter from Mr. Leonard Silvius Gall to Judge Judith Atherton 
dated April 17, 2004 
3) Letter from defendant to Judge Judith Atherton 
dated April 17, 2004 
4) Telephone conversations with Mr. Leonard Silvius Gall 
04/27/04, 04/28/04, 4/29/04, 4/30/04 
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VI. Limitations of Current Report 
Due to a variety of restrictions (temporal, geographic, and procedural), this report has 
been prepared in the context of the following limitations: 
1) lack of access to complete medical records and evaluations (past and present) 
2) lack of opportunity to perform direct face-to-face interview with the patient 
for the purpose of assessing mental state, neurocognitive functions, and judgment; 
and for the purpose of performing a thorough review of social and development 
background (including any possible history of physical, emotional, 
and /or sexual abuse), past symptoms, and subjective response to treatments 
3) lack of opportunity to perform interviews with collateral sources of 
information [additional family members, friends, former employers, teachers] 
4) lack of opportunity to perform an independent, comprehensive medical evaluation 
with referrals to pertinent specialists and completion of the following assessments: 
a) lab tests - such as CBC, liver function tests, comprehensive metabolic panel, 
heavy metal screen, hepatitis screen, RPR and FTA-ABs (to rule out 
latent syphilis or neurosyphilis), prolactin and Cortisol levels, ESR and ANA 
(to rule out lupus), HIV, urine drug screen, thyroid function tests (to include 
TSH and free T4), B12 and folate levels, urinalysis 
b) thorough neurological exam - to include review and assessment of 
all cranial nerves, sensory, and motor abilities, coordination, verbal 
fluency, gross cognitive limitations 
c) neuroimaging - as current standard of care for psychosis includes 
CT, MRI, or both to rule out intracranial lesions or other anatomic pathology 
d) EEG assessment: (preferably with patient off of all psychoactive medications) 
to rule out epilepsy or other electrophysiological abnormalities 
These limitations are duly acknowledged, not as a disclaimer for the remarks which 
follow; but as a reminder of the essential need for comprehensive and up-to-date 
assessments in the care of all mental health patients regardless of their disposition. 
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VDL Pertinent Social & Developmental History 
Leonard Preston Gall is a 27 year old single Caucasian male born on 12/03/76. The 
oldest of two boys, "Lenny" was born in California, where he was raised by both parents 
until their separation in 1982 (defendant age 6) and divorce two years thereafter. 
Following the parental separation, the defendant and his sibling (brother Michael, born in 
1980) were reared by their mother in Utah. During this time period, the boys enjoyed 
four weeks per year with their father in Southern California. Mr. Gall describes his eldest 
son as an "even keeled" young man who succeeded academically (As, Bs), athletically 
(captain of high school volleyball team in grade nine), and socially (caring deeply about 
his family, and earning the respect of his peers). 
From a developmental standpoint, there is no reported history of learning difficulties, 
speech or motor delays, oppositional or delinquent behaviors, or substance abuse 
problems. There was no record of violence or psychosis until after the defendant 
received his first psychiatric drug at the age of sixteen. From an academic standpoint, the 
defendant completed high school on time. He graduated from college with good grades, 
even though academic progress was interrupted by events described below. 
Psychosocial stressors which may have influenced the defendant include the following: 
1) his mother's early concerns about the health of the family into which she married 
(father of defendant notes that his own mother suffered a nervous breakdown around age 
55, possibly leading his new wife to become worried about "tainted genes" that might 
eventually be passed along to their progeny); 2) his mother's familial background (history 
of violence, difficult relations with her own father); 3) his frequent displacements and 
relocations due to his parents' separation (age 6 through 14 with mother in Utah; age 
14-15 with father in California; age 15-18 with mother in Utah; age 18 in California, 
then back to Utah following recurrence of symptoms during freshman year of college); 
4) his younger brother's psychological struggles (cannabis abuse, suicide attempts during 
his adolescence); 5) his mother's own health problems (she stopped practicing Christian 
Science at age 20; possible anxieties about her own health led to treatment with several 
medications - details not known). 
Family Psychiatric and Medical History 
There is a positive history of psychiatric illness in the defendant's maternal grandmother, 
whom Mr. Gall describes as "experiencing a nervous breakdown at age 55." The 
defendant's younger brother is reported to have experienced some delays with language 
for which a speech therapist was consulted early in the second year of his life 
(Note: Michael's delivery was difficult, and he experienced respiratory difficulties 
necessitating ICU treatment for several days after birth). The defendant's younger 
brother was placed in Special Education classes for a limited period of time. This brother 
later experienced problems with cannabis abuse (high school) and suicide attempts. The 
defendant's mother is described by Mr. Gall as "occasionally violent." He recalls 
specifically the notes of the speech therapist who attended to his youngest son, and whose 
records conveyed concerns about the emotional stability of the defendant's mother. 
As noted in Dr. Ann Tracy's declaration and in the letter of Mr. Leonard S. Gall, 
there is a history of hypoglycemia in the defendant's father. No other details of the 
family's medical history have been available or shared with me for my review. 
Defendant's Psychiatric & Medical History 
The preparation of a comprehensive chronology of symptoms, interventions, and 
treatment response has not been feasible (short notice to prepare this report, lack of 
access to pertinent records). However, the available sources of information permit 
the following outline of critical events: 
• 1993: "anxiety" diagnosed at age 16, treated with Paxil»»leading to 
new onset of psychotic and hypomanic or manic symptoms: 
paranoia, grandiosity, loosening of associations, suicidal thoughts 
• 1995: abrupt discontinuation of Paxil at age 18 (during college in California) 
leading to recurrence of paranoid delusions several weeks into the withdrawal 
period 
• 1996: eventual resolution of delusions with stability over a period of six months 
(closely monitored by father in Santa Barbara) 
• 1997: return of suicidal thoughts/suicide attempt (pill overdose) in aftermath of 
psychotic experience, and in context of return to Utah 
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• 1997: electro shock treatment (9 treatments, according to Dr. Ann Blake Tracy) 
• 1997 - 2001: treatment with series of antidepressant medications/herbs including: 
o Prozac (fluoxetine): unclear dates 
o Wellbutrin (bupropion) and Neurontin (gabapentin): abruptly stopped in 
early 2001 
o Desyrel (trazodone): taken "sporadically55 
o St. John's wort: taken "sporadically55 
• January 2001: first treatment with Zyprexa (olanzapine) given for "sleep55 
• fall 2001: motor vehicle accident with possible loss of consciousness, closed head 
injury / traumatic brain injury [ details not available] 
• August - December 14, 2001: resumption of treatment with olanzapine; 
six tablets consumed [doses, frequency, precise dates not clear] 
VHI. Understanding Violence - Neuroscientific Techniques 
Many theories have been proposed to explain the neurological underpinnings of 
human violence [10]. The research in this area begins with the consideration of the 
phylogenetic architecture of the human brain, which refers to the evolutionary 
development of discrete brain regions thought to underlie aggression in many species. 
Violence in humans and other primates is presumed to arise from abnormal or heightened 
activity in the limbic system; and/or the disinhibition (weakening of control) from the 
neocortex (the higher centers of the brain, through which impulses and instincts can be 
consciously restrained). These developments can develop through structural or 
physiological changes in the brain. 
Structural lesions in the limbic system or neocortex of the human brain represent 
anatomic substrates (foci) of potential violence. For this reason, neuroimaging studies 
are employed in order to establish the presence of discrete physical abnormalities: e.g., 
tumors, infectious granulomas or abscesses, demyelinating disease processes, A-V 
malformations, or traumatic injuries. 
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Most violence appears to be based in transient changes in cellular activity or 
neurophysiology, rather than the more permanent structural abnormalities mentioned 
above. In order to understand the possible physiological causes of violence, researchers 
explore the activity of specific neurotransmitters (serotonin, dopamine, norepinephrine) 
or hormones (testosterone, cholesterol) as they affect behavior in different neural 
locations. 
In the case of Leonard Preston Gall, it is essential for the State to consider what, if any, 
structural abnormalities might have existed in the defendant's brain at the time of the 
offense(s). [None have been identified, according to the information provided tome.] 
Next, it becomes essential for the State to consider the existence of physiological 
(electrochemical) disruptions in the limbic system and/or neocortex of the defendant, 
which may have precluded his ability to control his impulses and aggression. 
Given the fact that there are no reliable or non-invasive methods for sampling or 
detecting chemical levels in the human brain; and given the fact that the brain is 
delicately protected from the rest of the body by an exquisite shield known as the "blood 
brain barrier" - scientists cannot accurately evaluate brain function by measuring 
chemical substances in non-brain fluids (such as blood or urine). 
Therefore, most theories about human behavior have been developed in lab tests, 
by integrating data from three sources: 1) animal investigations (performing experiments 
on live specimens, then sacrificing the animal in order to analyze chemical or cellular 
changes in brain tissue; 2) lumbar punctures in human subjects (sampling the 
cerebrospinal fluid before and after a particular treatment or activity); and 3) direct 
observation of human behavior, in response to medications or other experimental 
manipulations. Ultimately, theories of human behavior are advanced by correlating the 
natural or medication-induced chemical changes in the human brain (most reliably 
assessed by sampling the fluid which bathes the brain) with animal models. 
Understanding Violence — Research Findings 
The most consistently replicated associations between violence and physiochemical 
changes in the brain include: 
• low levels of cerebrospinal BQAA (hydroxyindoleacetic acid, the major 
metabolite or breakdown product of serotonin) [11, 12, 13] 
• high levels of serum testosterone [14] 
• low levels of serum cholesterol [15, 16, 17] 
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In the absence of comorbid substance abuse or dependence, mental illness per se is not a 
reliable predictor of violence towards others. Most violent crimes in the U.S. are 
committed by sociopaths or individuals acting under the influence of mind-altering 
substances (such as alcohol, cocaine, PCP, crystal methamphetamine, LSD) [18]. 
While risk factors for violence do include psychosis, research suggests that most 
individuals who suffer from hallucinations or delusions do not harm others unless they 
are also under the influence of mind-altering drugs [19, 20]. Another significant risk 
factor for suicide and homicide among the mentally ill is akathisia, which is a common 
side effect of antipsychotic drugs [21]. Ironically, while it is widely acknowledged that 
street drugs and alcohol play leading roles in the commission of violent crimes in 
America each year, it is generally not acknowledged that prescribed drugs 
contribute significantly to many of these same behaviors. 
Serotonin and the Adverse Effects of Antidepressant Drugs 
Evidence for the adverse psychiatric effects of serotonergic antidepressants has existed 
for more than 50 years, but this information has generally been concealed or minimized. 
Although there were case reports of agitation, violent thoughts, and self-harm occurring 
in the development of many antidepressants throughout history, it was not until the 
arrival of Prozac-like drugs that these events began to occur in sufficient numbers to draw 
serious regard. A series of papers documenting Prozac-related agitation and violence 
began to appear in the medical journals around 1990. In response to these reports, the 
FDA convened a special hearing in 1991 to consider the issue of possible drug-induced 
violence. 
Despite the existence of clear evidence suggesting similar connections between violence 
and other SSRIs at that time (Paxil, Zoloft), the FDA refused to review evidence on any 
medication besides Prozac. Although the FDA agreed that more research in the area of 
product safety was indicated, it failed to pursue the kinds of studies needed to establish a 
clearer picture of the connection between serotonergic drugs and aggression. The FDA 
also refused to issue any warnings about the new drugs, fearing that more people with 
depression would be "scared away" from seeking pharmacotherapy if harsh warnings 
were issued about products which the regulatory agency wished to depict as necessary, 
effective, and only rarely harmful. 
The long-term repercussions of this decision have been disastrous. In a series of position 
statements, letters to governmental authorities, and peer-reviewed publications explaining 
the history of antidepressant induced violence and withdrawal syndromes [22, 23, 24], 
Dr. David Healy has performed a meticulous review of missing and/or misinterpreted 
data from healthy volunteer (Phase I) studies; pre-marketing (Phase IE) clinical 
investigations; and epidemiological surveys. His comprehensive analysis of data 
(largely concealed by drug companies, but accessed by Healy on several occasions as an 
expert witness in several key legal contests) has produced the following findings: 
1) a 2-3 fold higher risk of suicide in adults and children taking 
the newer serotonin antidepressants, relative to placebo 
2) an approximate 180 suicides among SRI (serotonin reuptake inhibitor) 
consumers per 100,000 depressed patients compared to 67 suicides per 
100,000 patients treated with older drugs or no drugs 
and, based on the estimated 50 million SRI consumers in the US since 1988: 
3) 21,900-70,000 excess adult suicides 
1500 excess child suicides 
all arising directly from the consumption of serotonergic 
antidepressants in the US since the introduction of Prozac-type drugs between 
1989 and 1992 
Among the most serious risks of antidepressant therapies are psychiatric side effects, 
which include worsening depression, hypomanic or manic states, and/or psychosis. 
Pertinent studies include the work of Yale researchers who recently reviewed the records 
of patients admitted to their hospital for inpatient stabilization. Their data suggest that as 
many as 8% of all patients admitted were experiencing mania or psychosis arising 
directly from antidepressant therapy [25]. Many case reports lend support to these 
findings. 
Most recently, researchers at the University of Calfornia San Diego have proposed the 
creation of a new diagnostic category, recognizing the high frequency of 
antidepressant-associated mood swings (11% of patients diagnosed with a bipolar II 
condition in their research). These investigators have proposed the label "bipolar 111" for 
the phenomenon of antidepressant-induced hypomania, due to the fact that the 
phenomenon has become such a common and clinically significant event [26]. 
Mechanisms Accounting for Serotonergic Antidepressant Violence 
Many possible mechanisms have been proposed to explain the physiological processes 
through which serotonin reuptake inhibitors may induce suicide and homicide. First, 
observers have identified the emergence of a "frontal lobe" or "amotivational syndrome" 
through which many patients on serotonin drugs become apathetic and indifferent about 
their behaviors. Concerned investigators have suggested that patients on serotonergic 
drugs may become incapable of contemplating the consequences of their actions, due to a 
loss of motivation or cognitive energy. This SRI apathy syndrome is so important that 
the textbook of the American Psychiatric Association now devotes specific attention to it 
[27], and a number of child and adolescent psychiatrists have observed the same 
phenomenon in their patients [28]. 
A second mechanism contributing to antidepressant-related violence is the induction 
of akathisia - a severe state of inner restlessness and agitation, commonly produced by 
antipsychotic medications. Studies in animals and humans suggest a complex interaction 
between serotonergic cells in the midbrain, and dopamine neurons in the striatum. 
It has been proposed that serotonin exerts an inhibitory effect upon dopamine 
transmission, in a manner that echoes the effects of dopamine antagonists (neuroleptics). 
In addition to akathisia, a large number of subjects treated with serotonergic drugs 
have experienced movement disorders, prompting one leading American psychiatrist to 
pen an article entitled "Must we now consider SRIs to be neuroleptics?" [29, 30, 31]. 
The link between akathisia and violence has been the subject of many epidemiological 
and experimental investigations [32] and is explicitly acknowledged in the DSM-IV as 
one of the most serious side effects of neuroleptic therapy. 
A third mechanism for antidepressant-induced violence involves acute or chronic 
disruptions in serotonin levels of the brain. In this regard, serotonin reuptake inhibition 
appears to cause acute elevation's in serotonin; chronic serotonin reuptake inhibition 
appears to cause adaptations in the brain which lead to significant reductions in serotonin 
levels. Either extreme appears to have serious consequences in the limbic system and the 
neocortical regions of the brain which modulate impulsivity, aggression, and mood. 
[Note: While the declaration of Dr. Ann Blake Tracy discusses serotonin syndrome as a 
possible cause of violence, it is this writer's opinion that the serotonin syndrome is more 
appropriately characterized by symptoms of delirium, autonomic instability, myoclonus, 
diarrhea, diaphoresis, coma, and possible death.] 
A fourth mechanism for serotonergic-drug violence relates to the impact of serotonin 
upon the levels or activity of other neurotransmitters in key regions of the brain. 
It is significant that the most current research of the drug companies themselves (such as 
Eli Lilly, maker of Prozac) has discovered that the "selective" serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors do not appear to be selective at all, due to the fact that they produce significant 
increases in norepinephrine and dopamine levels in many areas of the brain. These 
secondary effects may account for the delusions, hallucinations, mood states, or panic 
attacks that are frequently caused by the serotonin reuptake inhibitors and other 
antidepressants which affect any of the fourteen subtypes of serotonin receptors that have 
been identified to date. 
A fifth mechanism of serotonergic-drug violence, mentioned by Dr.Tracy, is the 
relatively new phenomenon of a parasomnia (sleep disturbance) entitled "REM sleep 
behavioral disorder." While I was never exposed to this phenomenon in my psychiatric 
training, I am grateful for the education which Dr. Tracy's declaration has provided me. 
While the prevalence of REM sleep disturbances that have actually involved homicides 
has presumably never been researched, my own clinical experience suggests that many 
of my former patients exposed to serotonergic agents were suffering from alterations in 
consciousness which made it difficult for them to distinguish the point at which their 
nighttime dreams had ended, and their daytime "reality" had begun. Retrospectively, I 
suppose it is possible that many of these individuals may have experienced the kinds of 
altered EEG states that Dr. Tracy has suggested. However, this is such a new and 
startling phenomenon that I suspect very few physicians recognize its existence and 
intervene appropriately in the face of its practical effects. 
Time Course for Emergence of SRI (serotonin reuptake inhibitor) 
Violence and Psychosis 
It is essential to appreciate the possibility that antidepressants (like many other 
psychiatric drugs) can precipitate any of the aforementioned changes during the active 
phase of treatment (e.g., while the drug is still being consumed); during the immediate 
period of drug discontinuation (days to weeks); or most suprisingly, during the months 
that follow the cessation or interruption of drug consumption. 
Not only do the fluorinated antidepressants (Prozac, Luvox, Paxil) accumulate in the 
brain at levels that are 2 to 20 times higher than blood levels; but these same chemicals 
now appear to remain in the body for far longer periods of time than most physicians 
have ever been trained to anticipate [33, 34, 35]. All of this information is particularly 
relevant to the case at hand, because it is possible that the defendant's behaviors at the 
time of his offenses represented the long term effects of previous drug treatments which 
continued to alter the neurotransmitter levels and activity of his limbic system and/or 
frontal lobes. 
Dopamine and the Adverse Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs 
Evidence for the role of antipsychotic medications in the development of suicidal or 
homicidal thoughts, mania, and/or psychosis is also robust [36, 37, 38]. Similar to the 
theories identified above, the mechanisms which account for neuroleptic-associated 
violence include drug induced disruptions in neurotransmitter turnover (metabolism); the 
induction of a specific reduction in mood or motivation, identified as "neuroleptic 
induced deficit syndrome" (or NIDS); cognitive disruptions, including the delayed onset 
of difficulties described by some investigators as the condition of "tardive dysmentia"; 
and the frequent induction of akathisia, which appears to occur in as many as 40-50% of 
patients treated with older neuroleptics. However, it is important to recognize that the 
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newer antipsychotic medications - such as olanzapine (Zyprexa) - have been found to 
induce akathisia in many patients [39]. Actual post-marketing reports suggest that there 
is very little difference between the rates of akathisia experienced by many patients given 
these new drugs compared to the older neuroleptics, despite the claims of the drug 
manufacturers to the contrary [40]. 
One final point which is particularly pertinent to the present case involves the neuronal 
adaptations which occur as medications are chronically administered, or when previously 
administered neuroleptic therapies are abruptly withdrawn. The Montreal researcher, 
Guy Chouinard, has proposed several models of "supersensitivity" or "tardive" 
psychosis, to explain the exacerbations of delusions or hallucinations which commonly 
emerge the longer a patient remains on dopamine antagonists, such as olanzapine; or 
alternatively, when dopamine blockade is suddenly reduced. Many other clinicians and 
researchers have expressed similar concerns about the existence of neuroleptic 
withdrawal syndromes, which have been noted to continue in some cases for as long as 
six to eight months [41]. 
Adverse Effects of ECT 
Reference is made by Dr. Ann Blake Tracy to a series of nine treatments of ECT, 
administered to the defendant in 1995. (Further discussion with the defendant's father 
On 4/30/04 reveals that these treatments actually occurred in 1997.) It is worth 
emphasizing here that ECT remains a controversial procedure because of the long term 
risks, in the face of unclear or only temporary benefits. ECT has been illegalized in Italy, 
and is seldom practiced in a number of other European countries (e.g., the Netherlands, 
Germany). Studies of even the most ardent supporters of ECT have acknowledged that 
the procedure is ineffective in about 40% of the patients who receive it; and only 
temporarily effective in those who do show signs of response (80-100% relapse rates 
within six months of therapy). 
The acute side effects of ECT include mania and/or rapid cycling (2-6% of patients in 
some studies); post-ECT seizures; and cognitive disturbances which are potentially 
longlasting in many subjects. Equally disturbing are research reports suggesting brain 
atrophy in some ECT recipients; and the epidemiological data which imply that ECT 
accelerates the frequency of depressive relapses, and retards the improvement of 
underlying psychopathology. For all of these reasons, one must wonder to what extent 
the defendant's past behaviors were possibly influenced by the long-term effects of nine 
separate electroshock treatments, administered while he was just out of his teens. 
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IX. Case Formulation 
From a biopsychosocial perspective, the present case suggests an overwhelming record of 
organic (biological) contributions to violence. While a variety of psychosocial stressors 
may have contributed to anxiety for which the defendant sought assistance at age 16, it is 
unlikely that those stressors precipitated the intense psychological problems which 
developed only after the defendant was exposed to psychoactive medications and ECT. 
The events of December 14, 2001 unfolded in the context of escalating assaults 
on the defendant's brain. The history reveals a crescendo of neurophysiological 
disruptions, arising from the active effects or withdrawal effects of psychiatric 
medications known to cause violence; from repeated episodes of electroshock therapy 
(outlawed in Utah for minors under the age of 14; and now banned by many countries 
because of the unacceptable risks of irreversible brain damage); from the sporadic use of 
an herbal remedy that has also been linked to mania and psychosis (St John's Wort) 
[42,43]; and possibly from closed head injury suffered in a car accident that occurred 
just months before the crime. 
Unlike most perpetrators of violent crimes, Leonard Preston Gall had no previous history 
of aggression or homicide; no previous history of delinquency; and no previous history of 
substance abuse or drug dependence. The development of manic and psychotic 
symptoms appears to have been iatrogenically induced at age 16; iatrogenically 
perpetuated through several years of continuing drug treatment and intermittent drug 
withdrawal; and iatrogenically aggravated by ECT and quite possibly an unrecognized 
closed head injury (frontal lobe syndrome) occurring in the immediate aftermath of a 
serious motor vehicle accident. 
X. Diagnoses 
While the historical diagnoses have not been revealed to me, my understanding of the 
case to date suggests the following progression of events: 
Axis I 
a) age 16: anxiety disorder NOS 
unclear symptoms but presumably occurring in context of parental difficulties and 
divorce, relocation from California to Utah after successful freshman year spent in 
company of father, mother's intrapsychic/interpersonal difficulties, family's 
financial stressors, negotiation of puberty, etc. 
b) age 16-18: paxil induced mood vs. paxil induced psychotic disorder 
hypomania or mania with psychotic features 
grandiosity, loose associations, and delusions, initially triggered by active 
treatment with medication; later, triggered by serotonin withdrawal syndrome 
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c) age 18-present: 
r/oPTSD 
characterized by anxiety, mood, and/or dissociative reactions to each of the 
aforementioned psychotic episodes, as well as possible violence witnessed 
or experienced in childhood; reaction to homicide in 2001; and ongoing stressors 
associated with protracted sentence and incarceration 
r/o mood disorder NOS vs. psychotic disorder NOS (resolving or resolved) 
occurring in the context of active treatment with, or withdrawal from, 
brain-altering medications and St. John's Wort; ECT; and possible closed head 
injury suffered in fall 2001 
r/o neuroleptic induced akathisia (by history) 
r/o SSRI-induced akathisia (by history) 
Axis II deferred 
Axis III r/o closed head injury (motor vehicle accident in fall 2001) 
r/o endocrine disturbance (hyperglycemia, hyperlipidemia secondary to 
olanzapine administered in past; r/o hypoglycemia due to paternal history of 
same) 
XL Recommendations 
It is remarkable that Lenny Gall has survived the series of traumas which have transpired 
since his first exposure to psychoactive medication eleven years ago. 
From my telephone conversations with the defendant's father on April 26, 2004, it is my 
understanding that the defendant currently displays no active signs of psychosis, mood 
disturbance, or cognitive deficits. He has not engaged in any acts of self-injury, and has 
not threatened or harmed other individuals or property since December 14, 2001. He is 
not currently regarded as an imminent threat to others or himself. He has engendered the 
respect of staff members, clinicians, and fellow patients alike. 
ft ft : « A i c 
Given the facts of the case as they have been reported to me. it would be my 
recommendation that the State of Utah attach an absolute priority to the defendant's 
petition for offense adjustments and/or reductions, in recognition of the fact that the 
crime for which he has been charged was most likely the product of neurological. 
disorder. The facts of the case argue strongly that the defendant, in all likelihood, 
suffered from a transient but severe disruption in brain function which prevented him 
from comprehending the wrongfulness of his behaviors; precluded his anticipation of 
the consequences of liis actions; and restricted or eliminated his capacity to control 
aggressive impulses arising from an overactive or disinherited limbic system. 
Finally, it would be prudent for the State to review the long-term indications for 
continued pharmacotherapy, inasmuch as the defendant has now exhibited stability for 
over two years; inasmuch as the protracted administration of unnecessary 
pharmacological agents can actually contribute to further chronicity of symptoms (via 
neuronal adaptation, desensitization, and tolerance); and inasmuch as the continued use 
of medications is presumably aimed at the stabilization of disorders that have largely 
been caused by psychiatric interventions all along. 
Signed: *<&~c*^. ^ft*****^ frtfl 
Grace E J a c k a l MD 
Date: April 30,2004 
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5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 * * * * * 
7 
8 THE COURT: All right, let's take the matter of State 
9 of Utah versus Leonard Preston Gall, case number 011919226. 
10 Will Counsel state their appearances. 
11 MS. GUSTIN: Suzanne Gustin — sorry, Steve. 
12 MR. McCAUGHEY: Go ahead. 
13 MS. GUSTIN: Suzanne Gustin for Mr. Gall. 
14 MR. McCAUGHEY: Steven McCaughey for Mr. Gall. 
15 MS. CAMERON: Anne Cameron for the State. 
16 THE COURT: The record should reflect that Mr. Gall 
17 is present also in the courtroom. This is the time set for 
18 sentencing. Mr. Gall entered pleas of guilty to second 
19 degree — guilty and mentally ill to a second degree 
20 manslaughter charge and a second degree theft charge. I 
21 committed Mr. Gall to the Utah State Hospital sometime ago, 
22 last September I believe it was, with regard to the third first 
23 degree felony count. I set this matter for sentencing at that 
24 point for Mr. Gall to have some time to be at the Utah State 
25 Hospital and also to receive an update from the State Hospital. 
_ 
And I have received one dated the 18 of February. 
Are you prepared to go forward with sentencing on the 
other two cases now, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I am. 
THE COURT: Ms. Cameron? 
MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, it would be — we've had 
quite a bit of testimony. I don't think that any — the 
victims are present. Do you have any desire to speak? 
Okay. The victims have spoke at the time that the 
pleas were entered, therefore the State doesn't have much more 
to say other than the fact that the State would definitely 
recommend, due to the nature of these crimes, that the two 
second degree felonies that the defendant is to be sentenced on 
today are to run consecutive to each other. 
THE COURT: I also have received and reviewed 15 
letters, as well as numerous documents concerning mental health 
issues with regard to the defendant. 
The February 18 report from the Utah State 
Hospital concludes that Mr. Gall has not retained any sort of 
stability and is still mentally ill and request continued 
treatment of him under the first degree felony. By way of 
sentencing then, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, prior to sentencing, it 
was — a letter I received from Mr. — from the defendant, 
Leonard Gall, which I am convinced was probably written by his 
zr\ A < * f\ 
1 father, he did indicate that there had been no motion for a 402 
2 reduction filed in this case. And that was a conscious 
3 decision on my part because I donft — in my judgement of the 
4 case, I believe filing such a motion would really be frivolous 
5 in light of the circumstances of this case. But in deference 
6 to my client and his father, I would orally make that motion at 
7 this time that had the Court — pursuant to 76-3-402, that the 
8 Court reduce each one of those second degree felonies to third 
9 degree felonies and at the same time sentence Mr. Gall to a 
10 concurrent sentence of zero to five on — with any weapon 
11 J enhancement on those particular charges. 
12 J And I think with that, the argument can be made that 
13 the circumstances of this case, being guilty but mentally ill, 
14 that Mr. Gall deserves the benefit of that statute. Other than 
15 that, I would submit it. 
16 THE COURT: Ms. Cameron, do you want to respond to 
17 Mr. McCaugheyfs motion? 
18 MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, the State would object to 
19 any 402 motion given the circumstances of this case. And there 
20 seems to be no mitigating circumstances at all involved with 
21 this. The defendant is mentally ill, that does not, however, 
22 lessen his culpability for his behavior, therefore the State 
23 vehemently objects to any 402 reduction and encourages the 
24 I Court to sentence him consecutively on the sentences, one of 
25 | which does carry a weapons enhancement. 
THE COURT: All right. I am denying the motion for a 
402 reduction. This was a crime of extreme violence and a 402 
reduction is simply out of the question in this case. 
Mr. Gall, do you want to say anything to me before I 
sentence you on these two charges? 
THE DEFENDANT: I just want to say to the Court 
that — and everyone — that I recognize my responsibility for 
my motherfs death and I!m sorry to everyone for everything 
that's happened, especially to the Jenkins. I feel terrible 
about what's happened. I love my mom very much and I miss her. 
And also I have some concerns about the letters I 
wrote on the date of the incident, in it I wrote I killed my 
family for the same reason. My family may think I have some 
plans, intents, or desires to kill or harm them. I do not have 
any plans or intents or desires to kill any of them or harm any 
of them or anyone else. And that's all. 
THE COURT: All right. All right, Mr. Gall, thank 
you for those statements. 
A few words before sentencing. This case has been a 
tragedy, Mr. Gall, to you, to your family, and you recognize 
that, and your mother. It's also been, in a real sense, a 
tragedy for this entire community because of the inability to 
keep you safe and to keep your mother safe. If there's 
anything positive, I'm reluctant to even use that word with 
regard to this, is that perhaps legislation that was passed 
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1 subsequent to your motherfs death may help in preventing this 
2 happening to somebody else. 
3 Your mother spent a great deal of time working with 
4 you and working with the community to help people suffering 
5 from mental illnesses such as yours. I hope in the future we, 
6 as a community, are able to be of greater assistance. 
7 All right, I make the following findings: I find 
8 first that by clear and convincing evidence that you, Mr. Gall, 
9 are currently mentally ill, continue to be mentally ill. I!m 
10 also finding that because of your mental illness you pose an 
11 immediate physical danger to yourself and to others. 
12 Further, that the Department of Human Services is 
13 able to provide treatment, care, custody, and security that is 
14 adequate to meet your conditions and needs, therefore my 
15 sentence is as follows: I am committing — Ifm ordering that 
16 you serve as indeterminate term, on Count I, of 1 to 15 years; 
17 Count II, 1 to 15 years; in addition, an enhancement of 1 year 
18 to 5 years concerning the firearm. They are to run 
19 consecutively with each other. 
20 I am committing you to the Department of Human 
21 Services. You will remain at the Utah State Hospital. And I!m 
22 committing you under the code section 77-16a-202 (1), 
23 subsection (a) . And that leaves that the decision with regard 
24 to your transfer ultimately to the Department of Corrections 
25 and prison, as well as your decision — any future decision of 
23 
24 
25 
readmission to the Utah State Hospital to the Department of 
Human Services and to the Department of Corrections. 
My order further is that these commitments commence 
forthwith. 
Mr. Gall, you will be at the Utah State Hospital 
where you will get treatment and be safe for a long period of 
time. And that's frankly my goal I think for almost everybody 
in this case from the very beginning. You — today you look 
better than If ve ever seen you, much clearer thinking. And I 
hope that the time at the Utah State Hospital has helped you 
and that you will be able to be safe and get treatment at the 
hospital. Okay. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey, thank you. Ms. Cameron, 
thank you. 
MS. CAMERON: Thank you. 
(Proceedings concluded at 2:24 p.m.) 
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Mental 111 
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty-Mentally 111 - Disposition: 09/10/2003 Guilty 
Mental 111 
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Case No: 011919226 
Date: May 03, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of MANSLAUGHTER a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
DEFENDANT TO BE IN CUSTODY OF DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES TO 
PROVIDE SERVICES. DEFENDANT TO REMAIN AT THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL. 
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT NOTE 
COURT ORDER 1-6 YEARS FOR WEAPONS ENHANCEMENT 
Dated this 3 day of N\0M 2 
JUDITHS ATHERTON ^ ,- . y, 
District Court Judged . A/ 
*• ,-6 tV 
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Appendix 
FORM 1 - GENERAL MATRIX 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT 
These are guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the offender. 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS 0 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS) 2 
4 
PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS 0 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS) 1 
(INCLUDES DUI & RECKLESS) 2 
(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC) 3 
4 
PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS 0 
(ADJUDICATIONS FOR OFFENSES THAT 1 
WOULD HAVE BEEN FELONIES IF 2 
COMMITTED BY AN ADULT)(THREE 3 
MISDEMEANOR ADJUDICATIONS EQUAL 4 
ONE FELONY ADJUDICATION) 
NONE 
ONE 
TWO 
THREE 
MORE THAN THREE 
NONE 
ONE 
TWO TO FOUR 
FIVE TO SEVEN 
MORE THAN SEVEN 
NONE 
ONE 
TWO TO FOUR 
MORE THAN FOUR 
SECURE PLACEMENT 
VIOLENCE HISTORY 
(PRIOR JUVENILE OR ADULT CONVICTION 
FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH INCLUDES USE 
OF A WEAPON, PHYSICAL FORCE, 
THREAT OF FORCE, OR SEXUAL ABUSE) 
WEAPONS USE IN CURRENT OFFENSE 
(ONLY WHEN CURRENT CONVICTION 
DOES NOT REFLECT WEAPON USE OR 
WHEN STATUTORY ENHANCEMENT IS 
NOT INVOLVED) 
TOTAL SCORE: 
0 NONE 
1 MISDEMEANOR 
2 3rd DEGREE FELONY 
3 2nd DEGREE FELONY 
4 1st DEGREE FELONY 
1 CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
2 ACTUAL POSSESSION 
3 DISPLAYED OR BRANDISHED 
4 ACTUAL USE 
6 INJURY CAUSED 
SUPERVISION HISTORY 
(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
SUPERVISION RISK 
(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
0 NO PRIOR SUPERVISION 
1 PRIOR SUPERVISION 
2 PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 
3 PRIOR REVOCATION 
4 ACT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER CURRENT 
SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
0 NO ESCAPES OR ABSCONDINGS 
1 FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFFENSE) OR OUTSTANDING WARRANT 
2 ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION 
3 ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM 
4 ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ROW 
V 
IV 
III 
II 
I 
16 + 
12-15 
8-11 
4 - 7 
0 -3 
CRIME CATEGORY 
fc £L O 
I -</) 
X 
-J 
< 
z 
RI
M
I 
U 
V 
IV 
III 
II 
I 
1st Degree 
10MOS 
Regular 
18MOST#16MO:f 9IV Probation Misde-meanors 
CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS: 40% of the shorter sentence is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS: 10% of the shorter sentence is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
Matrix timeframes refer to imprisonment only. Refer to the categorization of offenses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Utah Sentencing Commission, 
pursuant to its statutory authority and 
responsibility under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
25a-304, promulgates the following 2004 
Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines 
for adult criminal offenders. 
The Utah Sentencing Commission is 
charged to recommend and coordinate 
sentencing and release policy for both 
juvenile and adult offenders within the state 
of Utah. It consists of twenty-seven 
members who represent all facets of the 
justice systems: judges, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, legislators, victims, law 
enforcement, treatment specialists, ethnic 
minorities, corrections, parole authorities, 
and others. 
Changes from the 1998 Guidelines 
The 2004 Adult Sentencing and 
Release Guidelines include no changes to 
Form 1 (General Matrix), Form 2 (Sex 
Offender Matrix), or Form 3 (Aggravating 
and Mitigating Circumstances Associated 
With Mandatory Imprisonment Sentences). 
Form 4 (Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances) now includes an additional 
aggravating circumstance for financial or 
theft crimes. Consistent with prior practice, 
the lists of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances are not exhaustive. 
Addendum B, which categorizes 
felony offenses, has been updated to 
include offenses previously omitted and 
offenses enacted by the legislature since 
the implementation of the 1998 Guidelines. 
Finally, the text of the manual has 
been updated and revised, although it 
remains essentially the same as the 1998 
Guidelines. 
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Philosophy Statement 
The goal of the guidelines is to bring 
more objectivity to the sentencing and 
release process yet also allow the court or 
the Board of Pardons and Parole discretion 
in considering aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. The guidelines provide for 
consideration of the following factors: 
• Severity of the offense; 
• Utah penal statutes; 
• Crime history and risk to society; 
• Prosecutorial, judicial, and parole 
board discretion; and 
• Continuum of sanctions 
Sanctions should be proportionate to 
the severity of the current offense. 
Guidelines should reflect the culpability of 
the offender based on the nature of the 
current offense and the offender's role 
coupled with the offender's supervision 
history and overall likelihood to recidivate as 
inferred by the offender's "Criminal History 
Assessment." The Adult Sentencing and 
Release Guidelines reflect these basic 
concepts of justice. 
Criminal punishment should focus 
on the particular circumstances of each 
crime, offender, and victim involved. 
Guidelines should promote uniformity while, 
at the same time, afford the sentencing 
judge and Board of Pardons and Parole the 
flexibility to fashion a specific sentence to 
an individual offender. The guidelines 
facilitate individualized sentences by 
establishing matrices that include a variety 
of sentencing options to accommodate a 
continuum of sanctions such as regular 
probation, intermediate sanctions, and 
imprisonment. Aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances also enhance discretion and 
encourage individualized sentencing and 
release decisions. 
While decision makers are strongly 
encouraged to abide by the guidelines, 
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departures from the guidelines will 
sometimes be necessary. These 
departures should be based upon 
aggravating or mitigating factors, and the 
Sentencing Commission strongly 
encourages decision makers to articulate 
these factors on the record. 
Statement of Purpose 
The sentencing of criminal offenders 
is a complex process with many related 
decision points. For sentencing purposes, 
the process starts with the prosecutor's 
decision regarding the specific charges to 
be filed and what, if any, plea to negotiate. 
If the defendant is convicted, the judge 
typically refers the offender to the 
Department of Corrections for a 
presentence investigation. The 
presentence investigator reviews the 
background of the offender, documents the 
nature of the offense and its impact on the 
victim, and then makes recommendations to 
the judge concerning the sentence to be 
imposed and any conditions associated with 
that sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 64-
13-20. The judge then imposes sentence. 
A variety of options are available to 
the judge including an increasing number of 
intermediate sanctions. The most severe of 
all sentencing options involve the Utah 
Department of Corrections. Correctional 
resources are severely overtaxed and there 
has been concern about policy to help 
allocate those resources. The guidelines 
assist decision makers in the appropriate 
allocation of these limited resources. If the 
judge sentences the offender to prison, 
custody of the offender transfers to the Utah 
Department of Corrections, and jurisdiction 
and the decision of how long the offender 
remains under prison custody transfers to 
the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
Guidelines as a Tool 
Utah law provides the basis for the 
sentencing and release of criminal 
offenders. By sound design these statutes 
allow significant latitude in decision-making. 
The guidelines are an attempt to further 
structure decision making relative to 
sentencing and release, yet still retain the 
flexibility to deal with individual cases. The 
guidelines also provide a means of 
identifying and allocating required 
resources. Utah's guidelines are intended 
to maintain judicial and parole board 
discretion, and at the same time incorporate 
a rational criminal justice philosophy, 
eliminate unwarranted disparity, and provide 
a tool to match resources with needs. 
The guidelines, as structured, 
provide a forum for discussion regarding 
sentencing and a common frame of 
reference on which to base discussion. 
Equally important, they provide a means to 
look into the future and assess the demand 
for resources based on policy changes. 
Action Research Approach 
Although the foundation of the 
guidelines is sound, they need to be 
revisited, monitored, and evaluated on a 
regular basis. One of the primary directions 
of the Utah Sentencing Commission is to 
provide this review. The guidelines are not 
intended to set policy in concrete. Because 
the philosophy, functioning, and problems of 
the criminal justice system fluctuate 
constantly, the guidelines should be 
adaptable to change, and should even 
encourage such change. Through general 
monitoring of how the guidelines are used, 
they can be modified to accommodate 
changes in policy or practice. 
Utah Sentencing Commission 2 
2004 Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines 
POLICY IMPLICIT IN THE 
GUIDELINES 
These guidelines are a cooperative 
venture. No additional legislation is being 
proposed to coerce agencies to conform. 
The effort is to provide a mechanism for 
communication and improvement of key 
policy rather than to dictate practice by 
statute or rule. For the guidelines to 
function well, several policies are important. 
The policies need not be implemented 
exactly as stated, but their intent is critical. 
Prosecution 
Prosecutors may use the guidelines 
to determine the implications of charging 
and plea negotiations. The guidelines are 
intended to make the system predictable by 
making explicit the sentence an offender 
with a given background is likely to receive. 
Prosecutors should make it a policy to 
explain the effect of charging and plea 
negotiations in each individual case to the 
victim. 
Presentence Investigators 
Presentence investigations should 
be conducted on all felony convictions and 
class A misdemeanor sex offense 
convictions. Presentence investigations are 
beneficial to the Board of Pardons and 
Parole as well as to the court and should be 
completed even when the court may not 
deem it necessary in a particular case. 
Presentence investigations should have the 
guidelines forms attached when they are 
sent to the sentencing judge, the 
prosecutor, and the offender in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 and Utah 
Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-203. The 
recommendations made to the judge should 
conform to the guidelines unless 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances are 
documented. 
Sentencing Judges 
Sentencing judges may require that 
the guidelines forms be attached to all 
district court presentence investigations. 
Judges are encouraged to sentence within 
the guidelines unless they find aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances justifying 
departure. These circumstances should be 
stated in open court and included on the 
judgment and commitment order. 
In order to assist judges in 
sentencing, Utah law provides for a possible 
diagnostic evaluation. "In felony cases 
where the court is of the opinion 
imprisonment may be appropriate but 
desires more detailed information as a basis 
for determining the sentence to be imposed 
than has been provided by the presentence 
report, the court may in its discretion commit 
a convicted defendant to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for a diagnostic 
evaluation for a period not exceeding 90 
days." Utah code Ann. § 76-3-404. Such a 
referral involves the use of scarce resources 
and should be reserved for an in-depth 
review and assessment to provide the 
sentencing judge with the necessary 
information to make the appropriate 
sentence. This statutory authority and 
accompanying resources are intended to 
enhance the assessment capabilities in 
sentencing and are not intended to provide 
shock incarceration for the offender. When 
seeking to supplement a presentence report 
with a psychological evaluation, the court 
may also consider community resources 
other than the diagnostic unit at the 
Department of Corrections. 
Board of Pardons and Parole 
The Board of Pardons and Parole 
requires an updated guidelines form to be 
completed on each offender appearing for 
an original parole grant hearing. In many 
cases, additional events have occurred 
between the time of the court's first 
sentencing decision and the first 
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appearance before the Board (e.g., new 
convictions, program successes or failures, 
escapes, etc.). Except where there are 
aggravating or mitigating factors, the Board 
is encouraged to make decisions 
compatible with the guidelines. A statement 
of general rationale for Board decisions is 
provided to the offender and made available 
to the public. 
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Utah Sentencing and Release 
Guidelines Instructions 
Under the direction of the Utah 
Sentencing Commission, these 2004 Adult 
Sentencing and Release Guidelines 
represent a cooperative effort by all the 
components of the Utah criminal justice 
system to make a unified statement of 
policy regarding the sentencing and release 
of adult criminal offenders. The dominant 
underlying philosophy of the guidelines is 
that criminal sentences should be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offense for which the offender was 
convicted. Other major policies are inherent 
in the guidelines. These are the offender's 
overall culpability based on the nature of the 
current offense and the offender's role 
coupled with the supervision history and 
likelihood to recidivate, as inferred from the 
offender's criminal history. The guidelines 
provide predictability by communicating a 
standard in sentencing and releasing and 
thereby allow all parts of the system to have 
a good idea of the disposition and penalty 
associated with the conviction. 
Except for consecutive and 
concurrent enhancements, all statutory 
sentencing enhancements are not included 
in the context of these guidelines. For 
example, Utah law concerning repeat and 
habitual sex offenders, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-407, or gang enhancements, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1, are to be 
considered outside and in addition to these 
guidelines. 
Form 1 - General Matrix 
Criminal History Assessment 
The purpose of the Criminal History 
Assessment is to provide a standard frame 
of reference to reduce or enhance the 
severity of the sentence based on the prior 
criminal and supervision history of the 
offender. Only score the single highest 
point option within a given category. Do not 
check multiple scores in a single category 
and then add them. 
Prior Adult Felony Convictions 
Do not count the current offense or 
offenses. Prior felony convictions are 
limited to adult convictions. Only 
convictions should be counted. Other 
instances such as dismissed cases, 
intelligence information, numerous prior 
arrests, etc. may be considered in the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
section but are not quantified in the 
guidelines. Where military records are 
available, court martial information should 
be included if the charges are criminal in 
nature. 
Utah law defines "single criminal 
episode" as "all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401. If 
multiple convictions arise from a single 
criminal episode, as statutorily defined, only 
one conviction should be counted. 
Prior Adult Misdemeanor Convictions 
This item is scored similarly to the 
one above. Traffic crimes should be 
excluded with the exception of DUI and 
reckless driving convictions. 
Prior Juvenile Adjudications 
This item specifically scores the 
juvenile record. Only adjudications that 
would be criminal convictions if committed 
by an adult should be counted; do not count 
status offenses. Such adjudications should 
be calculated in the same manner as 
generally explained in the Prior Adult Felony 
Convictions and Prior Adult Misdemeanor 
Convictions categories. Only those cases 
that resulted in a finding of delinquency 
should count. In other words, some 
adjudication of guilt in the juvenile system 
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must be found before points are allotted 
here. Care must be exercised since not 
every entry on a juvenile record represents 
an adjudication. 
For purposes of calculating in this 
category, three misdemeanor offenses 
equal one felony. Do not "round up" in 
these cases, i.e., less than 3 misdemeanors 
= 0 felonies; 3 - 5 misdemeanors = 1 
felony; 6 - 8 misdemeanors = 2 felonies, 
etc. Status offenses are offenses that 
would not be illegal if committed by an adult, 
e.g., truancy or smoking. 
The final option in the prior juvenile 
adjudications category indicates that four 
points are awarded if the offender 
experienced a secure placement in the 
juvenile system. Only a commitment to 
secure care qualifies for this option. 
Supervision History 
This item encompasses both 
juvenile and adult history. Only post-
adjudication or post-conviction supervision 
should be counted. Pre-trial detention or 
jail, for example, would not constitute 
supervision history for these purposes. The 
term "revocation" includes situations where 
findings of fact hearings have demonstrated 
that the conditions of supervision had been 
violated, but the judge or Board of Pardons 
and Parole chose to continue supervision 
without revocation. The item entitled "act 
occurred while under current supervision or 
pretrial release" refers to the situation at the 
time the offense occurred. For points to be 
assigned in this Supervision History 
category, both the prior and present 
offenses should be criminal in nature. 
Traffic violations and status offenses for 
juveniles certified to the adult system should 
not be counted. 
Supervision Risk 
This item penalizes those who have 
absconded or escaped from court ordered 
supervision in the past, as either a juvenile 
or an adult. The more restrictive the 
supervision, the greater the penalty. Those 
who "fail to report" for court, presentence 
investigation, or supervision, receive one 
point. "Absconding" is when an offender 
leaves the facility without permission; or 
fails to return at a prescribed time. If an 
offender is under supervision, absconding 
occurs when he changes his residence . . . 
without notifying his parole officer or 
obtaining permission or when the offender, 
for the purpose of avoiding supervision: 
hides at a different location from his 
reported residence; or leaves his reported 
residence. Absconding receives two points 
if the placement is non-residential and three 
points if the supervision is residential in 
nature. Scoring points for absconding does 
not require a conviction because 
absconding is not a crime. 
"A prisoner is guilty of escape if he 
leaves official custody without 
authorization." Utah Code § 76-8-309(1). If 
the offender "escapes" from a secure 
(locked door or secure perimeter) 
confinement setting, four points are allotted. 
Only convictions for escape should be 
counted unless the offender could have 
been charged with escape or absconding 
but was, instead, charged or convicted of 
another crime while on escape status. 
Violence History 
This category is intended to 
document any violence that may have 
accompanied any prior criminal offense(s). 
Only count prior convictions. The guidelines 
contain a graduated scale of points to be 
allotted depending upon the past violent 
offense. One point is allotted for a 
misdemeanor, two points for a third degree 
felony, three points for a second degree 
felony, and four points for a first degree 
felony as indicated on Forms 1 and 2. 
Other incidents of documented violence that 
are not convictions in and of themselves 
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may be considered under Form 4 -
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances. 
Weapons Use in Current Offense 
In addition to the violence history 
category of the criminal history assessment, 
the guidelines emphasize the use of a 
weapon in the current offense(s) as a factor 
that may increase the criminal history score. 
Do not consider this category for any prior 
convictions as is the case in all other 
criminal history categories. This category is 
also to be considered only when the current 
conviction does not reflect the use of the 
weapon or when there is no statutory 
weapons enhancement involved. For 
example, if it is apparent that the offender 
was convicted of first degree felony 
aggravated robbery instead of second 
degree robbery because of the use of a 
weapon; do not additionally consider this 
category. Likewise, if an offender receives 
the dangerous weapons enhancement, do 
not additionally consider this category. 
The point allocation in this category 
depends upon the use of the weapon: 
Constructive Possession, for purposes of 
the guidelines, occurs when the offender 
has access to the weapon but it is not on his 
or her person. For example, there was a 
firearm in the glove compartment or a knife 
in a gym bag in the vicinity. One point is 
allotted for constructive possession. Actual 
Possession, for purposes of the guidelines, 
occurs when the offender has the weapon 
on his or her person. For example, a 
handgun in a pocket. Two points are 
allotted for actual possession. Weapon 
displayed or brandished results in three 
points being allotted. Weapon actually used 
results in four points being allotted. This 
occurs, for example, when an offender 
points or fires a gun, uses a knife in close 
proximity to the victim, or swings a baseball 
bat. Weapon used and injury caused 
results in six points being allotted, 
regardless of the seriousness of the injury. 
(Again, consider this entire category only if 
the conviction, itself, does not reflect the 
weapons use or when no dangerous 
weapons enhancement is being 
considered.) 
As mentioned, this category is the 
only occasion when the current conviction is 
considered in the criminal history portion of 
Form 1. Otherwise, current convictions are 
considered only in determining the 
appropriate column of the matrix or in 
aggravating and mitigating factors. 
Admittedly, considering the current 
conviction in the criminal history 
assessment creates an anomaly in the 
guidelines. However, the Sentencing 
Commission considers the use of a weapon 
to be such a significant factor in determining 
both placement and release decisions in 
sentencing, it is addressed in the guidelines 
in this manner. 
Total Score 
To arrive at this score, add up the 
points associated with each category in the 
Criminal History Assessment. 
Criminal History Row 
Using the Total Score, identify the 
appropriate criminal history row: I, II, III, IV, 
or V using the chart labeled "Criminal 
History Row." 
General Matrix 
The rows of this matrix represent 
differing levels of criminal history and 
correspond with the total score from the 
criminal history assessment. The columns 
represent crime categories and correspond 
with the most serious current offense. The 
columns list both a felony level and a crime 
category (murder, death, person, or other). 
The various levels of shading in the matrix 
represent suggested dispositions 
(disregarding aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances). 
Utah Sentencing Commission 7 
2004 Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines 
The crime category columns 
generally flow from left to right indicating the 
most severe sanction to the least severe 
sanction. However, this does not 
necessarily indicate which crimes are more 
severe than others. Some cells recommend 
a more severe placement than the cell 
immediately to its right (e.g. prison vs. 
intermediate sanction), but the length of 
stay may actually be shorter than in the cell 
immediately to the right. 
To determine the guidelines' 
recommended disposition, locate the cell 
where the appropriate crime category 
column and criminal history row intersect. 
The proper crime category column is based 
on: (1) the felony level of the most serious 
presenting offense; and (2) the crime 
category. Addendum B identifies the 
specific category for every felony offense 
(murder, death, person, or other). 
If there are multiple current offenses, 
refer to Addendum A, Crime Column Listing, 
to determine which offense is the most 
severe and which column should be used. 
This listing will also indicate which matrix 
should be used when current offenses 
include both sex offenses and non-sex 
offenses. 
As indicated earlier, to determine the 
proper criminal history row, calculate the 
total criminal history assessment score and 
use the chart labeled "Criminal History 
Score" to identify the row that corresponds 
with that score. 
After having identified the proper 
crime category column and criminal history 
row, locate the cell where the column and 
row intersect. That cell includes the 
guidelines' recommendation regarding 
sentencing disposition and the typical length 
of stay if the offender is sentenced to prison. 
The level of shading in that box identifies 
the suggested or mandatory sentencing 
disposition (probation, intermediate 
sanctions, imprisonment, or mandatory 
imprisonment). Split cells containing dual 
shading indicate that the guidelines 
recommend either placement. 
Mandatory Imprisonment 
Utah law mandates imprisonment for 
all offenders convicted of murder. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-406. Thus, the guidelines 
indicate a mandatory imprisonment 
sentence for murder, regardless of the 
criminal history row. Murder, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203, is the only offense 
considered in crime category A. 
Aggravated murder is not considered at all 
on the Adult Sentencing and Release 
Guidelines. 
Utah law mandates imprisonment for 
other offenses and mandatory jail for some 
offenses if the prison sentence is stayed. 
However, Form 1 - General Matrix does not 
indicate all mandatory incarceration 
sentences. Doing so would unnecessarily 
complicate the matrix when a review of the 
applicable statute will suffice. 
Time Enumerated within Individual Cells 
The length of time enumerated 
within each cell is the typical length of stay if 
the offender is imprisoned. These times 
apply only if the offender is sentenced to 
prison and do not apply if the offender is 
sentenced to an intermediate sanction or to 
regular probation. If there is only one active 
sentence, the typical guideline term is 
determined by simply identifying the cell 
where the appropriate crime category 
column intersects with the criminal history 
row. The times located within cells found in 
the mandatory imprisonment shaded area 
are not mandatory minimums. 
In rare cases, the statutory minimum 
length of stay in prison may be higher than 
the typical length of stay provided in an 
individual cell. This will happen only when 
the statutory minimum for a crime is longer 
than the usual statutory minimum for that 
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felony level. For example, a drive-by 
shooting is a third degree felony punishable 
by three to five years in prison. It is 
possible that the typical prison term 
indicated in the matrix will be less than three 
years since most third degree felonies are 
punishable by zero to five years in prison. 
In cases where the statutory minimum 
exceeds the typical length of stay provided 
in the matrix, the typical length of stay 
should be ignored. 
Consecutive or concurrent 
When multiple offenses are before 
the court, "[t]he court shall state on the 
record and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment: (a) if the 
sentences imposed are to run concurrently 
or consecutively to each other; and (b) if the 
sentences before the court are to run 
concurrently or consecutively with any other 
sentences the defendant is currently 
serving." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). 
State statute requires the court to consider 
the following factors in determining whether 
sentences shall run concurrently or 
consecutively: 
• Gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses 
• Number of victims 
• History, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
"The court shall order that sentences 
for state offenses run consecutively if the 
later offense is committed while the 
defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentencing would 
be inappropriate." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(3). 
If multiple convictions are ordered to 
run concurrently, the guidelines add 10% of 
the recommended length of stay of the 
shorter sentence to the full recommended 
length of the longer sentence. For example, 
consider an offender convicted of 
aggravated robbery with a recommended 
length of stay of 7 years (84 months) and 
also convicted of aggravated assault with a 
recommendation of 20 months. If the court 
orders the sentences to run concurrently, 
the guidelines recommend a length of stay 
of 86 months (10% of 20 mos = 2 mos + 84 
mos = 86 mos). 
If multiple convictions are ordered to 
run consecutively, the guidelines add 40% 
of the recommended length of stay of the 
shorter sentence to the full recommended 
length of the longer sentence. Using the 
same example above, if the sentences were 
consecutive, the guidelines would 
recommend a length of stay of 92 months 
(40% of 20 mos = 8 mos + 84 mos = 92 
mos). This same approach applies even if 
there are three or more sentences being 
considered. 
For another example, consider an 
offender convicted of robbery and 
sentenced to prison with a guidelines 
recommendation of 48 months. The 
offender is paroled after 36 months and, 
while on parole, commits aggravated 
burglary and is sentenced to prison with a 
guidelines recommendation of nine years. If 
the judge orders the sentences to run 
consecutively, the new guidelines 
recommended sentence is 9 years, 5 
months (40% of 12 mos (which is the time 
remaining on the original sentence) = 4.8 
mos + nine years = approximately 9 years, 
5 months). 
If there are a string of multiple 
offenses that are running consecutively or 
concurrently, add the applicable percentage 
of all of the shorter sentences to the longest 
sentence. For example, consider an 
offender convicted of 1) aggravated assault 
with a recommendation of 24 months, 2) a 
drug offense with a recommendation of 20 
months, and 3) forgery with a 
recommendation of 10 months. If the judge 
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orders the sentences to run concurrently, 
add 10% of both the drug offense and the 
forgery to the 24 months for the aggravated 
assault. The guideline recommendation 
would total 27 months (10% of 20 mos = 2 
mos; 10% of 10 mos = 1 mos; 2 mos + 1 
mos = 3 mos; 3 mos + 24 mos = 27 mos). 
Occasionally, the "longer" sentence 
may not be from the most "severe" offense 
as indicated by the Crime Column Listing 
(by severity) as explained above. In these 
exceptional cases, consider the sentence 
for the most severe offense to be the 
"longest" sentence for purposes of 
calculating concurrent and consecutive 
sentences. This is done to preserve 
consistency in guidelines application. 
All guidelines considerations of 
concurrent and consecutive sentencing 
should be consistent with the limitations in 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401. 
Conditions of Intermediate Sanctions and 
Regular Probation 
Intermediate sanctions include any 
sanction between regular probation and 
prison. In Utah, courts sometimes attach 
special conditions to a probationary 
sentence which makes the sentence more 
than regular probation. For the purpose of 
the guidelines, typical conditions of 
probation often include payment of 
restitution, attendance in counseling, drug 
testing, search and seizure clauses, 
community service, etc. These conditions 
ordinarily do not rise to the level of being 
special, and therefore do not transform 
regular probation into an intermediate 
sanction. 
The concept of intermediate 
sanctions is that the higher the risk an 
offender poses in the community, the more 
controls are placed on the offender. These 
controls are intermediate sanctions. They 
include such things as electronic monitoring, 
referral to the day reporting centers, 
participation in residential treatment 
programming, intensive supervision, etc. 
These are the special conditions referred to 
above. These programs always have 
increased levels of supervision. In addition, 
because of the increased supervision, these 
sanctions are more costly than regular 
probation. As such, these intermediate 
sanctions should be viewed from the 
perspective that because they are limited, 
the court should carefully select those 
offenders who need them in conjunction 
with the Department of Corrections. 
It is important to note that the higher 
the risk an offender presents in the 
community, the more intermediate sanctions 
an offender may access. For instance, an 
offender may be on intensive supervision 
and electronic monitoring and also be 
attending the day reporting center. 
Obviously, because of the cost of these 
programs, it is important that all the services 
accessed are necessary. Therefore, the 
separation of regular probation and 
intermediate sanctions has to do with cost 
and level of supervision as indicated by the 
special conditions attached. There is no 
bright line between regular probation and 
intermediate sanctions and this fact ought to 
be considered in sentencing. 
Form 2 - Sex Offender Matrix 
These are the sentencing and 
release guidelines to be used for all sex 
offenders. Specifically, offenses to be 
considered under this portion of the 
guidelines include: 
• offenses that require registration 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-
21.5(1)(e); 
• aggravated kidnapping, § 76-5-302; 
• custodial sexual relations or 
misconduct, § 76-5-412; 
• custodial sexual relations or 
misconduct with a youth receiving 
state services, § 76-5-413; and 
• sexual battery, § 76-9-702(3). 
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Aggravated kidnapping may be scored on 
Form 1 if the offense does not involve a 
sexual component. 
Criminal History Assessment 
The Criminal History Assessment is 
only slightly different than that used under 
Form 1 for all other offenders. Two 
additional categories exist on the Criminal 
History Assessment for sex offenders: 
Number of Prior Victims and Time Range. 
The factors related to the likelihood of sex 
offenders to commit additional sex offenses 
are specific to a history of sexual deviancy 
and situations resulting in sexual arousal. 
The added categories of Number of Prior 
Victims and Time Range are designed to 
address these factors. Other than these 
two additional categories, the Criminal 
History Assessment for sex offenders 
should be scored identically to Form 1. 
In an extensive study on mandatory 
minimum sentences for sex offenders, the 
Sentencing Commission found, among 
other things, that sex offenders were quite 
different than other offenders. See Utah 
Sentencing Commission Annual Report 
1995-1996] Utah Statistical Analysis Center, 
Analysis of Utah's Child Kidnaping and 
Sexual Abuse Act of 1983. Mandatory 
imprisonment, lifetime parole, treatment 
resources, and the separate guidelines 
matrix resulted from this study. Form 2 
reflects the amended laws mandating 
imprisonment for certain sex offenders in 
conjunction with differing indeterminate 
lengths of stay ranges. In addition, there 
are only three criminal history rows on the 
sex offender matrix compared to five on the 
general matrix. This provides the Board of 
Pardons and Parole with more discretion 
concerning sex offenders. 
Number of Prior Victims 
This category documents whether 
the offender had prior victims in any sex 
offense convictions not including the 
present offense. Zero points are allotted for 
no prior victims, three points allotted for one 
prior victim, and four points for more than 
one prior victim in any of these prior sex 
offense convictions. This victimization does 
not have to arise out of a single criminal 
episode. However, before any points are 
allotted under this section, there must be a 
specific conviction involving the victim or 
victims counted. 
Time Range 
This category quantifies the length of 
time the offender has been offending 
sexually and is based on sex offense 
convictions. If the offender has any sex 
offense conviction over two years old, four 
points are allotted. Three points are allotted 
if the offender has any sex offense 
conviction more than one year old and less 
than two years old. Two points are allotted 
for any conviction within the last year 
excluding the present offense, and one 
point for the present offense. The date of 
conviction is determinative for purposes of 
this section. 
Sex Offense Disposition Matrix 
The sex offender matrix on Form 2 is 
obviously different than the Form 1 matrix. 
However, they both function similarly. 
Simply identify the appropriate crime 
category column and intersect it with the 
appropriate criminal history row to 
determine the suggested or mandatory 
disposition. Addendum B lists the crime 
categories for all sex offenses. Addendum 
A identifies the appropriate column if more 
than one sex offense is currently before the 
court. As with Form 1, the criminal history 
row is located by calculating the total 
criminal history score and using the chart 
labeled "Criminal History Row." 
Utah law mandates imprisonment for 
certain sex offenses regardless of the 
criminal history score. This is reflected in 
the crime category columns and the 
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disposition shading. In rare cases, Utah law 
does allow for an alternative sentence to 
prison for otherwise mandatory 
imprisonment sex offenses. However, an 
arduous list of circumstances must be met 
before such a deviation is allowed. These 
circumstances are enumerated under Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-406.5. 
As on Form 1, split cells with dual 
shading indicate the guidelines recommend 
either placement. 
Form 3 - Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances Associated with Offenses 
with Three Alternative Minimum Lengths 
of Stay 
As mentioned, certain sex offenses 
mandate imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-406. For all but one of these offenses, 
three alternative minimum terms may be 
imposed. "[T]he court shall order imposition 
of the term of middle severity unless there 
are circumstances in aggravation or 
mitigation of the crime." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201 (7)(a). "In determining a just 
sentence, the court shall consider 
guidelines regarding aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances promulgated by 
the Sentencing Commission." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201 (7)(e). In accordance with 
the above statutory directive, the 
Sentencing Commission has, in Form 3, 
promulgated aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances for sex offenses with three 
alternative minimum terms and Form 3 
should be used in determining which of 
those three terms will be imposed by the 
court. Form 3 is not an exclusive list. 
Form 4 - Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances 
There are occasionally 
circumstances that compel deviation from 
the guidelines. Some of the more common 
reasons are listed for convenience on Form 
4. Other reasons, as they occur, can be 
specified. Reasons should always be 
specified when the guideline sentence is not 
recommended. These aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances should be 
considered for both Form 1 - General 
Matrix and Form 2 - Sex Offender Matrix. 
In considering all aggravating and 
mitigating factors in a particular case, the 
number of each should not merely be added 
up or otherwise mechanically applied in the 
balancing process. Rather, the totality of 
the mitigating factors should be compared 
against the totality of the aggravating 
factors. Any one mitigating factor, standing 
alone, could outweigh some or all of the 
aggravating circumstances in the case. On 
the other hand, one aggravating factor, 
standing alone, could outweigh some or all 
of the mitigating factors in the case. The 
guidelines are concerned with the 
respective substance and persuasiveness 
of the competing factors, not their relative 
numbers. Also, do not list an aggravating 
factor in either form if it is already an 
element of the offense. 
Aggravating factor #2 on Form 4 
states "Multiple documented incidents of 
violence not resulting in conviction." In 
order for these "documented incidents of 
violence" to be counted, there must exist a 
court approved stipulation that such 
incidents will be considered. The intent of 
this requirement, along with having a certain 
standard of verification, is to assure that all 
are aware at the time of conviction that such 
documented incidents will be counted on 
the guidelines and considered in both the 
sentencing and release decisions. 
Days of Credit 
Time incarcerated under the 
following circumstances should be counted 
as time served against the maximum 
sentence: (1) a conviction is set aside and 
there is a subsequent commitment for the 
same criminal conduct; (2) a commitment is 
made to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to 
a guilty and mentally ill conviction; (3) time 
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is spent in custody outside the State of Utah 
based solely on the Utah warrant; (4) the 
Board of Pardons and Parole deems such 
credit just under the circumstances; (5) 
credit is otherwise required by law. Utah 
Admin. R671-205-1. No credit is given for 
time spent in custody at the Utah State 
Hospital or comparable non-prison 
psychiatric facility while the offender is 
judicially declared incompetent. 
Guideline Matrix Recommendation 
The guideline sentence without 
regard to aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances should be documented here. 
AP&P Recommendation 
The recommendation of Adult 
Probation and Parole should be 
documented here. 
Reason for Departure 
Any reasons for departure should be 
documented by the presentence 
investigator in every case in which the 
guideline recommendation is not followed. 
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